Northern line train evacuation at Clapham Common

matt_world2004 · 2 Jun 2023

bramling said:
The only thing is, in this case there was no fire. Indeed my understanding is there wasn’t even smoke, just a strong burning smell.

These trains have always given out burning smells at times. In times past it was common, if not standard, practice for drivers to get the speed off the clock between High Barnet and Totteridge southbound, which with heavy braking from potentially 60 mph would give a very strong burning smell. Although the trains have regenerative braking, this relies on the traction current system being able to accept the regenerated energy, otherwise it reverts to being dissipated as heat. It doesn’t take too much imagination to consider what this smells like if the driver has just slammed the brakes on full service from 60+ mph, especially if there’s some dirt on the resistors. This particular practice is firmly in the past, but it’s still possible to heat up the brakes on these trains at times.

I have a suspicion that the bigger issue in this incident was the fire panel on the station being put into evac by people pressing call points on the platform (from where any burning smell would have been very evident). The panel going into evac puts an evacuation message on the station PA which is designed to sound urgent, and of course which people on the train would have heard.

For their part, LU do not publicise much information on what to do in an emergency, which is quite surprising really. Indeed certain trains used to have quite detailed posters - the 59 stock certainly did, and so did the 92 stock when new. By contrast the information displayed on the 95 stock is pretty basic. It isn’t something many passengers give much thought to, which is always going to cause a problem on the rare occasions something does happen. One day LU are going get burned by this IMO

I think it was a combination of the two. The burning smell would have ignited their suspicions and the evacuation message would have reinforced them

RailUK Forums

Nicholas Lewis · 2 Jun 2023

LUYMun said:
Leaving the train is one matter, doing so while a mass panic ensues is another.

The fact is panic drives itself once started majority of people lose all reasoning and just follow the herd so not unexpected behaviour which no controlled trial done as part of Crossrail testing can ever hope to recreate so its great RAIB are doing an investigation.

Mojo · 8 May 2024

The RAIB report into this incident has now been published

Report 03/2024: Uncontrolled evacuation of a partially platformed train at Clapham Common London Underground station

RAIB has today released its report into an uncontrolled evacuation of a partially platformed train at Clapham Common London Underground station, 5 May 2023.

www.gov.uk

At around 17:43 hrs on Sunday 5 May 2023, a London Underground train departing from Clapham Common station was brought to a halt by a passenger emergency alarm activation after smoke and a smell of burning entered the train. The train came to a stand with two cars inside the tunnel and four cars adjacent to the platform. The train’s doors remained closed. Around 100 of the train’s (estimated) 500 passengers subsequently self-evacuated onto the platform through the interconnecting doors between the train’s cars and the train’s windows, some of which were broken by passengers either inside the train or on the station platform. Station staff began opening the train’s doors around four and a half minutes after the train came to a stand.

The incident resulted in minor injuries being reported by a few passengers. However, it had the potential to have more serious consequences, not least because Clapham Common station has a narrow island platform which increases the risk of passengers falling onto the track and potentially being exposed to conductor rails and trains approaching on the adjacent southbound line.

RAIB’s investigation found that passengers perceived a significant risk from fire, and that they became increasingly alarmed when the train’s doors remained closed and they did not receive suitable information or see any effective action from London Underground staff.

An underlying factor to the incident was that operational staff were not provided with the procedures or training needed to effectively identify and manage incidents where passenger behaviour can rapidly escalate. A possible underlying factor was that London Underground did not fully apply and retain learning from a previous similar incident at Holland Park station. Additionally, a further possible underlying factor was that London Underground had not identified the risk of passenger self-evacuation from partially platformed trains, including those taking place at narrow island platforms.

Recommendations
RAIB has made three recommendations, all addressed to London Underground. The first relates to procedures and training to ensure that staff have clear guidance on how to deal with out-of-course events. The second relates to learning from previous incidents not being lost and to recommendations being tracked through to implementation. The third recommendation is that London Underground review its risk assessment processes so that the risks associated with out-of-course events and at specific locations are effectively identified and assessed.

Nicholas Lewis · 8 May 2024

Mojo said:
The RAIB report into this incident has now been published

Report 03/2024: Uncontrolled evacuation of a partially platformed train at Clapham Common London Underground station

RAIB has today released its report into an uncontrolled evacuation of a partially platformed train at Clapham Common London Underground station, 5 May 2023.

www.gov.uk

Not sure how RAIB can use statements like

A possible underlying factor was that London Underground did not fully apply and retain learning from a previous similar incident at Holland Park station. Additionally, a further possible underlying factor was that London Underground had not identified the risk of passenger self-evacuation from partially platformed trains, including those taking place at narrow island platforms.

The purpose of the investigation was surely to establish whether LU had properly trained staff and learnt lessons from previous incidents.

Peter Mugridge · 8 May 2024

Nicholas Lewis said:
The purpose of the investigation was surely to establish whether LU had properly trained staff and learnt lessons from previous incidents.

The way I'm reading that is that they hadn't learned and trained people properly, so the statement is within remit and is justified?

Goldfish62 · 8 May 2024

Nicholas Lewis said:
Not sure how RAIB can use statements like

A possible underlying factor was that London Underground did not fully apply and retain learning from a previous similar incident at Holland Park station. Additionally, a further possible underlying factor was that London Underground had not identified the risk of passenger self-evacuation from partially platformed trains, including those taking place at narrow island platforms.

The purpose of the investigation was surely to establish whether LU had properly trained staff and learnt lessons from previous incidents.

The report introduction explains this:

In some cases factors are described as ‘underlying’. Such factors are also relevant to the causation of the accident or incident but are associated with the underlying management arrangements or organisational issues (such as working culture). Where necessary, words such as ‘probable’ or ‘possible’ can also be used to qualify ‘underlying factor’. Use of the word ‘probable’ means that, although it is considered highly likely that the factor applied, some small element of uncertainty remains. Use of the word ‘possible’ means that, although there is some evidence that supports this factor, there remains a more significant degree of uncertainty

bramling · 8 May 2024

Nicholas Lewis said:
Not sure how RAIB can use statements like

A possible underlying factor was that London Underground did not fully apply and retain learning from a previous similar incident at Holland Park station. Additionally, a further possible underlying factor was that London Underground had not identified the risk of passenger self-evacuation from partially platformed trains, including those taking place at narrow island platforms.

The purpose of the investigation was surely to establish whether LU had properly trained staff and learnt lessons from previous incidents.

I do wonder how much value this investigation has delivered relative to its cost.

It’s a well-known issue that a passenger alarm operation that occurs as a train departs a platform is difficult to deal with, because none of the staff involved can directly communicate with each other.

RAIB haven’t really offered any solutions to this, just come up with a rather vague recommendation about staff training.

Essentially the staff involved in this incident seem to have done everything more-or-less correctly, albeit perhaps slightly slowly - and that slowness can be explained by the fact that there was a lot going on at the time.

The station staff were quite correct to have a level of reluctance to open train doors without having come to an understanding beforehand - as on LU trains it is quite possible for a train to move with doors open.

Had the train stopped 30 metres further on then it would have been entirely in tunnel, at which point the station staff would have become rather less relevant to the incident.

Towers · 9 May 2024

bramling said:
It’s a well-known issue that a passenger alarm operation that occurs as a train departs a platform is difficult to deal with, because none of the staff involved can directly communicate with each other.

The station staff were quite correct to have a level of reluctance to open train doors without having come to an understanding beforehand - as on LU trains it is quite possible for a train to move with doors open.

Had the train stopped 30 metres further on then it would have been entirely in tunnel, at which point the station staff would have become rather less relevant to the incident.

I’ve not read it yet; presumably had the alarm been operated with the train fully inside the tunnel, it would have continued to the next station anyway? Hopefully coming to a stop fully platformed and with the door able to be released.

I wasn’t aware that LUL stock can move with doors open, is there no interlock in place?

A lack of communication between those staff on the the train and platform seems a pretty basic failure of pragmatic system design!

bramling · 9 May 2024

Towers said:
I’ve not read it yet; presumably had the alarm been operated with the train fully inside the tunnel, it would have continued to the next station anyway?

In theory, however stop at the right moment and it could well end up wholly in the tunnel. Drivers will be likely to err on the side of stopping when departing a platform, due to the possibility of the alarm having been activated due to a dragging.

Towers said:
I wasn’t aware that LUL stock can move with doors open, is there no interlock in place?

The train can't motor, but it can roll.

Towers said:
A lack of communication between those staff on the the train and platform seems a pretty basic failure of pragmatic system design!

Yes it isn’t ideal, but it’s always been the case. In a perfect world control would act as the intermediate body and bring all the actions together. However this doesn’t account for them being busy, as they were on this occasion. Likewise the station staff were already dealing with other stuff as well.

What is possibly more of an issue is the lack of egress devices on LU trains. But again they would probably create more problems than solved. For their part I suspect few passengers have ever given thought to how they might evacuate a LU train if necessary to do it on their own initiative.

Towers · 9 May 2024

bramling said:
What is possibly more of an issue is the lack of egress devices on LU trains. But again they would probably create more problems than solved. For their part I suspect few passengers have ever given thought to how they might evacuate a LU train if necessary to do it on their own initiative.

I wonder if there is a reasonable basis for some type of ‘driver activated’ egress system, whereby the devices would only operate if the driver hits a switch to acknowledge that there is a legitimate need?

75A · 9 May 2024

If the 'incident' was at the opposite end of the train he may not know what's happening.

Dstock7080 · 9 May 2024

Towers said:
I wonder if there is a reasonable basis for some type of ‘driver activated’ egress system, whereby the devices would only operate if the driver hits a switch to acknowledge that there is a legitimate need?

The normal door open buttons are available to the driver and should be used in the most serious of circumstances.

edwin_m · 9 May 2024

Nicholas Lewis said:
Not sure how RAIB can use statements like

A possible underlying factor was that London Underground did not fully apply and retain learning from a previous similar incident at Holland Park station. Additionally, a further possible underlying factor was that London Underground had not identified the risk of passenger self-evacuation from partially platformed trains, including those taking place at narrow island platforms.

The purpose of the investigation was surely to establish whether LU had properly trained staff and learnt lessons from previous incidents.

That quote answers both your questions in the negative. The "possible" means that, had they done so, it might not have affected the outcome here. Even if trained fully there is always the risk of someone doing the wrong thing in the heat of the moment.

Dstock7080 said:
The normal door open buttons are available to the driver and should be used in the most serious of circumstances.

Even if, as pointed out in the report, it might have led to people trying to exit into the tunnel? Or simply falling out when the doors opened unexpectedly?

bramling said:
I do wonder how much value this investigation has delivered relative to its cost.

It’s a well-known issue that a passenger alarm operation that occurs as a train departs a platform is difficult to deal with, because none of the staff involved can directly communicate with each other.

RAIB haven’t really offered any solutions to this, just come up with a rather vague recommendation about staff training.

Essentially the staff involved in this incident seem to have done everything more-or-less correctly, albeit perhaps slightly slowly - and that slowness can be explained by the fact that there was a lot going on at the time.

The station staff were quite correct to have a level of reluctance to open train doors without having come to an understanding beforehand - as on LU trains it is quite possible for a train to move with doors open.

Had the train stopped 30 metres further on then it would have been entirely in tunnel, at which point the station staff would have become rather less relevant to the incident.

There's a clear lesson about the importance of keeping passengers informed - LUL had recognised this but there should be some thinking about priority versus other actions such as trying to contact Control. If the driver had put out a reassuring message after the first attempt to contact Control instead of trying them again, then the incident might have been averted.

Is the external door control part of the traction interlock? If so then perhaps platform staff should have the discretion to open the doors if they see a situation developing, and if stopped when partly out of the platform the driver should not release the brakes until someone confirms it is safe to do so (or does the passenger alarm then prevent any movement until reset anyway?).

Dstock7080 · 9 May 2024

edwin_m said:
Even if, as pointed out in the report, it might have led to people trying to exit into the tunnel? Or simply falling out when the doors opened unexpectedly?

Is the external door control part of the traction interlock? If so then perhaps platform staff should have the discretion to open the doors if they see a situation developing, and if stopped when partly out of the platform the driver should not release the brakes until someone confirms it is safe to do so (or does the passenger alarm then prevent any movement until reset anyway?).

There are now extreme circumstances that drivers are expected to operate the doors on both sides of the train in tunnel sections.

The outside door control is connected to the traction circuit.
A passenger alarm would also prevent movement within station limits, until reset.

bramling · 9 May 2024

edwin_m said:
That quote answers both your questions in the negative. The "possible" means that, had they done so, it might not have affected the outcome here. Even if trained fully there is always the risk of someone doing the wrong thing in the heat of the moment.

Even if, as pointed out in the report, it might have led to people trying to exit into the tunnel? Or simply falling out when the doors opened unexpectedly?

There's a clear lesson about the importance of keeping passengers informed - LUL had recognised this but there should be some thinking about priority versus other actions such as trying to contact Control. If the driver had put out a reassuring message after the first attempt to contact Control instead of trying them again, then the incident might have been averted.

Is the external door control part of the traction interlock? If so then perhaps platform staff should have the discretion to open the doors if they see a situation developing, and if stopped when partly out of the platform the driver should not release the brakes until someone confirms it is safe to do so (or does the passenger alarm then prevent any movement until reset anyway?).

The passenger alarm would prevent movement depending on where it was activated. If outside of station limits then no. However the driver has a switch which can be used to cut out the passenger alarm circuit. So it isn’t a guaranteed method of preventing the train from moving.

Theoretically you could have a situation where the controller authorises the driver to cut out the passenger alarm and continue to the next station, whilst station staff are operating the butterfly cock under their own initiative.

Now in a situation with cars full of smoke you could probably justify taking the risk operating the butterfly cock, on the basis that it’s *unlikely* the train is going to move (and there are a couple of ways someone with the relevant knowledge could then stop the train if they really needed to). However I wouldn’t expect station staff to be making these sorts of decisions without reference to control.

Worth remembering that presumably the station staff weren’t aware of the passenger alarm having been operated, so for all they knew the train could have been ready to move at any moment. The general thing on the railway is to take a moment to think before taking any action which could have safety-related consequences. Here the station staff seem to have done exactly that, they endeavoured to ensure they had come to a complete understanding before acting. In my view they should not be criticised for that. And their judgement was ultimately correct in that no one died or suffered serious injuries.

As alluded to above, there is a sequence of actions which someone with specific trains knowledge / experience could have done which would have allowed the butterfly cocks to have been released whilst - to some extent - addressing the potential pitfalls. Not appropriate to post precise details unfortunately.

LucyP · 9 May 2024

There is only one lesson to be learned here. When there is smoke and fire on a train and 4 of the carriages are at the platform, don't take 4.5 minutes to open the doors, of those carriages or the passengers on the train and other members of the public will quite rightly action their own evacuation plan for you.

WAB · 9 May 2024

bramling said:
Now in a situation with cars full of smoke you could probably justify taking the risk operating the butterfly cock, on the basis that it’s *unlikely* the train is going to move (and there are a couple of ways someone with the relevant knowledge could then stop the train if they really needed to). However I wouldn’t expect station staff to be making these sorts of decisions without reference to control.

Something that strikes me from your post and the RAIB report is the need for everything to be run via control, which would not have been the case in the past. If we are wanting to live in that world, both on the Tube and the big railway, then control needs to be resourced such that even when there are multiple incidents ongoing simultaneously, anything that is beyond a routine call is answered straight away by someone who can put in place anything that needs doing immediately. If that sort of resourcing is not viable, then in critical situations, local staff need to be able to make the kinds of judgements necessary to avoid this sort of situation.

DavyCrocket · 9 May 2024

Would LU support someone if they carried out a safe action based on the situation at the time, to reduce harm, but not following the Rule? Doubtful, especially once the hindsight brigade get involved that don’t have to make decisions.

As mentioned by RAIB, there is an absence of training and staff are often sent to to things they have not been properly trained in and it then goes wrong. Meanwhile no stressful situation in training, so when it happens in real life it can be overwhelming.

Plus passengers may be alarmed at something that staff are not, either because they know it is not serious or is routine, coupled with some who hype up an incident for social media attention

bramling · 9 May 2024

LucyP said:
There is only one lesson to be learned here. When there is smoke and fire on a train and 4 of the carriages are at the platform, don't take 4.5 minutes to open the doors, of those carriages or the passengers on the train and other members of the public will quite rightly action their own evacuation plan for you.

It is interesting to observe that a LU train essentially has no method of self-evacuation.

The normal saloon doors are effectively locked closed. In theory there is no way out by climbing between the cars (and whilst people have done this on occasions, it is *extremely* dangerous, and absolutely not to be advised). Accessing the rear cab will also find the side doors locked shut, and the end ‘M’ door would disgorge straight onto the negative rail which would represent a considerable hazard for those not in the know, whilst in a platform area the pit would make egress this way very difficult. And on surface-sized stock the climb down would be difficult for many people.

It is for this reason that fire safety standards on LU trains are very stringent. In normal circumstances the safest course of action is simply to move to another car.

Having said all this, I suspect at some point there will be a more serious incident on LU. Most tunnel sections have no form of smoke control in the form of fans, so there is a heavy reliance on avoiding fires.

WAB · 9 May 2024

DavyCrocket said:
As mentioned by RAIB, there is an absence of training and staff are often sent to to things they have not been properly trained in and it then goes wrong. Meanwhile no stressful situation in training, so when it happens in real life it can be overwhelming.

When the guards were abolished on LU, I'm sure it was justified by the presence of sufficient staff at stations. Since then, the number of station staff has been reduced considerably including the number of more experienced supervisors. If I'm reading it correctly, the RAIB report says there were only three members of staff on duty at the time. In order to evacuate effectively, the supervisor and one CSA were both needed to prevent further entries to the station, leaving the control office completely unmanned and only the single remaining CSA to respond to reports of smoke issuing from a train and deal with all consequences thereafter. It seems at least one more CSA should have been available so the supervisor could have remained in the control office to monitor the situation and liaise with line control. The calls to the supervisor from the CSA would have probably got a response if the super had not been distracted by the legwork of the evacuation, perhaps with a better response as a result.

c2c · 9 May 2024

Dstock7080 said:
There are now extreme circumstances that drivers are expected to operate the doors on both sides of the train in tunnel sections.

The outside door control is connected to the traction circuit.
A passenger alarm would also prevent movement within station limits, until reset.

Not to take this off topic but in deep level tube tunnel situations, what problems would opening the doors alleviate instead of worsen? Would this only be in the case of a severe fire that requires smoke to be vented out of passenger areas?

Somewhere · 9 May 2024

c2c said:
Not to take this off topic but in deep level tube tunnel situations, what problems would opening the doors alleviate instead of worsen? Would this only be in the case of a severe fire that requires smoke to be vented out of passenger areas?

Marauding terrorists

c2c · 9 May 2024

Somewhere said:
Marauding terrorists

Ahhh I see... definitely an extreme scenario.

flythetube · 9 May 2024

WAB said:
Something that strikes me from your post and the RAIB report is the need for everything to be run via control, which would not have been the case in the past. If we are wanting to live in that world, both on the Tube and the big railway, then control needs to be resourced such that even when there are multiple incidents ongoing simultaneously, anything that is beyond a routine call is answered straight away by someone who can put in place anything that needs doing immediately. If that sort of resourcing is not viable, then in critical situations, local staff need to be able to make the kinds of judgements necessary to avoid this sort of situation.

Of course in the good old days, there would have been a guard at the rear of the platformed portion. And the outcome may have been different.

plugwash · 9 May 2024

Reading the RIAB report, one very good thing I saw is that they got the power turned off before the passengers started self-evacuating.

bramling said:
It is for this reason that fire safety standards on LU trains are very stringent. In normal circumstances the safest course of action is simply to move to another car.

This seems to rather assume that the other car would have room for the passengers to move to.

Somewhere · 10 May 2024

plugwash said:
Reading the RIAB report, one very good thing I saw is that they got the power turned off before the passengers started self-evacuating.

This seems to rather assume that the other car would have room for the passengers to move to.

Have visions of London Underground changing their Rule Book to tell staff to make announcement to tell passengers to move to the next car in such circumstances, and the next incident the RAIB report saying people cannot move to the next car because its packed.
People in an empty train are going to be less likely to panic, as there won't be the herd mentality

edwin_m · 10 May 2024

The report notes it's very dangerous to use the inter-car doors when the train is moving. Are these interlocked at all to prevent the train re-starting if people are using them?

stuu · 10 May 2024

Somewhere said:
Marauding terrorists

And how would opening the doors help? Except on the newest sections there's physically nowhere to go

Dstock7080 · 10 May 2024

edwin_m said:
Are these interlocked at all to prevent the train re-starting if people are using them?

No and no indication to driver if they are used

Goldfish62 · 10 May 2024

Dstock7080 said:
No and no indication to driver if they are used

And people, usually beggars, do sometimes use them.

Northern line train evacuation at Clapham Common

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