I agree it would be significantly less likely, but without the redesign there were still ways it could have caused an accident.
My own feeling is that what lead to the MAX situation is, one way or another, the result of a series of decisions that reflect a particular corporate culture at Boeing.
Unfortunately, that means that I am now inherently less comfortable (although admittedly it's all about degrees, and I'd favour a competent Boeing operator over an incompetent Airbus one) flying a newer Boeing product than I am an Airbus one.
The inconvenient truth is that the 737 is getting on for seventy years old as a design concept, and that concept was in itself quite different from the one that MAX is purported to be.
Some may remember the Kegworth crash, which was catalysed by Boeing grandfathering things through, but fundamental changes to the aircraft's systems had been made, and flight crew were not trained on them. Worse still, the initial response was to try and blame the crew.
That was in 1989, more than thirty years ago, and totally different in technical cause to the MAX crashes, but not so dissimilar, it seems, in terms of how the causes came to occur.
Full disclosure, also: Airbus serves a much better lunch at the factory.