Route closure leading to greatest strategic loss

[Halish Railway]

Bury to Accrington and the Todmorden Curve; The closure of these lines just made it a bit of a pain to get from East Lancashire to Manchester.

Any of the lines through Market Weighton; Likewise it just made it a bit of a pain to get from West Yorkshire to the Yorkshire Coast around Bridlington & Filey.

 

[30907]

I'm sure that what you say is true in terms of the 1960s timetable, but my frustration is that today I can take half an hour off my train journey time between Kingussie and Edinburgh by driving on the motorway partly built over the direct rail route south of Perth. I wasn't around to feel the immediate loss of the closure 50 years ago, but I'm able to experience what that means now

My point, though, is that even if the Glenfarg route were still open, and with comparable speeds to the surviving routes, you would still be able to save 20 of those 30 minutes by driving on the motorway which would still have been built (if on a slightly different route).

(I see tbtc has made the point in more detail.)

 

[ChiefPlanner]

I’m sure we’ve had this before, and...

1) not all freight from Felixstowe to ‘the North’ needs to go towards Doncaster; indeed not even a majority of it does. A great deal turns left at Helpston.

2) it’s all very well saying ‘short sighted’, but in 1982 the prospects for the line (indeed almost any rural line) were pretty bleak, and it was simply not realistic to expect that Felixstowe would become the traffic generating centre it has today.

Yes we have heard all this before.

Felixstowe in 1980 or so was one terminal (the Landguard one) - the capacity of the port was well under what it is in today's world , with the addition of 2 substantial container handling berths. At the time the practical capacity was 4 20 wagon trains a day from a 2 track loading terminal. A significant amount of this traffic came from the the Stratford area via transfer. There was a northbound Coatbridge liner via Peterborough and not much else. (bar the odd special) - the pre-electric GEML had 1 Norwich -LV an hour and electric services off the Clacton / Walton lines and obviously some peak starters. Capacity was not really much of an issue.

The "Joint Line" was effectively dead in the water - the large flows of London bound gas and industrial coal (that which did not go by sea) - came from the Notts etc non water served coalfields which as far as longer distance flows were concerned had been declining since the 1950's. Traditional gas works and domestic coal burning was very much on the way out .There was no substantial flows of either Speedlink or Harwich bound ferry wagon load traffic - and that was to dissapear in favour of Dover a little later. (and to go completely with the Chunnel)

The glory days of the 1930's when vast quantities of East Anglian agriculteral produce moved by rail had gone , leaving a low baseload of freight - and some of that was seasonal and low revenue - things like sugar beet. The long distance aggregate flows for East Anglia was in the future - and in any case much less than to other parts of the Greater London and South East areas.

The passenger traffic in what was disparagingly called "other provincial" services was yet to see the developments that came later with newer fleet and better marketing.

Finally - BR and freight in particular from the late 70's had very challenging cost and falling revenue targets. Even the bullish and positive Sir Peter Parker had it on his radar as an area of concern. The GN / GE line was a very high cost railway to operate in a not very inspirational business scenario. Closure was not "Short sighted" for the times.

 

[BrianW]

My point, though, is that even if the Glenfarg route were still open, and with comparable speeds to the surviving routes, you would still be able to save 20 of those 30 minutes by driving on the motorway which would still have been built (if on a slightly different route).

(I see tbtc has made the point in more detail.)

I imagine Glenfarg enthusiasts will be familiar with this:

The Glenfarg route

Undoubtedly the most controversial of all the railway closures in Fife. The North British's Cowdenbeath to Kinross route was a double-track main line engineered to express standards forming the shortest connection to Perth from Edinburgh, a journey which today requires a circuitous loop via Stirl...

www.rmweb.co.uk

I guess if the 'formation' were not available and the M90 therefore took a different route, that would have added to the cost (substantially) and visual intrusion.

Did the then Laird/ MP for Kinross and West Perthshire/ PM (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) show no interest? Did he use the train?

 

[Sad Sprinter]

Hate to be "that guy", but I genuinely think the Great Central. I'm surprised it wasn't kept open in the 60s for use solely for intermodal freight from London/Southampton avoiding the WCML. It would have been a useful regional route nowadays perhaps starting from Reading, if not a full intercity service from London-especially since Leicester-Nottingham-Sheffield-Manchester, could be done without reversal in Nottingham and Sheffield. Outer suburban trains could run from London to Brackley, which would likely see more post-war growth as London/Birmingham overspills.

Of course, you'd have to keep the passing loops open in stations High-Wycombe to Wembley, at the very least.

 

[Bald Rick]

I'm surprised it wasn't kept open in the 60s for use solely for intermodal freight from London/Southampton avoiding the WCML.

I’m surprised you think there was much in the way of intermodal traffic in the 60s, or that you think the WCML was remotely at capacity.

 

[ChiefPlanner]

Hate to be "that guy", but I genuinely think the Great Central. I'm surprised it wasn't kept open in the 60s for use solely for intermodal freight from London/Southampton avoiding the WCML. It would have been a useful regional route nowadays perhaps starting from Reading, if not a full intercity service from London-especially since Leicester-Nottingham-Sheffield-Manchester, could be done without reversal in Nottingham and Sheffield. Outer suburban trains could run from London to Brackley, which would likely see more post-war growth as London/Birmingham overspills.

Of course, you'd have to keep the passing loops open in stations High-Wycombe to Wembley, at the very least.

The intermodal or ISO container was only developed in the 1960's and (to take the Southampton example - Martime FLT was opened in 1972 , and with the exception of a service to Leeds , the traffic had no absolute need for the much loved , tragically lost Great Central - there were 2 typically longstanding contract services to Barking , a Stratford and services to Birmingham , Coatbridge and Trafford Park - the latter making good progress on the electrified and container cleared WCML The Leeds would have been slower than going via the present route in any case.

It really is time for a stake to be driven through the metaphorical heart of some of these "good ideas" that come back all the time to these boards - the usual suspects of Woodhead etc - even (dare I say it) - Carmarthen to Aberystwyth.

 

[Sad Sprinter]

Nonetheless, it still would have been a useful freight route for the modern day, surely not?

 

[Bald Rick]

Nonetheless, it still would have been a useful freight route for the modern day, surely not?

For which flows?

 

[Sad Sprinter]

For which flows?

Southampton-East Midlands/Trafford
London-Trafford/Mossend
Felixstowe-Trafford
Channel Tunnel-Northwards

 

[ChiefPlanner]

Nonetheless, it still would have been a useful freight route for the modern day, surely not?

To reiterate the comment "which flows" ? (the GC was last in to the party - and really survived on trunk coal moves from the York , Notts and Derby coalfield from roughly Annesley to Woodford , there were a few fitted freights for flows that no longer exist like Grimsby - Swindon fish ! ) - the other trunk routes managed to find alternative freight and passenger traffics - think of the Midland today with heavy aggregate flows for example with direct access to connecting lines across London, and a solid passenger flow well - pre Covid !) from the same settlements to Leicester and the WCML served Rugby far better than the GC , and so on.

Southampton-East Midlands/Trafford
London-Trafford/Mossend
Felixstowe-Trafford
Channel Tunnel-Northwards

They all fail the connectivity and journey time test , especially from Southampton , and dare I say it , any Felixstowe to Trafford Park "reroutings" would need (double points) - Woodhead !

Precious little Channel Tunnel traffic on offer north of London , unfortunately.

 

[Sad Sprinter]

To reiterate the comment "which flows" ? (the GC was last in to the party - and really survived on trunk coal moves from the York , Notts and Derby coalfield from roughly Annesley to Woodford , there were a few fitted freights for flows that no longer exist like Grimsby - Swindon fish ! ) - the other trunk routes managed to find alternative freight and passenger traffics - think of the Midland today with heavy aggregate flows for example with direct access to connecting lines across London, and a solid passenger flow well - pre Covid !) from the same settlements to Leicester and the WCML served Rugby far better than the GC , and so on.



They all fail the connectivity and journey time test , especially from Southampton , and dare I say it , any Felixstowe to Trafford Park "reroutings" would need (double points) - Woodhead !

Precious little Channel Tunnel traffic on offer north of London , unfortunately.

Well call me a diehard sentimentalist but I think that's a pity.

 

[Doctor Fegg]

I wonder if the conclusion from this thread is that the UK network has suffered surprisingly few strategic losses.

Vast numbers of locally significant losses, certainly. Several cross-country lines that were unremunerative in the 1960s but would be remunerative now, perhaps. But nationally strategic? I don't see too many stand-out examples coming from this thread.

 

[ChiefPlanner]

I wonder if the conclusion from this thread is that the UK network has suffered surprisingly few strategic losses.

Vast numbers of locally significant losses, certainly. Several cross-country lines that were unremunerative in the 1960s but would be remunerative now, perhaps. But nationally strategic? I don't see too many stand-out examples coming from this thread.

If the worst excesses of various proposers / politicians and anti-rail canvassers , notably Serpell had come anywhere near reality , then there would have been severe strategic losses.

On a positive note - considerable investment (say Trent Valley 4 tracking , Swindon - Kemble redoubling etc , East London line extensions and many more ) and truly strategic decisions like the increase in container gauge clearances on really key routes have maintained and increased the railway's ability to stay in business. So not all lost , and I do not critiscise questions asked about the "usual suspects" of lost lines. - put simple - putting extra signalling capacity on the route between Basingstoke and Reading , then the remodelling of the latter , provided far more utility than any idea of nobly rebuilding the single track line between Winchester and Didcot.

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

The 1960/70s closures were often accompanied by the construction of new connections between remaining lines.
So the strategic connectivity before the closures was largely retained, and even improved.
The Hazel Grove and Windsor Link connections around Manchester radically improved through services in the area (and gave us modern headaches like Castlefield).

It's always instructive to look at how limited some of the pre-grouping connections were between their networks.
The GC in particular suffered from poor links to other lines, and this extended to its fief in the north-west, the CLC.
As another example the SER and LCDR didn't connect where they crossed at Bickley for instance, until the companies merged.

 

[Irascible]

I wonder if the conclusion from this thread is that the UK network has suffered surprisingly few strategic losses.

Vast numbers of locally significant losses, certainly. Several cross-country lines that were unremunerative in the 1960s but would be remunerative now, perhaps. But nationally strategic? I don't see too many stand-out examples coming from this thread.

Hardly any of the core network shut - was mostly secondary routes ( ignoring branchlines ). The Varsity closure was stupid, but tha wasn't actually a Beeching effort either & I suspect BR management somehow...

However I think people have got slightly the wrong end of the stick, is this not about strategic loss *now*, not when a line was closed? so March-Spalding should be looked at as a hole in the current network, not the 80s.

 

[Bald Rick]

Southampton-East Midlands/Trafford
London-Trafford/Mossend
Felixstowe-Trafford
Channel Tunnel-Northwards

Respective freight train paths per day, with origin and destination areas as shown:

Soton - East Mids none
Soton - Manchester 8, all via Oxford (rarely more than half run, only 1 today)
London - Manchester 2 (assuming Thameshaven counts as London)
London - Glasgow 2
Felixstowe- Manchester 5, one goes cross country
Channel Tunnel - anywhere north of London 3 (Daventry, Liverpool, Scunthorpe)

On any given day only around 60% runs, and a fair bit of it is at night. There’s not that much, really.

 

[Master Cutler]

I would vote for the Midland route between Derby and Manchester.

I second that, and, as I understand, it was not a Beeching closure.
Ever since we lost the line there have been feasibility studies carried out to discuss the viability of reopening it.
The stone traffic at the Buxton end has maintained a large portion of the line, and the Derby Matlock section has remained in service since the closure of the mid section.

 

[ChiefPlanner]

Hardly any of the core network shut - was mostly secondary routes ( ignoring branchlines ). The Varsity closure was stupid, but tha wasn't actually a Beeching effort either & I suspect BR management somehow...

However I think people have got slightly the wrong end of the stick, is this not about strategic loss *now*, not when a line was closed? so March-Spalding should be looked at as a hole in the current network, not the 80s.

If there was a strategic "gap" - an unfulfilled need , -then maybe a line restitution might be in order. The railway managed without it , and arguably still does - albeit with investment elsewhere as in Peterborough , Wennington Junction and of course the route via Lincoln.

Confession time - we looked at as part of the ATOC study some years ago , and we worked out the route was lost - but there were other options to avoid PBO. A bypass much nearer to the city and onto the aforementioned route. This option was not taken forward.

 

[daodao]

I wonder if the conclusion from this thread is that the UK network has suffered surprisingly few strategic losses.

Vast numbers of locally significant losses, certainly. Several cross-country lines that were unremunerative in the 1960s but would be remunerative now, perhaps. But nationally strategic? I don't see too many stand-out examples coming from this thread.

It may be true of England, and as I outlined earlier certainly true of Scotland, but 5 of Ulster's 9 counties (3 in Eire and 2 in the UK) have no rail services whatsoever.

In England, the strategic links that have been lost are mainly in the Midlands, but few have been crucial:

• There is no through orbital cross country route left linking the GWR/WCML/MML/ECML between London and the Birmingham-Leicester-Peterborough line, but (apart maybe from the Varsity line), it is not obvious which one should have been retained. Re-opening from Bicester to Bletchley would significantly undo this loss.
• Retention of the GC line between Banbury and Leicester might have been useful if it could have been connected to the MML there.
• Routes across the South Pennines are suboptimal because BR didn't follow Beeching's advice about retaining the Woodhead and Bakewell routes, and chose to keep the Hope Valley line instead, but at least this line was retained.
• Connectivity in Lincolnshire is also poor, following closure of most of the routes serving Spalding (to March, King's Lynn, Melton Mowbray and Grimsby). However, the low population density and innumerable level crossings made the railways there particularly uneconomic.

 

[47271]

I've not waded into this thread earlier, because a lot of people have a sentimental attachment to scenic lines through fairly empty countryside, and I can see that the "strategic loss" argument is a nice hook...

...but I'm not sure about the idea that a Glenfarg line is going to remove that "half an hour" difference (from Highlands/ Inverness/ Perth to Edinburgh)

It's fifty something minutes from Perth to Inverkeithing (including stops at Kirkcaldy etc)...

...but the current line from Cowdenbeath to Inverkeithing is around fifteen minutes...

....so that's around twenty five miles of line from Perth to Cowdenbeath that HS2 would struggle to do fast enough for the overall "via Dunfermline" journey time to knock half an hour off the current "via Kirkcaldy" journey time (and then there are stops at Kinross etc to consider?)

I think that, even if the line through Glenfarg had remained open, the twists and turns would mean that it was only a few minutes faster than the Kirkcaldy route - so it's not the "poster boy" that I'd choose for strategic losses - a five or ten minute journey time caused by the diversion - no major intermediate places that lack a station - I think that driving from Kingussie to Edinburgh is always going to be significantly faster than any train service - once the forth road bridge and motorway were built, rail was always going to struggle

(okay, they could have spent tens of millions of pounds on upgrading the line through Glenfarg to make it more competitive with driving, but I think that any reprieve would have been on the basis of "keeping a loss making line open with minimal investment" rather than "save it and spend huge sums on upgrades")

I'll take all of that as rational argument, not least the point about the time taken between Inverkeithing and where Glenfarg diverged from the existing Inverkeithing to Thornton line.

Also the very low speeds at the northern end, through the tortuous Glenfarg itself, and the time taken to climb up from Bridge of Earn.

I didn't raise it as a sentimental thing, as above I'm not old enough to feel any of that, but purely on the practical basis that shutting the line was a major boob in transport planning and that the entire Highlands and myself feel inconvenienced by it 50 years later.

So, expanding that out, we've come through quite a lengthy thread to discover that almost all historical closures, whilst locally devastating in some cases, led to few or no losses in strategic network terms.

 

[30907]

As another example the SER and LCDR didn't connect where they crossed at Bickley for instance, until the companies merged.

OT: not surprising, because the two companies were deadly rivals and had separate routes to anywhere that mattered (and largely complemented each other, so have survived).

 

[Helvellyn]

One I don't think that has been mentioned is Alton to Winchester, a big chunk of which survives as the Mid Hants line.

The route to Alton was electrified by the Southern Railway and the route was still open when the Bournemouth Line electrification from Pirbright Junction to Branksome took place.

As well as offering a shorter diversionary route than via Havant it would provide direct connections between Guildford/Aldershot/Fareham and Southampton/Bournemouth.

Not a long route. Not a glamorous route. But when looked at on a map a regional strategic loss even if not a national one.

 

[NorthernSpirit]

I'm also inclined to think of Christs Hospital - Shoreham in the same light - a greater proportion of the overall route between London and Brighton was already electrified, the intermediate stations had a lot of potential value and it was possible to avoid almost all of the BML if going via Mitcham Junction.

Wasn't the same line connected to the Guildford to Christ's Hospital via Cranleigh? The platforms are still there at West Grinstead and a small section suvives at Southwater but sadly the station is now the site of Lintot Square, so reopening it would involve a very small section of street running.

Another is the Leeds / Harrogate / Church Fenton to Wetherby routes had those lines remained we could have seen an alternative route to York if the Headingley or Garforth routes are ever blocked. The same for the Queensbury Lines, which would have been useful for those living in the villages north of Halifax as well as giving an alternative route to Bradford.

I'd even go as far as saying that the Lincolnshire Coast Line should have never closed, British Rail should have instead rationalised it to single line with Louth, Mablethorpe and Firsby being made into passing loops, most rural stations (e.g. Utterby, Saltfleet, North Thoresby) converted to request stop status and installed Auto Half Barrier at level crossings.

 

[yorksrob]

As another example the SER and LCDR didn't connect where they crossed at Bickley for instance, until the companies merged.

And still don't at Canterbury and Maidstone !

OT: not surprising, because the two companies were deadly rivals and had separate routes to anywhere that mattered (and largely complemented each other, so have survived).

Yes, it's notable that for all the inefficiencies inherant in their rivalry, the LCDR and SER have bequeathed Kent what is still one of the best local passenger networks in the country. It seems to have survived much better than that in Sussex or Hampshire for example.

Perhaps it was just more difficult to take individual lines out of the tangle in Kent, than with a more logical dentritic network such as in Sussex for example. Alternatively, perhaps the comprehensive nature of the Kent electrification scheme worked in the county's favour in the late 60's when BR appears to have had a prejudice in favour of closing unelectrified routes.

 

[Master Cutler]

I recently posted this on a different forum.

The plans to reopen the Manchester route from Matlock to Buxton seems to be gathering momentum and their members are actively promoting the project at public events. If they can attract freight as well as passengers, it looks quite a viable plan.
The passenger proposals include a combination of commercial and heritage traffic use, so here's hoping they achieve their goals.

Our reinstatement proposals for the Peaks and Dales Railway
Peaks and Dales Railway Limited is a special purpose company. Established with support from Manchester and East Midlands Rail Action Partnership, the company is leading the work to reinstate and upgrade the former Midland Mainline railway between Ambergate and Chinley - fondly known as
‘the Peaks and Dales Railway’.

© Peaks and Dales Railway Limited, 2020 - All Rights Reserved

 

[Bald Rick]

I recently posted this on a different forum.

The plans to reopen the Manchester route from Matlock to Buxton seems to be gathering momentum and their members are actively promoting the project at public events. If they can attract freight as well as passengers, it looks quite a viable plan.
The passenger proposals include a combination of commercial and heritage traffic use, so here's hoping they achieve their goals.

Very unlikely in my opinion. There’s a difference between ‘feasible’ and ‘viable’.

 

[yorksrob]

Wasn't the same line connected to the Guildford to Christ's Hospital via Cranleigh? The platforms are still there at West Grinstead and a small section suvives at Southwater but sadly the station is now the site of Lintot Square, so reopening it would involve a very small section of street running.

Another is the Leeds / Harrogate / Church Fenton to Wetherby routes had those lines remained we could have seen an alternative route to York if the Headingley or Garforth routes are ever blocked. The same for the Queensbury Lines, which would have been useful for those living in the villages north of Halifax as well as giving an alternative route to Bradford.

I'd even go as far as saying that the Lincolnshire Coast Line should have never closed, British Rail should have instead rationalised it to single line with Louth, Mablethorpe and Firsby being made into passing loops, most rural stations (e.g. Utterby, Saltfleet, North Thoresby) converted to request stop status and installed Auto Half Barrier at level crossings.

Yes, I think there was a South facing curve from the Cranleigh direction at Christs Hospital at one point, which would have enabled through running between the two, but I don't think it was used much.

 

[Gloster]

Yes, I think there was a South facing curve from the Cranleigh direction at Christs Hospital at one point, which would have enabled through running between the two, but I don't think it was used much.

The Itchingfield South-Itchingfield North curve opened in October 1865 and closed in August 1867. The station did not open until 1902. (Source: Signal Box Register, Volume 4. Signalling Record Society, 2009.)

 

[RT4038]

Hardly any of the core network shut - was mostly secondary routes ( ignoring branchlines ). The Varsity closure was stupid, but tha wasn't actually a Beeching effort either & I suspect BR management somehow...

Correct, it was a BR management proposal, originally in 1959 before Beeching, around the same time as the M&GN closed. The line carried few passengers. As is being found out now with re-opening after a considerable change in population density and economic activity in the area, the line did not interact with any other intermediate line in a helpful way, crossing the LNW and GN main lines at wayside stations with only local 'connecting' services timed for other needs, and the Midland and the GW cut-off lines at different station locations with 20 min walks in between.
It was not a strategic loss at that time.

I wonder if the conclusion from this thread is that the UK network has suffered surprisingly few strategic losses.

Vast numbers of locally significant losses, certainly. Several cross-country lines that were unremunerative in the 1960s but would be remunerative now, perhaps. But nationally strategic? I don't see too many stand-out examples coming from this thread.

I would concur with this view. Numbers of locally strategic losses, and some regional ones too. But as you say, unremunerative and presumably there was decisions to be made as to the total amount that could be supported.