Route closure leading to greatest strategic loss

[Bald Rick]

I wonder if the conclusion from this thread is that the UK network has suffered surprisingly few strategic losses.

Vast numbers of locally significant losses, certainly. Several cross-country lines that were unremunerative in the 1960s but would be remunerative now, perhaps. But nationally strategic? I don't see too many stand-out examples coming from this thread.

I would concur with this view. Numbers of locally strategic losses, and some regional ones too. But as you say, unremunerative and presumably there was decisions to be made as to the total amount that could be supported.

Does it follow, then, that Dr Beeching got it right?

 

[RT4038]

Do it follow, then, that Dr Beeching got it right?

Much to the annoyance of some, but the answer has to be by and large yes! Various caveats of course.

 

[Doctor Fegg]

Does it follow, then, that Dr Beeching got it right?

(insert popcorn gif here...)

Personally I believe a better future for the railways could have been imagined than the one that Beeching implemented - essentially going all in on the Gerry Fiennes 'Paytrains' model on more rural/semi-urban branch lines, and moving to PTEs in urban areas (which were a 1968 Barbara Castle invention, so post-Beeching).

The Government of the day effectively made a decision not to price-in the externalities of unfettered private car transport. We are dealing with the shameful consequences of that now. But that, of course, was an Ernest Marples decision rather than a Beeching one.

On the shape of the strategic network, yes, Beeching probably did more or less get it right.

 

[yorksrob]

Does it follow, then, that Dr Beeching got it right?

No, of course not.

The whole concept of removing duplicate lines was flawed.

 

[HSTEd]

Does it follow, then, that Dr Beeching got it right?

I remain convinced that the process was fundamentally flawed and was overly focussed on "routes" rather than track.

However some sort of rationalisation was required.

 

[Dr Hoo]

Personally I believe a better future for the railways could have been imagined than the one that Beeching implemented - essentially going all in on the Gerry Fiennes 'Paytrains' model on more rural/semi-urban branch lines, and moving to PTEs in urban areas (which were a 1968 Barbara Castle invention, so post-Beeching).

The Government of the day effectively made a decision not to price-in the externalities of unfettered private car transport. We are dealing with the shameful consequences of that now. But that, of course, was an Ernest Marples decision rather than a Beeching one.

On the shape of the strategic network, yes, Beeching probably did more or less get it right.

Although it is important to remember that the sea change in thinking towards cost-benefit analysis, integration in metropolitan areas in particular, the multi-modal 'conurbation studies' (which later led to the PTEs), commissioning the seminal 'Traffic in Towns' report on unfettered car transport, even the first mentions of subsidy, came under Marples and Beeching.

With capital funding in such short supply and so much un-modernised network still out there (steam traction, manual level crossings, many stations even with no electricity supply, etc.) it was essential to rationalise the network. E.g. why keep the duplicate Alton-Winchester route when you are re-signalling and electrifying Woking to Bournemouth; why keep the Great Central when you've just electrified the WCML, and so on.

 

[30907]

And still don't at Canterbury and Maidstone !



Yes, it's notable that for all the inefficiencies inherant in their rivalry, the LCDR and SER have bequeathed Kent what is still one of the best local passenger networks in the country. It seems to have survived much better than that in Sussex or Hampshire for example.

Perhaps it was just more difficult to take individual lines out of the tangle in Kent, than with a more logical dentritic network such as in Sussex for example. Alternatively, perhaps the comprehensive nature of the Kent electrification scheme worked in the county's favour in the late 60's when BR appears to have had a prejudice in favour of closing unelectrified routes.

It helps that Canterbury and Maidstone are substantially larger than any of the Sussex and Hampshire towns that have lost their services, and that the surviving railways are mostly London commuter and seaside routes (not to mention boat trains and Eurostar pre HS1) - all of which explains why they were considered worth electrifying.
(Incidentally Canterbury benefited enormously from electrification - previously its railways had been a bit of a backwater.)
Exceptions are Marshlink and (pre HS1 again) the Medway Valley, but the latter has freight.

 

[simonw]

Does it follow, then, that Dr Beeching got it right?

Yes pretty much. Most developed economies have seen closures and rationalisations. The main difference in GB was that there is a report on the subject that increases the speed of the process.

 

[RT4038]

(insert popcorn gif here...)

Personally I believe a better future for the railways could have been imagined than the one that Beeching implemented - essentially going all in on the Gerry Fiennes 'Paytrains' model on more rural/semi-urban branch lines, and moving to PTEs in urban areas (which were a 1968 Barbara Castle invention, so post-Beeching).

The Government of the day effectively made a decision not to price-in the externalities of unfettered private car transport. We are dealing with the shameful consequences of that now. But that, of course, was an Ernest Marples decision rather than a Beeching one.

On the shape of the strategic network, yes, Beeching probably did more or less get it right.

I am not sure that the price of the externalities of unfettered car transport could have been priced-in; the figure would not have been known then, anymore than it is really known now. What price freedom? Neither am I sure that the bulk of the lines proposed for closure by the Beeching Plan would have had any meaningful effect on the externalities of fettering private car transport.

 

[Kremlin Stooge]

I’m not sure that the question of Dr. Beeching being right or wrong lends itself to a binary answer. In some aspects his report was undoubtedly right, in other aspects it was probably wrong, or at least didn’t have the granularity of information analysis that we take for granted these days. Remember that we’re looking at this question through the thick end of 60 years-worth of hindsight!

Just surmising, but many mainland European railway undertakings had been gradually whittling down their networks over a period of many years (and continue to do so). The impact of the Beeching Report was amplified partly because it tried to introduce a restructuring, that should have taken place over the previous 30-odd years, into a much shorter time period.

As an idle thought experiment, I tried to visualise what todays network might look like had the 1921 nationalisation proposals been followed through. My speculative conclusion is that it wouldn’t look too much different from that which we actually have.

 

[Master Cutler]

For the railways of Britain the rot set in after the General Strike of 1926 with a short reprieve during the Second World War.
With the writing on the wall, it was of no importance who penned the Beecing report for railway restructuring as the faltering British economy had to claw back by what ever means the cash won by working men over many austere years of strife.
In reality any back room accounts clerk could have come up with the same drastic pruning plan for the railways as Beeching did.
The main problem is that the Beecing report was based primarily on cost cutting by identifying lines that were struggling to turn a profit, with scant regard to the economic importance for many of the condemned lines being integrated into future potential transport strategies, such as those discussed in the Restructuring of the Railways pre Beeching.
I believe the following snapshot sums up the whole economic and investment situation for the railways that took hold of our economy post 1926;

In the five years that followed, Churchill’s early liberalism survived only in the form of advocacy of rigid laissez-faire economics; for the rest he appeared, repeatedly, as the leader of the diehards. He had no natural gift for financial administration, and though the noted economist John Maynard Keynes criticized him unsparingly, most of the advice he received was orthodox and harmful. His first move was to restore the gold standard, a disastrous measure, from which flowed deflation, unemployment, and the miners’ strike that led to the general strike of 1926. Churchill offered no remedy except the cultivation of strict economy, extending even to the armed services. Churchill viewed the general strike as a quasi-revolutionary measure and was foremost in resisting a negotiated settlement. He leaped at the opportunity of editing the British Gazette, an emergency official newspaper, which he filled with bombastic and frequently inflammatory propaganda.

 

[tbtc]

I’m not sure that the question of Dr. Beeching being right or wrong lends itself to a binary answer. In some aspects his report was undoubtedly right, in other aspects it was probably wrong, or at least didn’t have the granularity of information analysis that we take for granted these days. Remember that we’re looking at this question through the thick end of 60 years-worth of hindsight!

That sounds fair

I think that a lot of the critics are two types of people...

...people who'll never accept closure of lines (e.g. the kind of people who cannot accept closure of incredibly lightly used stations/lines on the modern day railway aren't going to be great judges of whether the decision to close a lightly used line/station sixty years ago was the correct one - e.g. if you can't accept closure of a station like Breich or scrapping passenger services on a line like Knottingly - Goole then I don't think you're going to be a rational judge on Beeching's decisions, since you clearly have a rather different threshold for what would justify closing a station/line - you'll never accept that anything should have closed - fair enough if you think that no station/line should ever close - I respect your opinion - but let's not pretend that you'd have taken a rational approach on where to draw the line in the 1960s...

...people who apply today's standards to the 1960s - the Unions wouldn't have accepted some of the changes that may seem obvious today - the population has grown by around fifteen million people since then, the computer databases are much more sophisticated than Beeching had (complain all you want about how he only visited lines on wet Tuesdays in February and how poor the data gathering was but he had to work with the tools of the time) - average commuting distances are significantly longer than in the 1960s (when people worked locally rather than often travelling an hour or more in each direction) - if proposals for re-opening a line today are still fairly flimsy/ poor value for money then you have to understand that demand would have been significantly lower sixty years ago when there were significantly fewer people in the UK and the average worked commuted significantly shorter distances - applying today's standards to Beeching's decisions seems incredibly unfair - people on here often argue about how we shouldn't commit so much money to HS2 "because we don't know what future demand will be and things will change a lot in the future" yet expect Beeching to have superpowers to predict three generations ahead (and, to be honest, even when you look at today's passenger numbers etc, it's hard to find major things that look bad in his decisions - the poster boys for Regrettable Beeching Cuts tend to be things like "this would have been useful a few weekends a year as a diversionary line" or "this would have provided a parallel link" (and therefore spread passenger demand even thinner between two routes) - some of the rather weak arguments about supposed errors that he made just make a lot of the decisions he took look better, since if that's all you can find to pick fault in then you're really just quibbling at the margins (and discussing lines that would still be fairly marginal even after the population increased significantly)

 

[Revaulx]

B

And still don't at Canterbury and Maidstone !



Yes, it's notable that for all the inefficiencies inherant in their rivalry, the LCDR and SER have bequeathed Kent what is still one of the best local passenger networks in the country. It seems to have survived much better than that in Sussex or Hampshire for example.

Perhaps it was just more difficult to take individual lines out of the tangle in Kent, than with a more logical dentritic network such as in Sussex for example. Alternatively, perhaps the comprehensive nature of the Kent electrification scheme worked in the county's favour in the late 60's when BR appears to have had a prejudice in favour of closing unelectrified routes.

The SER/LCDR “merger” must be one of the most successful ever business combinations of former bitter rivals. A shame the LMS couldn’t have done the same 30 years later.

 

[yorksrob]

It helps that Canterbury and Maidstone are substantially larger than any of the Sussex and Hampshire towns that have lost their services, and that the surviving railways are mostly London commuter and seaside routes (not to mention boat trains and Eurostar pre HS1) - all of which explains why they were considered worth electrifying.
(Incidentally Canterbury benefited enormously from electrification - previously its railways had been a bit of a backwater.)
Exceptions are Marshlink and (pre HS1 again) the Medway Valley, but the latter has freight.

Indeed, although of course the Marshlink was originally planned for electrification, hence the concrete footbridge at Rye.

I still can't help thinking that we (speaking as an Ashfordian born and bred) lucked out in the sixties. East Sussex had apparently been planned for electrification at one stage (hence the modern signal box at Groombidge) and had this happenned, I can't help but think that Lewes to Tonbridge would have survived, particularly with Crowborough etc.

B

The SER/LCDR “merger” must be one of the most successful ever business combinations of former bitter rivals. A shame the LMS couldn’t have done the same 30 years later.

Indeed - it turned two basket cases into a good railway (although a lot happenned with the Southern Railway, with electrification by BR)

 

[BayPaul]

It occurred to me this morning that Broad Street station could perhaps be considered as a strategic loss. Not so much considered as the terminal of the North London Line, but as a large piece of railway land in central London. If it had stayed open for a bit longer, I wonder if it would have been a good destination for HS1, rather than St Pancras (not sure whether the very long platforms would have fitted), or for some significant improvement to the commuter services in east London - perhaps meaning that Crossrail would have taken a different route.

 

[ChiefPlanner]

It occurred to me this morning that Broad Street station could perhaps be considered as a strategic loss. Not so much considered as the terminal of the North London Line, but as a large piece of railway land in central London. If it had stayed open for a bit longer, I wonder if it would have been a good destination for HS1, rather than St Pancras (not sure whether the very long platforms would have fitted), or for some significant improvement to the commuter services in east London - perhaps meaning that Crossrail would have taken a different route.

Simply , the closure of Broad Street was a strategic gain for the railway as the land development funded the complete rebuild of next door Liverpool St. The many jobs created in the City also brought business to both BR and LUL.

The station was not just dying , but effectively dead.

 

[BayPaul]

Simply , the closure of Broad Street was a strategic gain for the railway as the land development funded the complete rebuild of next door Liverpool St. The many jobs created in the City also brought business to both BR and LUL.

The station was not just dying , but effectively dead.

At the time it was. If the site existed now, would it have been more valuable as an additional terminus (perhaps with an overline development to bring in some of those jobs and investment)? Not really my area of expertise, so I will bow to your knowledge. Similar to other suggestions, at the time rail travel was on a gentle decline, and the sale made complete sense as it would have taken quite a crystal ball to imagine the growth to come in the 2000s, but with the benefit of hindsight I could see it perhaps being a long term loss.

 

[Dr_Paul]

It occurred to me this morning that Broad Street station could perhaps be considered as a strategic loss. Not so much considered as the terminal of the North London Line, but as a large piece of railway land in central London. If it had stayed open for a bit longer, I wonder if it would have been a good destination for HS1, rather than St Pancras (not sure whether the very long platforms would have fitted), or for some significant improvement to the commuter services in east London - perhaps meaning that Crossrail would have taken a different route.

I wonder if a small station, perhaps two platforms, could have been built in a corner of the Broad Street site, next to Liverpool Street. It would not have taken up much space, a small sliver of the huge site that the old station and goods depot took up. NLL (and later Overground) services could have been split between there and Stratford.

 

[edwin_m]

I wonder if a small station, perhaps two platforms, could have been built in a corner of the Broad Street site, next to Liverpool Street. It would not have taken up much space, a small sliver of the huge site that the old station and goods depot took up. NLL (and later Overground) services could have been split between there and Stratford.

I'd suggest the East London Line Overground has removed any need for Broad Street in its original role, by providing a station nearby with links both north and south. As for a high speed station, the space required (width over a length of around 600 metres) would probably mean it ended up with only two or three platforms.

 

[Dr_Paul]

I'd suggest the East London Line Overground has removed any need for Broad Street in its original role, by providing a station nearby with links both north and south.

Good point! I forgot about that. Shoreditch is pretty close to the City, and a change at Highbury and Islington or at Canonbury isn't much bother.

 

[ChiefPlanner]

I'd suggest the East London Line Overground has removed any need for Broad Street in its original role, by providing a station nearby with links both north and south. As for a high speed station, the space required (width over a length of around 600 metres) would probably mean it ended up with only two or three platforms.

Exactly - and various other factors for consideration were the GN electrification programme from Moorgate which drove services from there out to the likes of Welwyn and Hertford North (replacing some odd and sparse services from Moorgate - widened lines)- and certainly better than a tube shuttle to Drayton Park , and also the re-architecture of services from Dalston - Hackney - Stratford LL - towards what is now Docklands) - more to it than just "Broad Street" - much good thinking for the latter done by the GLC and some of the staff who transitioned from there to LUL.

 

[DerekC]

I think Beeching did more or less what Marples asked him to do and (much as I regret them from a sentimental point of view) loss of branch lines and long but slow routes such as the S&D were inevitable. What is and always has been clear, though, is that UK governments don't do joined up and strategic thinking. For instance joined up thinking would have kept Oxford - Bletchley - Cambridge - closed at the same time that Milton Keynes was announced - and strategic thinking would have kept, or at least mothballed or route protected, the Great Central. The same problems can be seen now. Rebuild the south western sector of the M25 with no provision for railway access to Heathrow? Doh!

 

[Helvellyn]

I think Beeching did more or less what Marples asked him to do and (much as I regret them from a sentimental point of view) loss of branch lines and long but slow routes such as the S&D were inevitable. What is and always has been clear, though, is that UK governments don't do joined up and strategic thinking. For instance joined up thinking would have kept Oxford - Bletchley - Cambridge - closed at the same time that Milton Keynes was announced - and strategic thinking would have kept, or at least mothballed or route protected, the Great Central. The same problems can be seen now. Rebuild the south western sector of the M25 with no provision for railway access to Heathrow? Doh!

The lack of strategic thinking can be seen in the way Motorway and Trunk road schemes were abandoned, even going as far back as the 1960s. Beeching took place in a world where the car was king and grand schemes were afoot. But, rail routes were closed and road upgrades or new construction never materialised.

Or in the fact that there was a view Heathrow also needed expanded or replaced as far back as the 1960s as well!

Long term strategic planning just doesn't exist in this country - and that applies whether the Government of the day is red or blue.

 

[Master Cutler]

Regarding the strategic loss of lines, and taking into account historical factors, many line closures were driven by political motives as well as commercial interests.
The 1958 transfer of The GC from Eastern to Midland region of BR was motivated by the need to firm up the balance sheet in preparation for the Rationalisation Plan.
Once all of the Midland and GC operating costs were amalgamated, the newcomer, in the form of the GC, was bound to take the hit.
However, as a fast freight route the GC had all of the infrastructure and potential to compete with the blossoming soon to be de-nationalised road haulage companies.
The line was also robust enough to cater for local passenger traffic with the addition of DMU stopping services.
In reality though the commercial and marketing strategies of the Midland Region under BR were not interested in future line potential but only in handing over much of the potential new GC freight business to the fast expanding road haulage, which then gave momentum to the fast expanding and growing road building programmes.
This makes me think that the closure of the GC was possibly the greatest strategic mistake the railways have ever made.

 

[Dr Hoo]

However, as a fast freight route the GC had all of the infrastructure and potential to compete with the blossoming soon to be de-nationalised road haulage companies.

This is the bit that I don't get. As someone who started my railway career on the LMR in the London area the GC lines were hopelessly disconnected in terms of links to routes round London, connections to the docks, availability of land for new terminals and so on.
Once the historic role to move coal for burning in Central London had gone (with clean air legislation) and the 'sundries' freight was in decline (especially after the 1955 footplate staff strike) the route was on a downward spiral. The passenger service had never been a money spinner.
It has always struck me how few references there are to the GC's role in the Second World War. There are endless tales of new links and enhancements on the GWR and Southern, heroic achievements in carrying additional traffic to East Anglia for building new airfields and supplying fuel, serving West Coast ports like Garston with shipping diverted to avoid u-boats in the North Sea, new rail links to emergency ports in Scotland, etc. Yes, I know that some traffic fed down via Woodford Halse and on to the GWR and there was an extra link at Claydon (mainly for contingency purposes) but it never seemed to be really strategic.

 

[Grumbler]

This is the bit that I don't get. As someone who started my railway career on the LMR in the London area the GC lines were hopelessly disconnected in terms of links to routes round London, connections to the docks, availability of land for new terminals and so on.
Once the historic role to move coal for burning in Central London had gone (with clean air legislation) and the 'sundries' freight was in decline (especially after the 1955 footplate staff strike) the route was on a downward spiral. The passenger service had never been a money spinner.
It has always struck me how few references there are to the GC's role in the Second World War. There are endless tales of new links and enhancements on the GWR and Southern, heroic achievements in carrying additional traffic to East Anglia for building new airfields and supplying fuel, serving West Coast ports like Garston with shipping diverted to avoid u-boats in the North Sea, new rail links to emergency ports in Scotland, etc. Yes, I know that some traffic fed down via Woodford Halse and on to the GWR and there was an extra link at Claydon (mainly for contingency purposes) but it never seemed to be really strategic.

Wasn't a link built at Loughbororough?

 

[Spamcan81]

The trains were empty. It was obviously not the way to go from Exeter to Plymouth. What other traffic could it serve, circumnavigating the wilds of Dartmoor

Both Okehampton (small town) and Bere Alston (isolated village) are, in the traditions of this route, nowhere near the stations named after them.


It was indeed a fast piece of railway, mainly because there was nowhere worthwhile to stop. Diverting through the 4th largest city in Scotland, little extra mileage, gave a substantial frequency boost to a range of mainstream journeys; Glasgow to Dundee, Dundee to Aberdeen, etc. It was really just sorting out pre-1923 operating patterns.

Less than a mile from station to town centre. There are stations that never closed that are as far if not further from the centre of the town they purport to serve.

Wasn't a link built at Loughbororough?

I think that came post closure to enable mineral trains to access East Leake Gypsum works from the MML and MoD trains to Ruddington.

 

[Taunton]

Less than a mile from station to town centre. There are stations that never closed that are as far if not further from the centre of the town they purport to serve.

Okehampton station is probably a mile higher than the town centre as well!! Have you ever walked it?

Bere Alston station is, like most ex-LSWR stations west of Salisbury, way out in the country, along the bleakest, narrowest Station Road imaginable. Would you send your children off to walk to school along here each day? https://www.google.com/maps/@50.482...4!1ss9GTo28AEXS0KzrTT0YGCg!2e0!7i13312!8i6656

 

[Pinza-C55]

My twp main nominations would be the Leamside Line and Harrogate - Ripon - Northallerton'

The Leamside provided an alternative to the 2 track ECML for diversions and IIRC only added 20 minutes to the journey time even in its last state as a freight only line. Passed through the large town of Washington and close to the Nissan car factory. Had only 2 level crossings. Signalling was all colour light and mainly CWR track.
Harrogate - Ripon - Northallerton provided services between Leeds and the major named towns as well as being a valuable diversionary route, a purpose it served when DP2 derailed at Thirsk and the line had to be temporarily reopened.

 

[Ianno87]

My twp main nominations would be the Leamside Line and Harrogate - Ripon - Northallerton'

The Leamside provided an alternative to the 2 track ECML for diversions and IIRC only added 20 minutes to the journey time even in its last state as a freight only line. Passed through the large town of Washington and close to the Nissan car factory. Had only 2 level crossings. Signalling was all colour light and mainly CWR track.
Harrogate - Ripon - Northallerton provided services between Leeds and the major named towns as well as being a valuable diversionary route, a purpose it served when DP2 derailed at Thirsk and the line had to be temporarily reopened.

Although from a "Diversionary" perspective, the Durham Coast line also fulfills the same purpose as the Leamside line over a longer section of the ECML, just with a slightly higher journey time cost.

The only non-diversion-able section of the northern ECML is Colton Jn-Northallerton, mitigated to some extent by this section being predominantly 4 track anyway.