West Coast Railways Suspended (now reinstated)

[driver_m]

Apologies if this has already been posted, seems to be cropping up on a few sites that WCRC has to suspend its operations on Network Rail metals. To do with the Tangmere Spad. Applies from tonight.

 

[Rich McLean]

Apologies if this has already been posted, seems to be cropping up on a few sites that WCRC has to suspend its operations on Network Rail metals. To do with the Tangmere Spad. Applies from tonight.

Not been made Public information yet. I have PM'd Ainsworth for him to post if he feels it relevant to re-open the existing thread or create a new one

 

[Jonfun]

At the end of the day, on the railways, if it isn't safe, you don't do it. And if you can't operate safely, whether you're its a steam train or pump trolley, you don't operate at all.

 

[carriageline]

I do feel sorry for them though. It isn't going to do their business any good. And then their is the staff who won't be making any money.

 

[TDK]

I do feel sorry for them though. It isn't going to do their business any good. And then their is the staff who won't be making any money.

Many of their staff are on zero hours contracts, to suspend a company like this is serious stuff and someone somewhere is to blame.

 

[stuartl]

How many other companies use West coast for their rolling stock ? Are there other's who could step in at short notice to provide replacements ? Now waiting to hear what will happen to the trips I've booked this year.

 

[Chris125]

I do feel sorry for them though. It isn't going to do their business any good. And then their is the staff who won't be making any money.

Have you read the independent report into the lineside fire with Olton Hall last year? I personally have no sympathy for a company with the attitude and behaviour depicted in that, if anything they were lucky not to be suspended nationally back then.

 

[Matt Taylor]

Is there a link to that report, I don't see on the RAIB site.

 

[LAX54]

includes charter passenger services, freight services, NSC services and light engine moves

 

[Lord Longhop]

Some would say this should have happened a long time ago and the railways will be a safer place for the suspension. Lets hope they and other companies of the same ilk put their houses in order and are back sooner rather than later, as it would be a crying shame for the charter train market to fold.

 

[IrishDave]

From Philip Haigh, of RAIL Magazine, on Twitter:

@philatrail: NR suspends @westcoastrail from 0000 3 Apr, saying WCR ops are a "threat to the safe operation of the railway". Cites response to SN45 SPAD.

@philatrail: NR says @westcoastrail suspension can be withdrawn if sufficient remedial action by 15 May 2015.

 

[zuriblue]

Is there a link to that report, I don't see on the RAIB site.

There's a bit of information here under ADA20.

http://www.accessdisputesrail.org/New ADC Web/Access Dispute Adjudications/ADA determinations.htm

 

[gazthomas]

Will they survive the suspension?

 

[theblackwatch]

NR seem to think it can be remedied. The letter can be downloaded from http://www.networkrailmediacentre.co.uk/news/statement-west-coast-railways-suspension-notice

 

[fv43576]

I have few charter with steam by Railway Tour Company which is hire by West coast company like to be cancelled?

 

[CharlieSpotted]

Having read some of the material linked...

As a layperson, I find it surprising that it's even possible to fit the various electronic safety systems to steam locos, and even more so that operators of steam locos are held to such a high standard in regard to them!

This SPAD sounds very serious indeed and I'm sure that some action must be taken, but it sounds like the driver was very much in error?

I can kind of (slightly) see where WCR are coming from in terms of seeing it as a NR vendetta against steam on main lines... I can at least see why someone might *feel* that way.

Am I being naive?

 

[Monty]

From Philip Haigh, of RAIL Magazine, on Twitter:

@philatrail: NR suspends @westcoastrail from 0000 3 Apr, saying WCR ops are a "threat to the safe operation of the railway". Cites response to SN45 SPAD.

@philatrail: NR says @westcoastrail suspension can be withdrawn if sufficient remedial action by 15 May 2015.

Just in time for the Jacobite season I can't help but notice.

I suspect this suspension will be lifted in due course but WCR are going have to do a lot to convice they are doing all they can to operate trains as safely as possible.

 

[route:oxford]

Just in time for the Jacobite season I can't help but notice.

Have the Scottish Government expressed "fear" yet?

Maybe something for the nippy sweetie to raise this evening...

 

[Monty]

This SPAD sounds very serious indeed and I'm sure that some action must be taken, but it sounds like the driver was very much in error?

The full details surrounding the SPAD are not yet available so it's not the case of simply putting it all on the driver (though he will be culpable to a degree) especially if there is fault with any of WCR's operations and training policies. NR seem to think that there is definately room for improvement that would significantly increase WCR's safety record. Don't forget this isn't one isolated incident this company has had scores of SoL (Safety of the Line) incidents and this was the final straw.

I can kind of (slightly) see where WCR are coming from in terms of seeing it as a NR vendetta against steam on main lines... I can at least see why someone might *feel* that way.

Am I being naive?

That's just WCR going on the defensive and playing the hard done by card, DB Schenker who also provide crews for steam hauled railtours don't seem to have this problem.

 

[455driver]

Can somebody explain to me-

1/ Why a safety system has been designed and fitted in such a way that it can be isolated within 8 seconds and so prevented from doing what it is designed to do?
I always thought that once the TPWS had operated the train would stop regardless of the drivers actions!

2/ Why a (so called) 'professional' driver would even consider isolating the system without working out why the system had operated or getting permission/ informing the controlling signaller?

3/ Can everyone work out what would have happened if the steamer got to the junction at the same time as the other train?

 

[ac6000cw]

Having read some of the material linked...

As a layperson, I find it surprising that it's even possible to fit the various electronic safety systems to steam locos, and even more so that operators of steam locos are held to such a high standard in regard to them!

It's simple - they are a commercial Train Operator, just like all the other TOCs and FOCs, so they (and the rolling stock they operate) have to conform to the same rules and regulations as the other operators. It's the same standard, not a higher standard. So the steam locos have to have working AWS, TPWS and OTMR equipment in order to operate on NR running lines.

 

[najaB]

Can somebody explain to me-

1/ Why a safety system has been designed and fitted in such a way that it can be isolated within 8 seconds and so prevented from doing what it is designed to do?

I won't attempt to answer your other two questions, but no doubt there will be cases when it is necessary to isolate the system - e.g. wrong direction moves, movements that have been agreed with the signaller due to wrong-side signal failures.

 

[IrishDave]

1/ Why a safety system has been designed and fitted in such a way that it can be isolated within 8 seconds and so prevented from doing what it is designed to do?
I always thought that once the TPWS had operated the train would stop regardless of the drivers actions!

I can't explain it, nor do I wish to defend the actions of the driver and fireman, but may I make two minor points: it was the AWS, not the TPWS; and it wasn't isolated after 8 seconds, it was after a loss of 8mph of speed:

Evidence shows that the driver and fireman instead took an action which cancelled the effect of the AWS braking demand after a short period and a reduction in train speed of only around 8 mph.

(see https://www.gov.uk/government/news/dangerous-occurrence-at-wootton-bassett-junction-wiltshire )

Nonetheless, it's still pretty damning. As I understand it the AWS/TPWS isolation is usually out of reach of the driver, so that it cannot be isolated while on the move. But with a second man in the cab, in this case the fireman, is it possible that the fireman has isolated the AWS/TPWS rather than the driver?

 

[jopsuk]

As a layperson, I find it surprising that it's even possible to fit the various electronic safety systems to steam locos, and even more so that operators of steam locos are held to such a high standard in regard to them!

The Great Western Railway deployed an early version of the system in 1906. The modern systems are a bit more complex (for a start, they use a non-contact system!) but nevertheless that established the basic principle.

 

[Islineclear3_1]

I know the other thread has been locked/closed but how long roughly until the full RAIB report comes out?

And yes, why would a "professional" driver isolate the AWS?

 

[theblackwatch]

3/ Can everyone work out what would have happened if the steamer got to the junction at the same time as the other train?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colwich_rail_crash - utter carnage...

I notice that WCRC senior management are the ones who come under fire in the letter from Network Rail:

Network Rail believes that an Event of Default has occurred because a breach of the Safety Obligations has already taken place or, in the alternative, is reasonably likely to take place. You are aware that Network Rail has had concerns about WCR’s performance of its Safety Obligations for some time and recent events lead Network Rail to believe that the operations of WCR are a threat to the safe operation of the railway. Specifically:
 WCR’s senior management response to the recent SPAD at SN45. This ranked as the most serious SPAD that has taken place this year when the industry risk ranking methodology was applied;
 The response by the senior management of WCR to the issues raised in the meeting of 30 March 2015, where WCR demonstrated that its controls, communication and commitment following the recent SPAD were inadequate;

 

[ComUtoR]

Can somebody explain to me-

1/ Why a safety system has been designed and fitted in such a way that it can be isolated within 8 seconds and so prevented from doing what it is designed to do?

I would say that many onboard systems can be isolated in such a way. They are designed to isolate systems and rely heavily on human action. They are also designed in such a way in that whatever it takes to isolate it is very much a deliberate action rather than "accidental"

I always thought that once the TPWS had operated the train would stop regardless of the drivers actions!

Someone posted in the spad thread that they knew how it was possible on the steam. Reading the incident. The Driver managed to override the brake activation (for an aws). At that point the system was isolated and the tpws/aws for the signal couldn't stop the train as it was isolated. Like you, I am stunned it was done on the fly whilst the train is moving.

However; I reckon I could isolate the TPWS whilst the train is in motion. On a networker it is a switch that would take a fraction of a second to flip. "in theory" would that override the brake application ?

2/ Why a (so called) 'professional' driver would even consider isolating the system without working out why the system had operated or getting permission/ informing the controlling signaller?

Scott Walford recently done something similar. In your experience I have no doubt you know various incidents that went unreported. Reset and Go used to be common when I first started. Was this Driver "old school" ?

3/ Can everyone work out what would have happened if the steamer got to the junction at the same time as the other train?

I don't like playing "what if.."

 

[Llama]

It is not certain that the driver isolated anything. Actions were taken that negated the effect of the brake application. TPWS 'temporary isolation' wouldn't clear an existing brake demand, and AWS full isolation would have prevented the subsequent warning that the literature suggests was received after whatever action the driver took.

The RAIB report might be out before Christmas if we are lucky.

 

[D1009]

How many other companies use West coast for their rolling stock ? Are there other's who could step in at short notice to provide replacements ? Now waiting to hear what will happen to the trips I've booked this year.

I'd I'd say it's likely all charter trains using WCR as the train operator in the near future are likely to be cancelled, and WCR will have to compensate the charter operators. It's technically possible for a charter operator to go to DBS or another operator, but this would take a lot of reorganistion and goodwill within the industry, which in the light of this incident will probably not be forthcoming.

 

[ComUtoR]

It is not certain that the driver isolated anything. Actions were taken that negated the effect of the brake application.

Something is seriously wrong then. The brake application I can accept but without isolating the AWS/TPWS I cannot for the life of me figure out what could prevent a further application without isolation. The other spad where the TPWS was "isolated" because of the "fault" was also worrying but that was and unknown. This is deliberate. :/

TPWS 'temporary isolation' wouldn't clear an existing brake demand, and AWS full isolation would have prevented the subsequent warning that the literature suggests was received after whatever action the driver took.

I wouldn't like to put that theory to the test. But I do know how to circumvent the brake application as well as "reset and go" both deliberately and "accidentally" I can also fully isolate the TPWS and AWS on the move. I wouldn't but I know it is possible.

The RAIB report might be out before Christmas if we are lucky.

What I find shocking is that they detail all the actions taken. I am unsure if I wanted to know how he did it. The volume of information available to the public about how a train works and the intricacies of the safety systems and how you can ignore them does freak me out a little.