TPWS was effectively an upgrade on the old AWS automatic warning system. At the time ATP was hugely expensive and might have only stopped small number of very serious crashes.
TPWS is an additional safety system that is selectivity fitted. It is normally only fitted where there is a potential conflict point after (beyond) the signal (and level crossings normally don't count). Unless a design specifies otherwise. Note that here, the phrase conflict point means a junction or points that allow another movement across, converging with the line that the signal is protecting.
I only speak about GWML ATP, as that is the type that I am familiar with.
IMHO, the costs that are used to justify not proceeding with ATP are misleading. They include fitting every single main aspect or semaphore signal in the country as part of a large scheme that would therefore require specific large funding and which would most likely bring most, if not all other signalling work to a halt. In addition, every single loco, EMU, DMU etc, would need to be taken out of service to be fitted with ATP.
Also keep in mind that at the time, it was not mandatory for signals to be fitted with AWS. And indeed, there were both freight and passenger lines that were not fitted with AWS. Yes, these were mostly branch lines. So with a national ATP fitment, signals that did not even have AWS would have been required to have ATP fitted.
In the real world, a far more sensible approach would have been to add a requirement to all new trains to be ATP fitted during manufacture. In the long term, this would have saved money. Looking back, how many new trains have been introduced since 1993?
Then to fit the high speed, main lines, or busy lines first. To fit the trains that travelled on these lines first. And to roll out the above as a rolling programme. Leaving all other lines later to when the existing signalling was due to be upgraded, renewed, replaced due to other reasons.
Also, it needs to be realised that fitting GWML ATP to a multi-aspect colour light signal does not require
ANY alterations to the interlocking whatsoever unless said signal has a route indicator (any type). There are no alterations to the circuitry in the signal box/panel.
For signals that do have a route indicator (any type), the alteration is very minor.
Hence, with the vast majority of signals, fitting GWML ATP is
considerably cheaper than fitting the very same signal with TPWS (all signals fitted with TPWS require alterations to the interlocking, and a lot will also require alterations to the circuitry in the signal box/panel).
Hence when the costs of ATP (as a national project) are compared with TPWS (where only a fraction of signals are fitted) is IMHO very misleading.
No one will ever know what the outcome of fitting ATP on at least the high speed, main lines, or busy lines would have been. But it would have most certainly have saved lives, reduced the number of injuries and reduced the number of over-speeding incidents.
You may call AWS old, but it's not the oldest system with similar features. GWR had its ATC (Automatic Train Control) system for example, which had the same functionality.
AWS is still a current standard and for a lot of signals, is the only 'safety system'.
AWS was a simple warning that the signal ahead is either red or another aspect. It was placed on approach to a signal, and if red needed intervention within few seconds or it applied the brakes.
AWS is a
warning system that alerts the driver when a signal is not showing a green aspect (or equivalent). If the driver does not acknowledge the warning, after a short delay, the train brakes will automatically be applied.
To be clear, if the signal is not lit (black/no light), is red, single yellow, double yellow, or at caution, then a horn (or equivalent noise) sounds in the cab.
Only if the signal is showing green (or off) will the bell (or equivalent noise) sound in the cab.
AWS also has the advantage that the train will still detect each installation even if there is no electrical power to any of the signalling system. As the permanent magnets used work without needing a power source (the rest of the system does need electrical power).
AWS and other similar systems (such as GWR ATC) have saved many, many lives. If this has been proposed to be brought in as one large project like costed for ATP, AWS would never have happened either....
TPWS as explained above had the approach replaced by over speed grids (so it only intervened if train was going too fast to stop before danger point). I believe there are 2 settings and freight locos are set at 80% of passenger speed permitted due to different train braking characteristics. From memory mixed traffic locos have a switch that can be set to which time (but not sure about this)
The reason was that in busy areas or at commuter times, many trains do not get green line clear signals, but get regular yellow or double yellow signals (signal after, or 2 after is red), so ok to proceed, but not at unrestricted speeds as signal further ahead is red. A balance between keeping the railway moving and slowing trains approaching red signals.
TPWS therefore has two functions, the over speed (which replaced the simple red or not, but couldn't distinguish the yellow cautions, treating them same as green), and an absolute stop, (the grid adjacent to the signal).
For the TPWS equipment used for the track based / line side part of the system, all the loops ("grids", "toast racks") are exactly the same. Apart from where the line speed is low, in which case shorter versions are available (typically seen in platform lines). The differences are in the position, the spacing between pairs of loops and in the frequency transmitted by each loop.
Each TPWS installation is built up using different combinations of standard parts.
A typical installation is a signal with an OSS (Over Speed System) and a TSS (Train Stop System).
The OSS has two loops, an "arming" and a "trigger" some distance on approach to the signal. The distance between these two loops sets the trigger speed. If a train passes at or above the set speed, the train brakes will be applied. To prevent trains being affected when the signal is showing a proceed aspect, these loops are powered down.
The distance away from the signal is related to where the first potential conflict point after (beyond) the signal is and the line speed
TPWS provided for a speed restriction is effectively an OSS that is always powered.
TPWS provided for movements towards buffer stops is also an OSS that is always powered.
TPWS+ also known as OSS+ is an additional OSS installation used at 'high-risk' locations, increasing the effectiveness to 100MPH. OSS+ is mounted at a greater distance away from the potential conflict point.
A TSS is always provided at a signal that is required to have TPWS. As previously described, a pair of loops is mounted close together in line in one arrangement such that from a train, it looks like one long loop. A powered TSS will always trigger the brakes if a train passes over it. The TSS loops are powered down when the signal shows a proceed aspect.
Because the speed and braking capacity and other characteristics vary between different train types, and TPWS is not a computer based system, the duration of the timer used in the train equipment is different for passenger class trains and freight trains. Thus, for a freight train, a OSS set speed is lower than for a passenger train at the same OSS.
TPWS does not solve the problem of trains encountering multiple signals showing caution (yellow or double yellow) aspects. As many of these signals will not have a potential point of collision beyond the signal, hence there is normally no requirement for TPWS to be fitted...
The problem with drivers encountering multiple consecutive signals showing caution, is that with them repeatedly acknowledging the warning from the AWS, this may become routine. So when the next signal is showing a red, they get the same horn, they automatically acknowledge the warning from the AWS, then if they are not paying attention, they may find that they cannot stop their train before passing the signal at danger. ATP does solve this issue.
That seems like a problem with a (relatively) simple solution...
The plug in modules had a specification change. Now the plugboard contacts must be gold plated. However, there is no requirement for the baseplate contacts to be gold plated. So although it reduces the problem (well, delays the problem), it does not solve it. As you still have two different metals... The powers that be presumably know about it. But someone must have done a cost benefit analyst and decided not to make any further changes.