I do not think in the future it is unrealistic for a train to track objects in the distance, they could begin building up a database of constantly evolving images of what the railways are like and could use that to detect changes (ie objects). There's nothing particularly fanciful about track workers wearing RFID tags, they're cheap and reliable. RFID technology was in fact popularised by US railroads decades ago for tracking containers.
Do you actually understand how the auto flight systems on an aircraft work? It’s not as automated as you seem to believe. I’ve not contributed to this thread as it’s the same arguments over and over again in a new thread every few months or so.
+1 on the aircraft autopilot. The idea that a pilot is sitting there most of the time doing nothing is ridiculous but one put out by the consistently by the media. It's exactly the same with signallers. On a large IECC worksation most trains are signalled from the timetable by ARS but the signaller can still have a massive workload.
Of course its possible for a trackworker to wear a RFID tag in the same way its possible for them to wear an orange top hat. And yes they use them in many places to count things. However they are unidirectional and there is no safety critical elements to the way they operate. If you miscount a container its not a life and death matter. It would need additional equipment like GPS etc to make it work. What happens if the RFID fails? It's just not failsafe.
As per my previous post, and I urge you to read the report the Watford crash could have been very serious indeed. It was by a fluke of axle/transmission design that the trains didn't collide head on in a tunnel.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploa...t_data/file/636626/R112017_170810_Watford.pdf The independent report says:
The consequences of the accident were mitigated by the actions of the train
crews in the following ways:
a. Early use of the GSM-R emergency button by the driver of train 2K04 before
his train stopped moving (paragraph 33).
b. Quick response to the emergency stop message by the driver of train 2Y59, by
applying his train’s brakes in time to significantly reduce the speed of collision.
It is likely that this reduced both the extent of injuries and the amount of
damage (paragraph 34).
c. Early notification of the accident to the signaller by both drivers (paragraphs
37 and 45).
d. Actions of the guards, including checking and reporting that no passengers
were seriously injured, communicating with the drivers, keeping passengers
informed, and assisting with detrainment (paragraphs 40 and 47).
It also notes that the crash happened at 06.55 and that the first person MOM got to an access point at 07.20 which was 400m away from the crash site. Not bad although could have been way longer on other parts of the network. If they had been crewless as people seem to be clamouring for there may have been an uncontrolled evacuation on to the main lines. Sense says we need proper trained crew on the trains as well as technology.