Carmont (near Stonehaven) derailment - 12 August 2020

[ainsworth74]

A further update from the RAIB replacing their previous one and including more information about the landslip itself and the movements of 1T08:

The RAIB is investigating a fatal accident that occurred near Carmont on the national rail network in Scotland.

At around 09:38 hrs on Wednesday 12 August 2020, all six vehicles of a passenger train derailed after striking a landslip around 1.4 miles (2.25 km) north-east of Carmont, Aberdeenshire. There were nine people on the train at the time of the accident - three train crew (the driver, conductor and a second conductor travelling as a passenger on this train) and six passengers. Tragically, the driver of the train, the train’s conductor and one passenger suffered fatal injuries in the accident. The remaining passengers and member of train crew were taken to hospital.

On the morning of 12 August, there were thunderstorms with associated heavy rain in southern Aberdeenshire. Weather records indicate that between 05:00 hrs and 09:00 hrs, around 52 mm of rain fell in the Carmont area. This is almost 75% of the total monthly rainfall (70 mm) for Aberdeenshire in an average August.

The site of the accident was approximately four miles (6.4 km) south-west of Stonehaven and 20 miles (32 km) north of Montrose, on the double track main line which runs between Dundee and Aberdeen. The train, which was operated by Abellio (trading as ScotRail), was a High Speed Train set with a leading power car, four Mark 3 passenger coaches and a rear power car. It had originally been operating as train reporting number 1T08, the 06:38 hrs service from Aberdeen to Glasgow Queen Street. Train 1T08 had departed on time from Aberdeen and then from Stonehaven, its next scheduled stop.

After departing from Stonehaven, train 1T08 continued past Carmont on the up (southbound) line until it was stopped by the signaller at Carmont at 06:59 hrs, using a radio message. This was because the signaller had just received a report from the driver of train 2B13, which was on the down (northbound) line, that a landslip was obstructing the up line between Carmont and Laurencekirk.

Google Earth image showing locations

Train 1T08 stood south of Carmont for over two hours. Soon after 09:00 hrs, after the rain stopped, the skies cleared and by 09:30 hrs there was bright sunshine.

The northbound train (2B13) which had reported the landslip had been held at Stonehaven station because of reports of flooding between Stonehaven and Aberdeen. At 09:10 hrs, after its passengers had alighted, train 2B13 was moved a short distance forward to create space in the platform at Stonehaven. It was apparent that train 1T08 could not continue its journey south, and the decision was taken to run it to Stonehaven, to enable onward travel for the passengers. At 09:25 hrs train 1T08 was given permission to start moving north, and was routed over a crossover at Carmont onto the down line. The signaller at Carmont cleared the signal for the train to proceed to Stonehaven, and the train continued north, passing over the crossover at 5 mph (8 km/h) at 09:36 hrs. Its speed increased, reaching 72.8 mph (117.1 km/h) after it had travelled for approximately 1.4 miles (2.25 km), which is within the maximum permitted speed for HSTs of 75 mph (120 km/h) on this stretch of line.

At around 09:38 hrs, the train struck a landslip covering the down line and derailed. As the track curved to the right, the train continued in a roughly straight line for around 77 yards (70 metres) until it struck a section of bridge parapet, which was destroyed. The leading power car continued most of the way over the bridge and fell from the railway down a wooded embankment, as did the third passenger carriage. The first passenger carriage came to rest on its roof, having rotated to be almost at right angles to the track. The second passenger carriage also overturned onto its roof and came to rest on the first carriage. The fourth passenger carriage remained upright and attached to the rear power car; it also came to rest on the first carriage. All wheelsets of the rear power car derailed, but it remained upright.

Aerial photograph of derailment site

In the area where the derailment occurred, on the left-hand side of the railway (in the direction of travel of the train) a slope rises steeply to a field which then slopes gently upwards away from the railway. A drain runs northwards along the lower edge of the field until it reaches an access chamber about 50 metres south of the landslip area, from where it runs diagonally down the steep slope, passing through two more access chambers, until it reaches an outfall structure at a track level ditch which takes water northwards towards Carron Water. The drain running diagonally consists of a 450 millimetre (18 inch) diameter plastic pipe laid at the bottom of a trench. After the drain was installed, the trench was filled with gravel. Water flowing from land above the railway washed some of this gravel onto the railway, together with some larger pieces of rock which had formed part of soil eroded from the sides of the trench.

Lineside features in the area of the landslip

We are currently collecting evidence needed to identify factors relevant to the cause of the accident and its consequences. The scope of the investigation is likely to include:

• the sequence of events and the actions of those involved
• the operating procedures applied
• the management of earthworks and drainage in this area, including recent inspections and risk assessments
• the general management of earthworks and drainage and associated procedures designed to manage the risk of extreme weather events
• the behaviour of the train during, and following the derailment
• the consequences of the derailment and a review of the damage caused to the rolling stock
• underlying management factors
• actions taken in response to previous safety recommendations

We will publish our findings, including any recommendations to improve safety, at the conclusion of our investigation. This report will be available on our website.

The RAIB’s investigation is independent of any investigation by the railway industry, and of the joint investigation instructed by the Lord Advocate to be carried out by British Transport Police, Police Scotland and by the industry’s regulator, the Office of Rail and Road.

Report 02/2022: Derailment of a passenger train at Carmont

Derailment of a passenger train at Carmont, Aberdeenshire, 12 August 2020.

www.gov.uk

Edit: 25/08/2020

An article from the BBC regarding some of the disgraceful comments in certain sections of the media (and even some in the railway press) which seem to be trying suggest/hint that the driver had some blame in the accident:

Stonehaven derailment: Widow says train driver 'did all he was told to do'


The wife of the train driver who died in the Aberdeenshire derailment has said her husband did everything he was told to do before the accident.

Stephanie McCullough said she could not stand people implying that "my beautiful kind husband was to blame".

The train had reached almost 73mph before it hit a landslip, according to a report published by the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) on Friday.

The RAIB said this was within the 75mph limit on the line near Stonehaven.

Driver Brett McCullough, 45, conductor Donald Dinnie, 58, and passenger Christopher Stuchbury, 62, died in the crash last week. Six others were injured.

Mr McCullough's widow posted a message on social media saying: "I can assure you Brett loved his job and did everything by the book."

She added that the "black box" recorder on the train had logged all communications between her husband and ScotRail staff.

Mrs McCullough said: "When Brett was at Carmont, he was actually held there for 2 hours, when Brett was told to proceed back north he was told it was good to proceed at line speed that was 75mph, he was under that!!

"We also know Brett saw the landslide because the emergency brakes were applied. Many people don't know that you can't just stop a train! When the brakes are applied it could take up to a mile to stop a train, it's not instant like a car."

The RAIB report confirms that the accident took place at about 09:38, just a few minutes before the first reports reached the emergency services.

Investigators said all six vehicles of the train derailed after it struck the landslip 1.4 miles north-east of Carmont in Aberdeenshire.

Mrs McCullough's Facebook message added: "It's extremely hurtful to think people are judging Brett when they have absolutely no idea what they are talking about. Nobody should go to work and not come home.

"I have 3 heartbroken children here who Brett adored. His family was his world and he cared so much about people. Nobody can say a bad word about my kind gentle husband. Steph x."

Describing conditions at the time of the crash, the RAIB said there had been thunderstorms in the area, with 52mm (2in) of rain falling within the space of four hours. This is about 70% of the total monthly rainfall which could be expected in Aberdeenshire in August.

The high-speed train - with two power cars and four carriages - had been operating the 06:38 service from Aberdeen to Glasgow.

It was initially stopped at Carmont at 06:59, after a northbound train reported a landslip further south, on the section of track between Carmont and Laurencekirk.

After sitting at Carmont for more than two hours, it was decided to move the train back to Stonehaven, to allow passengers to get off.

The driver was given permission to move north at 09:25, moving at 5mph initially as it crossed on to the northbound track, but then accelerating to 72.8mph.

The investigators said that, after it was derailed by the landslip, the train continued for 77 yards (70 metres) before hitting the parapet of a bridge.

Widow says train driver 'did all he was told to do'

Brett McCullough died along with a conductor and passenger when their train derailed near Stonehaven.

www.bbc.co.uk

Please do feel free to report this post with any updates from official sources or other reasons that we may wish to consider posting an update. One minor request though is that if you do get in touch please provide a link (if available) to whatever the update is. It makes it much easier for us to track things down and avoid having to guess what you may be referring to!

 

[Mag_seven]

A further update from Network Rail as reported by the BBC:

Stonehaven derailment: Report says climate change impact on railways 'accelerating'

A report into the fatal derailment near Stonehaven says the industry must improve its response to extreme weather.

www.bbc.co.uk

Network Rail has admitted that the impact of climate change on its network "is an area that is accelerating faster than our assumptions"

It said a fatal derailment near Stonehaven on 12 August showed that the industry must improve its response to extreme weather.

 

[Mag_seven]

Update:

One of the conductors involved in this incident has posted on Facebook that she has returned to work and yesterday was her first live train working on her own

Morning Just thought I would post an update as I'm still getting loads of messages.

As you are all aware I was involved in the Stonehaven 1T08. 6 months on and im officially working my first shift today by myself...I started back to work after being off for 5.5 months after intense therapy which thankfully has worked so far and all my physically injuries have healed up too. Been out and about the past 4 weeks doing a phased return having another conductor on train in case I needed their assistance ❤

After a review with my manager on Thursday we decided I would try out on my own again from today which I was both equally nervous and excited for.

It feels so good to be back and out doing the job I love.

Just wanted to say once again a massive thank you for all the cards, posts, messages etc I have received over the past 6 months...they all mean to much to me ❤

#RailwayFamily

 

[Morayshire]

The earthworks management report by Lord Robert Mair has now been published.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-56428611

"Drones and helicopters should be used more often for railway inspections, an investigation launched after the Stonehaven crash has recommended.

A task force led by civil engineer Lord Robert Mair, of the University of Cambridge, has examined the management of railway cuttings and embankments.

In a report, the group said aerial checks could help identify problems.

Three people died and six were injured when a train travelling from Aberdeen crashed into a landslip last year.

The incident close to Carmont, near Stonehaven in Aberdeenshire, on 12 August followed heavy rain.

Driver Brett McCullough, 45, conductor Donald Dinnie, 58, and passenger Christopher Stuchbury, 62, died when the 06:38 Aberdeen to Glasgow Queen Street train crashed and derailed

Network Rail's interim report on the crash found that the train "struck a pile of washed-out rock and gravel before derailing".

Lord Mair's UK government-commissioned report said "shortfalls in the earthwork examination and risk evaluation system need to be addressed", with "significant investment" required to update the company's monitoring and surveillance methods.

"More regular and frequent use" should be made of helicopters and drones to identify problems, his task force suggested.

The report was published alongside a study into the impact of heavy rainfall on the railway.

A total of more than 50 safety recommendations were made to Network Rail in the report.

Martin Frobisher, Network Rail's safety and engineering director, said: "It is clear that extreme weather presents a significant challenge to the way we safely and reliably manage railway infrastructure.

"We do a vast amount to tackle the effects of climate change already but there is more to do.

"We established two independent, expert task forces led by world-class specialists to investigate the problems we face and, crucially, to guide us as we make substantial improvements.

"We will carefully consider every single recommendation and develop a science-backed improvement plan, to target available money and technology in the best possible way. This is a real breakthrough."

UK Transport Secretary Grant Shapps said: "We must do everything we can to keep our railways safe."

He added: "These findings will inform our work as we push ahead with measures to make our railway more resilient in future, and less vulnerable to sudden tragedies like that near Stonehaven."

A spokesman for train drivers' union Aslef said the UK government needed to provide Network Rail with sufficient funding "so it can carry out the work that is needed to maintain our rail infrastructure so that passengers, and crew, can be confident of the safety of our railway".

The line at the scene of the crash was opened to trains in November following repairs."

The full 420 page pdf report is freely available on the Network Rail website at the link below along with the weather advisory report and an update on the "resilience of rail infrastructure."

https://www.networkrail.co.uk/who-we-are/our-approach-to-safety/stonehaven/

It has been seven months since a passenger train derailed at Carmont, near Stonehaven and three people tragically lost their lives. Our thoughts remain with the families and friends of Brett McCullough, Donald Dinnie and Christopher Stuchbury, and everyone affected by the awful events of 12 August last year. We owe it to them all to learn lessons.


Although formal investigations into the derailment continue, interim findings suggest that the train collided with stone washed out from the land above the tracks, and that heavy rainfall that morning played a significant role in the washout. Our railway remains one of the safest in Europe and accidents are thankfully incredibly rare, however it is clear that we are facing a substantial challenge in managing rail infrastructure in the face of extreme weather....

 

[ainsworth74]

The RAIB have published their interim report into this accident. You can find the report at this link. An extract can be found below:

...

Events during the accident

48 In the area of bridge 325, north of Carmont, heavy rain between 05:50 hrs and 09:00 hrs on 12 August 2020 resulted in gravel from the crest drain, together with stones and soil eroded from the surrounding ground, being washed onto the track. This debris covered the down line at 220 miles 1610 yards. The precise time at which this occurred is not known, but must be between about 07:07 hrs, when the last train before the accident passed this location (paragraph 37), and the arrival of train 1T08 at about 09:37 hrs.

49 Data from the on-train data recorder (OTDR) fitted to the trailing power car shows train 1T08 travelling at about 73 mph (117 km/h), which was less than the maximum permitted speed of 75 mph (121 km/h), as it approached the washout debris. The left-hand curve on the approach obstructed the driver’s view of the debris until the train was about 120 metres from it. The train covered this distance in less than four seconds. Although the OTDR records an application of the emergency brake, there was insufficient time for this to have had any significant effect on the train’s speed before it struck the debris. When the leading power car struck the debris, it derailed to the left. Its leading end progressively deviated towards the cess as the track curved to the right, and it continued running derailed for around 60 metres until it struck a section of bridge parapet. After destroying more than half the parapet, the power car fell off the bridge and down onto a wooded embankment below, and the driver’s cab became detached on impact with the ground.

50 Three of the following five vehicles travelled in different directions beyond the bridge (figure 12). The first passenger coach came to rest on its roof, almost at right angles to the track. The second passenger coach came to rest overturned onto its roof with its trailing end on top of the first coach and facing the direction of travel. The third passenger coach ran down the steep embankment to the left side of the railway and came to rest on its right-hand side. The fourth passenger coach remained upright and came to rest with its leading end on top of the first coach. The trailing power car remained upright on the down line, still coupled to the rear of the fourth coach. The behaviour of the train in the derailment and the damage it sustained are described in more detail in paragraphs 71 to 83.

Events after the accident

51 The contractors working on the scour protection project at bridge 325 (paragraph 31) had a small team on site on 12 August 2020 to protect plant and equipment from rising water levels. Two people were standing by the river when they heard a ‘loud rumbling noise from above’, and ran as the derailed vehicles fell down the embankment. The contractor’s supervisor made a 999 call at about 09:37 hrs.

52 At 09:43 hrs Police Scotland advised route control of a report of a train off the track and on fire between Carmont and Stonehaven. This message was passed to the signaller at Stonehaven, who in turn called the Carmont signaller, and at 09:48 hrs the signallers stopped all further train movements between these locations. Network Rail staff, including the MOM who had been at Carmont signal box, reached the site of the accident at approximately 09:55 hrs, and the emergency services started to arrive at around 10:13 hrs. At 10:15 hrs a conductor who had been travelling to Dundee as a passenger on train 1T08 phoned Carmont signal box from a lineside telephone, having walked along the line from the site of the accident.

53 The scour protection contractor’s staff provided initial assistance to the injured people on the train. They also used a small excavator that was on site to move a portable fuel tank away from the scene, to put water on one of the fires (see paragraph 83) and to place a timber mat across the river to make a temporary bridge. Local residents also responded and provided assistance to injured people and the emergency services.

54 During the first few hours after the derailment, the emergency services established their presence on site, removed the injured people to hospital and extinguished the fire in coach B.

...

Cause of the derailment

59 The train derailed after colliding with stones washed out onto the track from the gravel-filled crest drain and from the adjacent ground. Post-accident surveys of the track found no evidence suggesting the derailment occurred on the approach to the debris on the track, and verified pre-accident inspections which had found no track defects in this area. RAIB has not found any evidence of a train fault that could have played a part in its derailment.

60 The first evidence that train wheels had deviated from the rails was identified less than one metre beyond the point where the left-hand rail emerged from beneath the debris. The top surface of the rail was scored by the flange of the leading left- hand wheel as it started to derail.

Cause of the washout

61 The washout was caused by unusually heavy rain (paragraph 19) which washed stone from the gravel-filled crest drain near catchpit 18, and from surrounding ground, onto the adjacent track leaving the perforated drainage pipe exposed. Local ground topography directed large amounts of surface water onto the steeply sloping drain in the area from which gravel was washed (figure 8). Although surface water flow alone can dislodge gravel, and stones of other sizes, RAIB is continuing to investigate whether other factors, such as the drainage system’s design or the quality of installation, contributed to the displacement of material.

62 The topography of the area around the washout, as recorded by an RAIB aerial survey immediately after the accident, is shown in figure 8. Gravel was missing from the drain to a depth sufficient to expose the buried pipe partially or completely for a distance of about eight metres upslope of catchpit 18 (figure 13). Material was also missing for an additional six metres around and downslope of catchpit 18 (figure 14). Evidence of large surface water flows in this area was shown by detritus caught on a fence and by erosion of channels in the soil immediately upslope of the drain.

63 The colour and shape of the drain fill, as evidenced by gravel remaining in the drain, differed from stones occurring naturally in the surrounding area and represented a significant proportion of the debris on the track. The locally occurring material found on the track was probably washed from the surrounding soil and the slope close to the track. Stones similar to those found in the debris on the track were seen in natural soil exposed in the trench sides in areas where the gravel fill had been washed out.

64 It is possible that surface water flows, before the day of the accident, had been sufficient to dislodge gravel from small areas of the gravel-filled drain, sufficient to be seen in the area affected, but with insufficient material washed down for this to be apparent at track level. The lack of an effective drainage inspection regime (paragraph 26) meant that any such indications of future problems upslope of catchpit 18 would not have been detected.

...

The derailment and its consequences

71 When the train struck the washout debris, the leading bogie of the leading power car derailed to the left (cess) side of the track, followed by the trailing bogie within a few metres. The leading bogie progressively drifted towards the cess as it approached the bridge. None of the following vehicles appear to have derailed at the landslip. By the time the power car reached the bridge, its leading end was displaced so far to the left that it struck the bridge parapet, demolishing it and, as a result, deviating even further to the left of the track. Near the middle of the bridge, the leading power car became detached from the first passenger coach. During the detachment, the first passenger coach climbed over the trailing right- hand side of the power car, which caused substantial structural damage to the vehicle ends involved in this interaction. The power car then fell off the bridge and down onto the embankment below. The leading bogie of the first passenger coach followed the leading power car onto the embankment.

72 The first passenger coach and following vehicles continued over and beyond the bridge. The first three coaches then jack-knifed in sequence, each becoming uncoupled from the adjoining vehicles, shedding all their bogies and rotating in different directions in the horizontal plane. The first passenger coach (D) rotated to the left (anticlockwise) and came to rest on its roof and almost at right angles to the track. The second coach (C) rotated to the right, ran through some trees and collided with the bank on the cess side of the up line. It then spun round further and came to rest upside down having rotated almost 180 degrees so its trailing end was on top of coach D.

73 The third coach (B) rotated to the left, ran down the steep embankment and came to rest on its right-hand side at an angle of 130 degrees to the track. The fourth coach (A) continued upright on its bogies, until it struck debris from the other vehicles near coach D, and was lifted up and to the left of the track, coming to rest on top of the leading end of coach D. The trailing end of Coach A remained coupled to the trailing power car, which stayed upright.

74 As a result of the derailment and damage to the vehicles, the train driver, the conductor in coach D and a passenger in coach C all suffered fatal injuries. The six other occupants of the train suffered injuries, some serious.

75 The leading power car and all four passenger coaches suffered substantial damage, with the extent of the damage reducing progressively towards the rear of the train.

76 On the leading power car, the driver’s cab became completely detached when the vehicle collided with the bank, and the roof, right-hand body side, trailing end, bogies and underframe were substantially damaged.

77 The first passenger coach (D) suffered severe damage to the leading vestibule, roof, and body sides over the leading half of the vehicle, which resulted in significant loss of survival space in that area. The collapsed roof and bodysides also caused substantial disruption to the interior furniture, light fittings and trim panels in that area, but the seats and tables remained attached. Almost all the windows in the leading half of the vehicle were broken through.

78 The second coach (C) sustained damage to the leading vestibule, and localised penetration damage to the trailing left-hand side, most likely as a result of impacts with detached bogies. There was also penetration of the trailing right-hand side. Four windows along the left trailing side were broken through. The coach retained its survival space and the interior furniture remained in place except within a localised area at the trailing end where the seats had been pushed into the aisle by damage to the left-hand body side.

79 The third coach (B) sustained substantial damage to the right-hand body side, roof and underframe equipment, and some damage to the leading vestibule. All the windows on the right-hand side and most of those on the left-hand side were broken through. Coach B later caught fire, which resulted in most of the vehicle’s interior being burnt.

80 The fourth coach (A) suffered substantial damage to the leading vestibule and localised damage to both body sides, and the leading bogie pivot and underframe equipment were severely damaged. Several windows were also shattered but not broken through. The interior remained intact.

81 The trailing power car did not suffer any significant damage.

The RAIB are continuing to investigate the following areas:

Areas of ongoing investigation

89 The main areas being considered by RAIB as part of its ongoing investigation are:

- The railway’s responses to severe weather events and weather-related infrastructure failures

- The competence and training of operational staff to deal effectively with such events

- The railway’s management systems and decision-making processes at times of wide-spread disruption caused by severe weather and/or multiple instances of infrastructure failure

- The railway’s use of weather data to help it manage events such as:

o major winter storms, which can often be forecast with relatively high certainty​

o localised events, such as intense summer storms, for which details cannot be forecast with confidence, but which may be apparent from real-time weather monitoring.​

- In respect of the Carmont drainage system:

o the actual behaviour of the drainage system and a comparison of this with the intended behaviour; an investigation strand which includes analysis of relevant ground and groundwater data, collection of additional ground and groundwater data and mathematical modelling​

o the validation and approval of the drain design methodology, design data, and design output​

o the way in which the drain was constructed and actions taken in response to issues identified during construction and the quality of installation​

o the intended and actual post-construction inspection processes and reasons for any differences.​

- In respect of the train and the mitigation of derailments:

o causes of the fires, particularly the fire in coach B​

o possible effects of fire on the way in which windows broke​

o causes of the injuries sustained by the people on the train​

o crashworthiness of rail vehicles in high energy accidents​

o the performance of devices fitted on trains to displace obstacles on the track​

o devices to mitigate risk in the event of derailments at high-risk locations.​

- The likely effect of climate change on the type of weather event that caused the accident at Carmont, and its relevance to the future management of railway drainage

- Underlying management factors, including the development and validation of standards relating to risk management of extreme weather events

- The railway industry’s responses to previous RAIB recommendations

- Recommendations for the improvement of railway safety.

This thread has therefore be re-opened for discussion and comments regarding the findings of the interim report.

 

[najaB]

Still reading but this stood out:

61 The washout was caused by unusually heavy rain (paragraph 19) which washed stone from the gravel-filled crest drain near catchpit 18, and from surrounding ground, onto the adjacent track leaving the perforated drainage pipe exposed.

There is a degree of situational irony that the drain designed to protect the railway actually played a role in the accident.

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

Only an interim report but gives a lot more detail to the events leading upto the washout and what happened to the train. So there assessment is only the PC derailed not the following vehicles so had the bridge abutment not been there would have been a different outcome

When the train struck the washout debris, the leading bogie of the leading power car derailed to the left (cess) side of the track, followed by the trailing bogie within a few metres. The leading bogie progressively drifted towards the cess as it approached the bridge. None of the following vehicles appear to have derailed at the landslip. By the time the power car reached the bridge, its leading end was displaced so far to the left that it struck the bridge parapet, demolishing it and, as a result, deviating even further to the left of the track. Near the middle of the bridge, the leading power car became detached from the first passenger coach. During the detachment, the first passenger coach climbed over the trailing right- hand side of the power car, which caused substantial structural damage to the vehicle ends involved in this interaction. The power car then fell off the bridge and down onto the embankment below. The leading bogie of the first passenger
coach followed the leading power car onto the embankment.

The investigation still has fair amount to conclude

RAIB as part of its ongoing investigation are:
l The railway’s responses to severe weather events and weather-related infrastructure failures
l The competence and training of operational staff to deal effectively with such events
l The railway’s management systems and decision-making processes at times of wide-spread disruption caused by severe weather and/or multiple instances of infrastructure failure
l The railway’s use of weather data to help it manage events such as:
o major winter storms, which can often be forecast with relatively high certainty
o localised events, such as intense summer storms, for which details cannot be forecast with confidence, but which may be apparent from real-time weather monitoring.
l In respect of the Carmont drainage system:
o the actual behaviour of the drainage system and a comparison of this with the intended behaviour; an investigation strand which includes analysis of relevant ground and groundwater data, collection of additional ground and groundwater data and mathematical modelling
o the validation and approval of the drain design methodology, design data, and design output
o the way in which the drain was constructed and actions taken in response to issues identified during construction and the quality of installation
o the intended and actual post-construction inspection processes and reasons for any differences.
l In respect of the train and the mitigation of derailments:
o causes of the fires, particularly the fire in coach B
o possible effects of fire on the way in which windows broke
o causes of the injuries sustained by the people on the train
o crashworthiness of rail vehicles in high energy accidents
o the performance of devices fitted on trains to displace obstacles on the track
o devices to mitigate risk in the event of derailments at high-risk locations.
Report IR1/2021 28 April 2021
l The likely effect of climate change on the type of weather event that caused the accident at Carmont, and its relevance to the future management of railway drainage
l Underlying management factors, including the development and validation of standards relating to risk management of extreme weather events
l The railway industry’s responses to previous RAIB recommendations
l Recommendations for the improvement of railway safety.

 

[scotraildriver]

I don't think a HST cab has ever completely detached like that before. Worrying.

 

[43 302]

So there assessment is only the PC derailed not the following vehicles"

Four out of six vehicles completely derailed.

 

[Stuch]

Four out of six vehicles completely derailed.

Only the power car derailed as a result of the landslip I think they meant, the three following passenger cars derailed after the power car struck the parapet.

 

[najaB]

I don't think a HST cab has ever completely detached like that before. Worrying.

Has there been a previous accident with similar forces involved?

 

[43096]

Has there been a previous accident with similar forces involved?

Ladbroke Grove, but that was closer to a head-on collision and the cab (and a significant amount of the bodywork behind it) was destroyed.

 

[najaB]

Ladbroke Grove, but that was closer to a head-on collision and the cab (and a significant amount of the bodywork behind it) was destroyed.

I think this accident was pretty unique in that there would have been a lot of torque on the cab involved as the body of the power car revolved around it as a pivot.

 

[snookertam]

Hadn’t been aware that there had been contractors nearby and had attended so soon. Their actions quite possibly prevented a worse tragedy.

 

[Stuch]

I think this accident was pretty unique in that there would have been a lot of torque on the cab involved as the body of the power car revolved around it as a pivot.

I think the cab sheared off the frame completely when the bottom of the car collided with the bank.

 

[saxsux]

Still reading but this stood out:

There is a degree of situational irony that the drain designed to protect the railway actually played a role in the accident.

Paragraphs 61-63 are pretty damming, and I think you come surmise that role played by the drain was quite a major one. A substantial amount of the debris on the track was actually the gravel that surrounded the drain, and the rest of the debris could have been stones and soil that were exposed after the gravel washed away. RAIB are investigating whether the design or installation quality of the drain affected the amount of material that was washed away.

Doubly ironic was that 1T08 was turned around to avoid a landslip at Ironies Bridge.

Hadn’t been aware that there had been contractors nearby and had attended so soon. Their actions quite possibly prevented a worse tragedy.

This really struck me too. They reported the accident immediately at 09.37. I wonder whether, had they not been there, the first report would have been from the passenger using a line side telephone at 10.15. Without their quick reporting, and their work to extinguish fires and build a temporary bridge, help might have come a lot more slowly.

 

[Highlandspring]

Hadn’t been aware that there had been contractors nearby and had attended so soon. Their actions quite possibly prevented a worse tragedy.

Not to detract from the actions of the Story Rail staff, which were indeed very commendable, but two Network Rail MOMs and a LOM were also on scene within the first 10 minutes (having raced round from Carmont signalbox) and one of the MOMs bravely went on board the coaches to search for trapped passengers but that doesn't get a mention for some reason.

 

[mcmad]

Not to detract from the actions of the Story Rail staff, which were indeed very commendable, but two Network Rail MOMs and a LOM were also on scene within the first 10 minutes (having raced round from Carmont signalbox) and one of the MOMs bravely went on board the coaches to search for trapped passengers but that doesn't get a mention for some reason.

True, but they were only aware of the incident due to it being raised by the contract staff on site via the police and route control.

 

[Highlandspring]

The first 999 call was made by the householder of 'Nether Wyndings' cottage on the hillside above the site who also witnessed the crash and directed the emergency services to the site from the road.

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

I think this accident was pretty unique in that there would have been a lot of torque on the cab involved as the body of the power car revolved around it as a pivot.

RAIB will have modelling done to understand how the train behaved but given the power car fell off the bridge it would have exerted some unusual forces onto coach 1. It also is decelerating a lot faster than the vehicles in the rear once it strikes the parapet wall so they they then push into each other.

The thoroughness and broad extent of the investigation go someway to justify why they had the site for a long period of time.

Interesting they make no immediate recommendations and I wonder if they considered whether derailment protection through the viaduct would have prevented the PC overturning which ultimately I believe will be seen to have amplified the subsequent behaviour of the coaches.

 

[Highlandspring]

I've been told that RAIB have had assistance from the AAIB to model crash dynamics and vehicle deformation, which I have no reason to disbelieve.

 

[Grumpy Git]

I wonder if they considered whether derailment protection through the viaduct would have prevented the PC overturning which ultimately I believe will be seen to have amplified the subsequent behaviour of the coaches.

But the leading PC was already derailed before it got to the viaduct.

 

[swt_passenger]

I've been told that RAIB have had assistance from the AAIB to model crash dynamics and vehicle deformation, which I have no reason to disbelieve.

I expect that’s one of the reasons they’re co-located at Farnborough?

But the leading PC was already derailed before it got to the viaduct.

I think the question is actually whether to start derailment protection, (ie guard rails), well before the bridge, rather than in the immediate vicinity?

 

[najaB]

I expect that’s one of the reasons they’re co-located at Farnborough?

While planes and trains have a lot of differences, once they hit something solid the results will be quite similar so it makes sense to share knowledge. In the USA they aren't even separate agencies - the NTSB has responsibility for highway, rail, marine and aviation accident investigation (and pipeline for some reason). They generally only investigate the most serious highway accidents though.

 

[sunnyjohn]

Good to see that, despite some skepticism in previous posts, the driver has effectively not been held at fault:

45 As the signaller was not aware of any obstruction on the line, railway rules did not require him to instruct the driver to travel at a speed slower than the maximum normally permitted. If aware of a possible obstruction or other potential problem, a signaller should instruct a driver to proceed at caution, at a speed which will allow the train to be stopped short of any obstruction.

46 The driver then asked the signaller whether train 1T08 would be held at Stonehaven, and the signaller confirmed that was the case, because the line was blocked beyond Stonehaven.

47 The signaller gave the driver permission to make the move, and the driver repeated back the instruction to confirm that he had understood it. Train 1T08 moved off, and passed Carmont signal box at about 09:34 hrs, travelling at 5 mph (8 km/h). After passing over the crossover, the train’s speed increased and, as permitted by railway rules, the driver continued to accelerate the train towards
75 mph (121 km/h), the maximum permitted speed at the accident site.

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

But the leading PC was already derailed before it got to the viaduct.

Indeed but guard rail protection is designed to contain a derailed vehicle from an excursion off the top of a structure. Of course it depends on how far towards the cess the derailed vehicle is and potentially could cause more problems if the 6ft pair of wheels are beyond the centre line of the four foot as it would exacerbate the vehicles deviation further to the cess side. In my experience of derailments once derailed the vehicles didn't deviate that much as interaction with sleepers controlled the vehicle direction unless the wheelset came up against another obstruction in the four foot.

 

[QueensCurve]

Has there been a previous accident with similar forces involved?

I would suggest Polmont, 1984 and Southall, 1997.

 

[trebor79]

I expect that’s one of the reasons they’re co-located at Farnborough?


I think the question is actually whether to start derailment protection, (ie guard rails), well before the bridge, rather than in the immediate vicinity?

While planes and trains have a lot of differences, once they hit something solid the results will be quite similar so it makes sense to share knowledge. In the USA they aren't even separate agencies - the NTSB has responsibility for highway, rail, marine and aviation accident investigation (and pipeline for some reason). They generally only investigate the most serious highway accidents though.

There will be crossovers in human factors, data recovery, modelling structural failure etc so it makes sense to co-locate as a lot of the skills will be similar. Also AAIB have a large hangar and other warehousing to store items at the very secure and private site, so a good place to take parts and vehicles for further investigation after removing from the scene.

 

[92002]

I would suggest Polmont, 1984 and Southall, 1997.

Howver Polmont didn't involve an HST. It was DBSO leading a push/pull set of Coaches.

 

[edwin_m]

Ladbroke Grove and Great Heck were probably rather higher collision energy, being head-on collisions with moving trains, with one of them moving faster than at Carmont.