Collision and derailment near Salisbury (Fisherton Tunnel) 31/10/21

[WesternBiker]

I have noticed over the last tn years how badly road signs are getting hidden behind trees. I have nearly missed a turn that way.

I think the vegetation problem has grown steadily so there is now 50-60 years of neglect to catch up on. I would hope that clearing back by 3 metres might last ten or more years.

I also think from my own experience that things are growing faster and bigger over the last ten or twenty years - we have warmer and wetter weather then in the past. I have recently reluctantly re-visited a garden I helped clear many years ago and was surprised how much had grown back worse than before. The garden was solid from house to the end of the garden.

So I think this is a symptom of cost saving maintenance but also a change in climate.

I agree completely with that - except I fear 3 metres won't last ten or more years, given the rate of growth of some plants. I've noticed faster and thicker plant growth, which is what you'd expect from higher CO2 levels, given it's a key ingredient of plant growth. Compared with 1950, the atmospheric concentration of CO2 is 30-40% higher.

 

[Deepgreen]

They have in certain areas removed trees from embankments as they can slide down when the embankments get really wet.

As in 'The Railway Children'!

Technical solutions are not needed, just cut the trees down and then, keep them from re-growing. This is a 50 year long literally growing problem, caused by first BR giving up lineside maintenance as soon as steam finished and then Railtrack and NR doing even more nothing. Paul Clifton on BBC South tonight, quite rightly highlighted the tree growth problem and used the Warship picture on screen to compare with a scene from today. He pointedly said that the trees are still there 2 years after the crash and that NR when contacted, refused to comment.

I would think, if they still won't cut them down, this may be criminal negligence, certainly mismanagement. If DfT won't fund vegetation management, then they should be prosecuted. Putting cost cutting over safety is never right, whether it is rail, road, air or health.

Far more complex than that - very many trees are privately-owned, for a start, and the world has moved on from the steam-era's self-produced deserted embankments and cuttings. Even if trees adjacent to the line could be removed and maintained that way (a huge cost in itself), there will always be those on the other side of the fence. Then there is the issue of brake types - brake blocks/brushes may return in a reduced capacity but regen/disc braking is here to stay. A combination of tree management and technology will probably continue to be pursued.

 

[Peter Sarf]

Here's the diagram (from figure 35 of the report) with all the relevant distances:
View attachment 145356
The distances indicated are: 560m from the double-yellow signal to the driver's normal braking point (Broken Cross Bridge); 1000m from Broken Cross Bridge to the driver's actual braking point; 780m from the braking point to the single-yellow signal; 270m from the single-yellow signal to the 50mph speed restriction commencement board; 510m from the speed restriction board to the red signal; and 200m from the red signal to the point of collision. The tree and the 50mph warning board are both indicated, but without precise distances (though I believe they're given elsewhere in the report), between Broken Cross Bridge and the actual braking location.

The braking curve of the ill fated 1L53 is very similar to that of 1L45. One can imagine that apart from the later application the rail conditions might have deteriorated quite seriously between the two times. Now 1L43s curve shows a different approach not avoiding applying the brakes in the published risk area (shaded red). It is possible that 1L53 heeded the risk of sliding in the red area without knowing (it was not published) that further along the line was all of a sudden a lot worse than the red shaded area and also worse than it had itself been earlier. Also note 1L43 entered the published risk area that was not a problem with a speed about 10mph lower.

Perhaps 1L43 shows the actions of a new and cautious driver or a driver who has had a near miss before. Lets be realistic we all see car drivers driving slower in ice but often NOT until a few mangled cars are seen.

So perhaps the driver of 1L53, being a driver of some 50 years iirc was more confident. Then a once in a lifetime experience !. The driver must have been a good enough driver to last 50 years.

It is important to note that at no point were drivers breaking the speed limit or breaking any rules.

To put it in terms a car driver would understand (a wider audience) - No traffic light jumping occurred apart from the skid past the red on black ice. And on rails a skid is an agonisingly long skid compared to road.

Edit
corrected error where I had transposed 1L43 and 1L53.

 

[bahnause]

The braking curve of the ill fated 1L43 is very similar to that of 1L45.

The ill fated train was 1L53.

 

[Peter Sarf]

The ill fated train was 1L53.

Ouch. I will go correct .

 

[Dr Hoo]

I don’t know the actual numbers. I only have limited information for one area. But I do know that for this area, before 2010 the number of signals reported was considerably lower compared to this year. And that before Network Rail existed, the number of reports for this area were even lower, back then it was very occasional. Last year and this year, the number reported in my area was insane.

It’s possible that nationwide the number is in the thousands. But you are missing my point. My point is two fold. Firstly that the problems caused by vegetation are getting worse each year and secondly that Network Rail know about the problems. They know that vegetation is a problem. I’m talking about senior mangers knowing about this.

It’s a safety risk if it results in a reduced sighting distance for signals. It’s a risk to staff working on the infrastructure. And now, it’s absolutely clear that its another real risk to trains where it results in rail head contamination. Leaves on the line are not a joke.

The railway already does record where they experience regular reports of low adhesion. Information on known sites is already available.

The real problem is that Network Rail is limited in what maintenance it can do. And a factor in this is the funding of the railways. The senior mangers on maintenance have an impossible job. Their budget is not increased, but the costs go up. And they know that in the real world, they actually need more resources, not less. It’s normal for them to be running over budget despite trying to stay within budget.

Oh, and on the subject of the costs of vegetation clearance, yes the railway does use modern tools. So a small team over a year can made a considerable difference. But long term, for this to be effective, it has to be consistent. Year after year. If you don’t keep on top of it, once you fall behind, if not sorted out soon, the costs skyrocket.

Fitting trains with improved brakes only mitigates against low adhesion. It doesn’t solve any of the other problems caused by vegetation. The railway can only spend each pound once. How much would it cost to modify every item of rolling stock? Which existing budget would this money come from?

If the amount of money spent on vegetation clearance was increased enough, that would in time deal with most of the problems caused by vegetation. The resources will still be limited, so known problem areas and critical locations should be prioritised.

I note from the ORR's Periodic Review 2018 documents that Wessex Route's budget for Maintenance had been £518,000,000 in Control Period 5 (2014-2019) but this was increased to allow £570,000,000 in Control Period 6 (2019-2024). All at 2017/18 prices.

I get that 'Maintenance' doesn't only cover vegetation management and a bigger budget may well have been needed for (say) earthworks but it isn't immediately obvious that an increase in expenditure on vegetation management wasn't possible. Perhaps other areas were seen as an even bigger problem than the approach to Salisbury.

 

[bahnause]

The braking curve of the ill fated 1L53 is very similar to that of 1L45.

I can't see that at all. In this diagram, the actual curve is highlighted with the red dotted line. It is much flatter then the orange line of 1L45, despite of a step 3 application instead of step 2. The grey line shows the speed of the wheelset, not the speed of the train.

 

[Deepgreen]

Ouch. I will go correct .

Perhaps both may be described as such!

 

[Peter Sarf]

I can't see that at all. In this diagram, the actual curve is highlighted with the red dotted line. It is much flatter then the orange line of 1L45, despite of a step 3 application instead of step 2. The grey line shows the speed of the wheelset, not the speed of the train.

I mean in the sense that braking was held off until later then 1L43s and then the drop in wheel-set speed when the brakes were presumably applied. Both then waver about with the slip coming and going. But of course in the case of 1L53 it is more dramatic as a bad slip is happening. Then, with such a poor level of adhesion Step 3 would be almost pointless.

 

[TurboMan]

It is important to note that at no point were drivers breaking the speed limit or breaking any rules.

I'd be amazed if the driver of 1L53 was driving in accordance with SWR's PDP for low adhesion.

 

[ComUtoR]

Just out of interest, is that technique based on leaf fall conditions or not? If the latter, how do you deal with leaf fall?

It's not based on leaf fall conditions. I'm a naturally defensive driver. I have a decent margin of error built in.

How do I personally deal with leaf fall ?

Being prepared for a slip or a slide the second I brake. (and understanding the difference)
Understand the unit/traction I'm driving
Understand the route I'm on.
Brake and then leave it in.
Sand button like a crazy person (unit dependent)
Emergency Brake if ever in doubt.
Run at reduced speed
Don't panic
Don't overthink it
Follow the Driving Policy to the letter.

There are many techniques you can use for braking and each Driver will have their own personal tool box and the newer Drivers will tend to stick more to the policy and what they have been instructed to do.

 

[dannydm1]

As in 'The Railway Children

It's possible this guy was the driver of the train in the railway children.

 

[Dan G]

No matter how many times I read this report, I still can’t make much sense of what this driver was doing. I find it bordering on incredulous that a driver would be scouring the line (at nearly 90 mph) in the pitch dark for a fallen tree to use as a braking marker, when he had a perfectly good braking marker in the form of the double yellow aspect, even if this meant the red aspect was heavily overbraked. If worried about adhesion, why would anyone not simply brake earlier, even if just getting the train down a more manageable speed? If the driver wasn’t concerned about adhesion then why change braking points in the first place?

Yes. Absolutely astonishing that a driver's reaction to the risk of low adhesion was to delay braking until after where he thought there was low adhesion, and chose to judge where that low adhesion was on the basis of a fallen tree he'd seen earlier. At 90 mph. In the dark.

(To be clear, the driver missed the tree, and only began braking 20s after passing it, and 12s after an AWS speed warning.)

I note he was 74 years old and the report seems to suggest driver competency checks are every three years. In these days of no compulsory retirement age you get airline pilots of that age, but their checks are every six months, so far more likely to catch failing skills due to age (and there are two pilots up front, for the most part monitoring an autopilot!).

 

[Ediswan]

I note he was 74 years old and the report seems to suggest driver competency checks are every three years. In these days of no compulsory retirement age you get airline pilots of that age, but their checks are every six months, so far more likely to catch failing skills due to age (and there are two pilots up front, for the most part monitoring an autopilot!).

The ICAO retirement age is 65.

 

[TurboMan]

I note he was 74 years old and the report seems to suggest driver competency checks are every three years.

I think what that means is that the competency cycle is a 3 year one, but within the cycle there will be several assessment events, including practical assessments, simulator assessments, OTDR downloads, written exams etc.

 

[ComUtoR]

Yes. Absolutely astonishing that a driver's reaction to the risk of low adhesion was to delay braking until after where he thought there was low adhesion, and chose to judge where that low adhesion was on the basis of a fallen tree he'd seen earlier. At 90 mph. In the dark.

(To be clear, the driver missed the tree, and only began braking 20s after passing it, and 12s after an AWS speed warning.)

How would you have driven the route that day ? Please feel free to outline each brake step, decision, use of sand, local knowledge, unit characteristics etc.

90mph in the dark is a bit of a red herring. I'm not sure why this is an issue. Route knowledge allows you to drive in circumstances that non industry and non Drivers would find scary but is often bread and butter for Drivers.

 

[Islineclear3_1]

Genuine innocent question: On the approach to SY29R, SY29 and SY31, is it usual to shut off traction power and coast downhill on wet rails?

 

[bramling]

How would you have driven the route that day ? Please feel free to outline each brake step, decision, use of sand, local knowledge, unit characteristics etc.

90mph in the dark is a bit of a red herring. I'm not sure why this is an issue. Route knowledge allows you to drive in circumstances that non industry and non Drivers would find scary but is often bread and butter for Drivers.

I agree about the 90mph in the dark being normal, but scouring the line at 90 mph in the dark for a fallen tree whilst running on restrictive aspects is a few steps beyond normal.

As to how the train might have been driven, how about light service braking at around the point of the double yellow aspect, even just to make an initial kill of a proportion of the 90 mph? Get the train down to, say, 50 mph and then make further applications as necessary.

Reading between the lines, I have a feeling the RAIB aren’t entirely convinced about this either. Note that they mention the braking happened when various lineside prompts came into view. That sounds more like a bog-standard lapse of concentration to me. Of course, thinking about the fallen tree would have provided a perfect distraction to allow such a lapse to occur.

 

[Tomnick]

How would you have driven the route that day ? Please feel free to outline each brake step, decision, use of sand, local knowledge, unit characteristics etc.

90mph in the dark is a bit of a red herring. I'm not sure why this is an issue. Route knowledge allows you to drive in circumstances that non industry and non Drivers would find scary but is often bread and butter for Drivers.

I have a similar setup, signalling wise at least, on one of my routes. 90mph on the approach, three-aspect distant (Y/YY/G), then four-aspect stop signals subsequently, the distant being at braking distance from the first stop signal and thus "overbraked" if you get YY to stop at the second stop signal.

Personally, I always get the brake in at the YY, if only to knock 20mph or so out of it. It's too easy to lose focus if you just let it run, and getting back into the room when you sight the Y is far too late. Throw poor railhead conditions into the mix, especially if I've been told about that specific location already, and that just reinforces that position - I want to get stuck into the braking asap, firstly to get a feel for what it's like, but also to scrub a load of speed off early on just in case it does get worse later.

I don't want to appear critical of the driver in this case. I only want to discuss it as I think it's something that we can all learn from.

 

[43096]

How would you have driven the route that day ? Please feel free to outline each brake step, decision, use of sand, local knowledge, unit characteristics etc.

90mph in the dark is a bit of a red herring. I'm not sure why this is an issue. Route knowledge allows you to drive in circumstances that non industry and non Drivers would find scary but is often bread and butter for Drivers.

It was known low adhesion conditions - and the report is clear that the driver was told this - and he was evidently concerned about the impact of the fallen tree on adhesion. It frankly defies belief that you would then brake later in such conditions - it goes against all common sense, not to mention TOC professional driving policies. Had the driver braked earlier he would, at the very least, have mitigated some of the effects of the collision.

You appear to be attempting to defend what is, to be blunt, indefensible.

 

[ComUtoR]

I agree about the 90mph in the dark being normal, but scouring the line at 90 mph in the dark for a fallen tree whilst running on restrictive aspects is a few steps beyond normal.

Maybe, but for a seasoned Driver this may be 'normal' I'm 20yrs in and whilst defensive in style, I still remember times where you brake when you see the whites of their eyes. I know, from experience, you can hit one of our platforms at 60mph and still stop on the platform with room to spare. Would I do this in normal running ? Absolute no, but I know there is capacity to do so. One of my personal brake points is when I see a shadow, because the outline of the bank makes a perfect dark triangle against the hills in the distance. I know a few of my routes so intimately that I can judge almost precisely where little dips in the track are and where, in the dark, specific trees and lineside features are. Granted, I tend to choose big giant features that are blindly obvious or lit up at night but you really can know a route inside and out. Especially after 20yrs driving it. Ever counted AWS magnets in the fog ?

As to how the train might have been driven, how about light service braking at around the point of the double yellow aspect, even just to make an initial kill of a proportion of the 90 mph? Get the train down to, say, 50 mph and then make further applications as necessary.

I don't want to appear critical of the driver in this case. I only want to discuss it as I think it's something that we can all learn from.

Even as a Driver I find it difficult to criticise. Firstly, we are looking at this in hindsight, knowing what all the variables were. If the Driver managed to stop just shy of the unit in front we would be hailing him a hero. Sully landed a plane on the Hudson but even in the aftermath he was heavily criticised. Hindsight is a wonderful thing. Even with all my experience, I still couldn't tell you what was right or wrong in the situation. I do not sign the route or the traction so I could only really go 'by the book' Which is what the RAIB tend to stick to.

Personally, I always get the brake in at the YY, if only to knock 20mph or so out of it. It's too easy to lose focus if you just let it run, and getting back into the room when you sight the Y is far too late. Throw poor railhead conditions into the mix, especially if I've been told about that specific location already, and that just reinforces that position - I want to get stuck into the braking asap, firstly to get a feel for what it's like, but also to scrub a load of speed off early on just in case it does get worse later.

When I was driving for two TOCs at the same time (don't ask..) There was a conflict of braking policies. However, I remember driving their route with one of their Instructors and he was really taken aback with my braking style. His comment was us on our best 'leaf-fall day' was still better than their worst. They would still leave it late because they knew it would still stop. When we got our new units the braking got a lot "worse" their performance in the slip is pretty phenomenal so your confidence level skyrocketed. I could even tell you about my TOCs brake policy once was to deliberately force the slide using heavier braking purely because it kicked in the auto sander as it doesn't apply in brake 1. There are just so many variables to consider.

I highlighted 'personally' because its exactly that. Other than following the company braking policy, it all comes down to how we individually handle our units. Would I brake later, knowing that I could brake and not get WSP and avoid a slide or brake earlier but know that I might be braking in the low adhesion zone ? I understand why someone might want to coast past it for a few seconds and then brake a little harder but avoid WSP activating.

Sometimes, the train just ain't gonna stop...

Report 18/2011: Station overrun incident at Stonegate

Station overrun incident at Stonegate, East Sussex, 8 November 2010.

www.gov.uk

Shortly after 08:00 hrs on 8 November 2010, a passenger train running from London Charing Cross to Hastings failed to stop at Stonegate station in East Sussex. The train ran for a further 2.45 miles (3.94 km) with the emergency brake applied, passing the level crossing at Crowhurst Bridge before coming to a stop 3.22 miles (5.18 km) after first applying the brakes.

 

[Tomnick]

I highlighted 'personally' because its exactly that. Other than following the company braking policy, it all comes down to how we individually handle our units. Would I brake later, knowing that I could brake and not get WSP and avoid a slide or brake earlier but know that I might be braking in the low adhesion zone ? I understand why someone might want to coast past it for a few seconds and then brake a little harder but avoid WSP activating.

If you knew that railhead conditions were generally poor, that there was a potentially even worse area around where you'd normally put the brake in, but that this all happens getting on for a mile after the YY - would you really leave it *later* than normal, or would you get a load in as soon as possible upon sighting the YY? I know what I'd do!

 

[bramling]

I agree about the 90mph in the dark being normal, but scouring the line at 90 mph in the dark for a fallen tree whilst running on restrictive aspects is a few steps beyond normal.

Maybe, but for a seasoned Driver this may be 'normal' I'm 20yrs in and whilst defensive in style, I still remember times where you brake when you see the whites of their eyes. I know, from experience, you can hit one of our platforms at 60mph and still stop on the platform with room to spare. Would I do this in normal running ? Absolute no, but I know there is capacity to do so. One of my personal brake points is when I see a shadow, because the outline of the bank makes a perfect dark triangle against the hills in the distance. I know a few of my routes so intimately that I can judge almost precisely where little dips in the track are and where, in the dark, specific trees and lineside features are. Granted, I tend to choose big giant features that are blindly obvious or lit up at night but you really can know a route inside and out. Especially after 20yrs driving it. Ever counted AWS magnets in the fog ?





Even as a Driver I find it difficult to criticise. Firstly, we are looking at this in hindsight, knowing what all the variables were. If the Driver managed to stop just shy of the unit in front we would be hailing him a hero. Sully landed a plane on the Hudson but even in the aftermath he was heavily criticised. Hindsight is a wonderful thing. Even with all my experience, I still couldn't tell you what was right or wrong in the situation. I do not sign the route or the traction so I could only really go 'by the book' Which is what the RAIB tend to stick to.




When I was driving for two TOCs at the same time (don't ask..) There was a conflict of braking policies. However, I remember driving their route with one of their Instructors and he was really taken aback with my braking style. His comment was us on our best 'leaf-fall day' was still better than their worst. They would still leave it late because they knew it would still stop. When we got our new units the braking got a lot "worse" their performance in the slip is pretty phenomenal so your confidence level skyrocketed. I could even tell you about my TOCs brake policy once was to deliberately force the slide using heavier braking purely because it kicked in the auto sander as it doesn't apply in brake 1. There are just so many variables to consider.

I highlighted 'personally' because its exactly that. Other than following the company braking policy, it all comes down to how we individually handle our units. Would I brake later, knowing that I could brake and not get WSP and avoid a slide or brake earlier but know that I might be braking in the low adhesion zone ? I understand why someone might want to coast past it for a few seconds and then brake a little harder but avoid WSP activating.

Sometimes, the train just ain't gonna stop...

Report 18/2011: Station overrun incident at Stonegate

Station overrun incident at Stonegate, East Sussex, 8 November 2010.

www.gov.uk

I just can’t see why you would want to avoid the low adhesion by setting up a higher risk situation, having had the gift of plenty of braking distance provided by the unusually early double yellow aspect. It’s not like braking earlier was going to delay the journey unnecessarily when running up to a red signal at a junction - one where he would have known from experience there’s a high chance of being held for other train movements.

The way I’m seeing it one is far more likely to drive in this way having had a lapse of concentration after initially sighting the YY. I just can’t see a driver suddenly deciding to use a fallen tree as a landmark, but it would certainly serve as the perfect distraction. The MO here fits this absolutely perfectly - a signal very often seen on YY, no real need for an immediate reaction in normal conditions, and plenty of time thence for the mind to wonder. And to add to this just on the approach to the home depot, which is another hot-spot. Does the report mention whether the driver was booked to hand over the train upon arrival at Salisbury?

I agree the RAIB tend to focus on processes, and it’s notable they adopt a gentlemanly approach when focussing on key individuals, especially in this case where the driver seems to have retired as a result of the incident, not to mention was injured as well. Nonetheless I find it an interesting topic of discussion because the whole thing just doesn’t quite add up (to me, at least).

 

[bahnause]

Maybe, but for a seasoned Driver this may be 'normal' I'm 20yrs in and whilst defensive in style, I still remember times where you brake when you see the whites of their eyes. I know, from experience, you can hit one of our platforms at 60mph and still stop on the platform with room to spare. Would I do this in normal running ? Absolute no, but I know there is capacity to do so. One of my personal brake points is when I see a shadow, because the outline of the bank makes a perfect dark triangle against the hills in the distance. I know a few of my routes so intimately that I can judge almost precisely where little dips in the track are and where, in the dark, specific trees and lineside features are. Granted, I tend to choose big giant features that are blindly obvious or lit up at night but you really can know a route inside and out. Especially after 20yrs driving it. Ever counted AWS magnets in the fog ?

A problem in this case might have been the signal spacing. A signal makes a great landmark for applying the brakes, in this case it coud have been the double yellow. Due to the signalling pre-dates modern standards, the normal braking point was quite a bit after the double yellow. Passing this signal at line speed was normal.

Quote from the report:

The signalling at Salisbury Tunnel Junction substantially pre-dates standard
NR/ L2/SIG/30009/D220 which states: ‘If the distance is significantly greater than
the minimum then this may lead to drivers continuing at the permissible speed
and trying to judge when to brake with the risk of SPAD, or braking early and
coasting leading to an increase in journey time or loss of capacity'. As such, the
over-long spacing between cautionary and danger aspects on the Down Main line
enables drivers to decide how far beyond the cautionary aspect to start braking
and increases the possibility of situational awareness loss.

I highlighted 'personally' because its exactly that. Other than following the company braking policy, it all comes down to how we individually handle our units. Would I brake later, knowing that I could brake and not get WSP and avoid a slide or brake earlier but know that I might be braking in the low adhesion zone ? I understand why someone might want to coast past it for a few seconds and then brake a little harder but avoid WSP activating.

There was a published low adhesion area before the braking point of 1L53. This can be helpful if accurate. However, if it is not - and I think we can agree in this case that is wasn't as adhesion after the published risk area was not any better - it can be misleading.

 

[Annetts key]

If the braking point is significantly different to the position of the relevant signal, a proper sign in-between giving the distance to the next signal can be provided, like the example ([8.87] Signal Reminder Board) right at the bottom of this page that reads “(number) metres to (signal ID)”.

 

[Wyrleybart]

A lot of interesting and varied ccomments on here. I have not sat in a train drivers or secondman's seat for nearly 40 years but I know the feelings going through a person's head whilst in that space of responsibility. I believe the fallen tree is a red herring in this story simply because in my view a train driver uses different landmarks for braking. Back then there were no high intensity headlights and you could mostly see more out the front, but looking for a piece of wood - nah.

Also, knowing there was poor adhesion, I am pretty confident most drivers, unless very foolish, would be treating the brake with some respect. I am also pretty sure that a gentler but longer application, to take some of the inertia would be in most footplate's minds.

 

[Western Gaffer]

I believe the fallen tree is a red herring in this story simply because in my view a train driver uses different landmarks for braking. Back then there were no high intensity headlights and you could mostly see more out the front, but looking for a piece of wood - nah.

Depends what you mean by a red herring (and "nah") in this context, but the driver is directly quoted (in para 175 of the report) as saying that he planned to use the location of the fallen tree to inform his choice of braking point:

The driver stated that on the evening of the accident he intended to use the fallen tree and associated debris that he had seen on his earlier journey to London as his marker after which to start braking (paragraph 47 and see paragraph 181). The tree was 250 metres beyond Broken Cross bridge and braking here was also consistent with the range of braking points used by other drivers. However, OTDR data shows that the driver actually applied the brakes approximately 750 metres beyond the location of the fallen tree and associated debris and 1,000 metres beyond Broken Cross bridge, with the train travelling at 86 mph (138 km/h) (figure 35 and see paragraph 189)

 

[bramling]

Depends what you mean by a red herring (and "nah") in this context, but the driver is directly quoted (in para 175 of the report) as saying that he planned to use the location of the fallen tree to inform his choice of braking point:

Depends what you mean by a red herring (and "nah") in this context, but the driver is directly quoted (in para 175 of the report) as saying that he planned to use the location of the fallen tree to inform his choice of braking point:

And this is what I just don’t buy. So you’re (to some extent at least) bothered about poor adhesion, yet managed to apply the brakes 1,000 metres *later* than normal, as it happens coincident with other visual cues coming into view that would have served as a reminder of the train’s location.

Worth noting that, again as per the RAIB report, SWR instructors stated that they would expect a driver aware of potential low adhesion to be braking “no later than SY29R”, which seems to tie in with the general consensus on this thread.

I just don’t see what purpose was being served by delaying the braking. If he was worried about flatting the wheels, then why not brake earlier so as to encounter the fallen tree at reduced speed? This question doesn’t seem to have been covered in the report, which to me is quite telling.

As an aside, again reading between the lines, I note the RAIB aren’t exactly over complimentary about class 158/159 crashworthiness. I wonder if this will re-ignite the debate about crashworthiness performance of old rolling stock.

 

[Brush 4]

All this pre-occupation with the driver, yet it was the presence of trees and their leaves that caused all of this. A tree can't fall across the line if it isn't there, which it shouldn't have been. Likewise, the leaves, mostly from the forest above the junction, which shouldn't be there either. Oddly, other tunnel locations have been cleared of trees in recent years, although I don't know if it has been maintained. Whiteball, Dainton and Honiton, on this very route.

 

[Peter Sarf]

All this pre-occupation with the driver, yet it was the presence of trees and their leaves that caused all of this. A tree can't fall across the line if it isn't there, which it shouldn't have been. Likewise, the leaves, mostly from the forest above the junction, which shouldn't be there either. Oddly, other tunnel locations have been cleared of trees in recent years, although I don't know if it has been maintained. Whiteball, Dainton and Honiton, on this very route.

I have been wondering. How overgrown is railway land in Europe ?.