Did Beeching get it right in Scotland?

[Magdalia]

I recall Anglo-Scottish sleepers c1980 being dual heated, with the heating swapping from one system to the other when locos were changed en route.

I have a stock book for 1980 that gives the details. The ER had 137 sleeping cars of which 102 were steam heat only.

 

[LT02 NVV]

My answer to that question is a simple "Nah".

Because the closure of the line that lead through Glasgow Central Low-Level in the 60s was realised to be a really poor thing to do. But thanks to the Argyle Line rebuild in the late 70s, it’s a vital part of Glasgow’s rail services that I couldn’t see ever being removed from the network.

 

[Dr Hoo]

My answer to that question is a simple "Nah".

Because the closure of the line that lead through Glasgow Central Low-Level in the 60s was realised to be a really poor thing to do. But thanks to the Argyle Line rebuild in the late 70s, it’s a vital part of Glasgow’s rail services that I couldn’t see ever being removed from the network.

Based on the thin, largely steam-worked, irregular, essentially peak hours only service in 1962, running through mostly industrial areas that were already in decline can you say how many people honestly thought that it was a really poor thing to do back in the day? It stood in almost laughable comparison with the recently modernised and electrified Queen Street Low Level lines.

Worth noting that besides the core route through Glasgow Central LL the Argyle Line did nothing to re-connect places like Carmyle, Kelvin Hall, Possil, Whiteinch Riverside and so on to the passenger network anyway.

 

[eldomtom2]

Based on the thin, largely steam-worked, irregular, essentially peak hours only service in 1962, running through mostly industrial areas that were already in decline can you say how many people honestly thought that it was a really poor thing to do back in the day? It stood in almost laughable comparison with the recently modernised and electrified Queen Street Low Level lines.

Considering it reopened just 15 years later, the "they couldn't have known at the time" excuse is rather dubious...

Worth noting that besides the core route through Glasgow Central LL the Argyle Line did nothing to re-connect places like Carmyle, Kelvin Hall, Possil, Whiteinch Riverside and so on to the passenger network anyway.

What does this have to do with anything?

 

[Falcon1200]

It stood in almost laughable comparison with the recently modernised and electrified Queen Street Low Level lines.

And between the Partick area and Dumbarton the ex-CR Central Low Level lines simply duplicated the, as you say, modernised ex-NBR lines. Connecting the routes at Finnieston was necessary to get Central Low Level re-opened, apart from the short section near Dumbarton the rest of the ex-CR lines to the west remain abandoned!

 

[OVS Flatbottom]

The version I heard (which could be very inaccurate) was that the Central Low Level lines were closed in large part because it wasn't considered possible to electrify them at 25 kV/6.25 kV within the then state of the art; by the time the decision was taken to reopen, this was no longer a problem. I've also heard that the track, signalling etc. were actually left in situ initially but ended up being removed due to vandalism.

 

[Dr Hoo]

What does this have to do with anything?

The whole point is that the bulk of the Low Level service group didn't re-open, only the (much altered) Kelvinhaugh-Rutherglen bit did.

Considering it [the Argyle Line] reopened just 15 years later, the "they couldn't have known at the time" excuse is rather dubious...

Loads had changed in 15 years - the Greater Glasgow Transportation Study of 1964, the development of slab track, reduced clearances for 25kV, establishment of the Greater Glasgow Passenger Transport Executive, the use of cost benefit analysis as advocated by both Marples and Dr Beeching, the electrification of the WCML through to Glasgow with the Lanarkshire lines as an add-on, the availability of spare EMUs from the earlier schemes because of declining population, new construction techniques that allowed Argyle Street to be excavated for two years and then roofed over again, etc.

It is well documented in railway books dating back to the 1960s that the original Modernisation Plan electrification schemes around Glasgow were limited by murky deals between Glasgow Corporation and British Railways' Scottish Region over 'spheres [edit] of influence' in the 1950s. The ship had already sailed.

 

[yorksrob]

It is well documented in railway books dating back to the 1960s that the original Modernisation Plan electrification schemes around Glasgow were limited by murky deals between Glasgow Corporation and British Railways' Scottish Region over 'spares of influence' in the 1950s. The ship had already sailed.

No need for Beeching and his questionable list then.

 

[eldomtom2]

Loads had changed in 15 years - the Greater Glasgow Transportation Study of 1964, the development of slab track, reduced clearances for 25kV, establishment of the Greater Glasgow Passenger Transport Executive, the use of cost benefit analysis as advocated by both Marples and Dr Beeching, the electrification of the WCML through to Glasgow with the Lanarkshire lines as an add-on, the availability of spare EMUs from the earlier schemes because of declining population, new construction techniques that allowed Argyle Street to be excavated for two years and then roofed over again, etc.

It's odd how depending on what's convenient for your argument Beeching flips between being a great visionary and being someone who couldn't predict anything that happened in the next decide.
I also have no idea why you fixate on Marples and Beeching "advocating" cost-benefit analyses, since they are not a precisely defined tool that will produce the same results every time.

 

[RT4038]

It's odd how depending on what's convenient for your argument Beeching flips between being a great visionary and being someone who couldn't predict anything that happened in the next decide.

Nobody can accurately predict all the details of the future, and it is a little ridiculous to think that failing to do so is therefore a 'mistake'. Beeching was dealing with the financial situation of there and then, and was not in the luxury of retaining currently uneconomic services for what might be predicted in the future. As has been pointed out, the tunnel line was left in situ for some years and suffered vandalism and the track and fixtures then removed. Even then (and this was after the departure of Beeching) the re-opening was not foreseen. At the time of closure the line was a loss making anachronism, much of it closely paralleled by another line.

I also have no idea why you fixate on Marples and Beeching "advocating" cost-benefit analyses, since they are not a precisely defined tool that will produce the same results every time.

This was more the concept of Government 'political' funding of rail line losses for societal benefits, rather than cross subsidy within the business (which was no longer an option) or closure. It is not a precisely defined tool, but was not considered as an option before their era.

 

[eldomtom2]

Nobody can accurately predict all the details of the future, and it is a little ridiculous to think that failing to do so is therefore a 'mistake'.

But at the same time, to entirely reject the idea that someone can be judged for a failure to predict something is to reject the idea of causality.

Beeching was dealing with the financial situation of there and then, and was not in the luxury of retaining currently uneconomic services for what might be predicted in the future.

If Beeching was closing every uneconomic service, he would have proposed much deeper cuts in his first report...

This was more the concept of Government 'political' funding of rail line losses for societal benefits, rather than cross subsidy within the business (which was no longer an option) or closure. It is not a precisely defined tool, but was not considered as an option before their era.

The claim that without Beeching the idea of government subsidies for loss-making lines would not have occured is absurd!

 

[RT4038]

But at the same time, to entirely reject the idea that someone can be judged for a failure to predict something is to reject the idea of causality.

Failing to predict the future is not exactly a black and white concept, and failing to predict the future of a relatively small detail within a massive work such as The Reshaping of British Railways, in the knowledge and context of the times [as far as we are aware of those] is unlikely to be a mistake. Circumstances changed and a small part of the line re-opened 13? or so years later.

If Beeching was closing every uneconomic service, he would have proposed much deeper cuts in his first report...

Correct, but there was no doubt political boundaries, but closure of lightly used parallel lines in poor/outdated infrastructure condition was presumably within them.

The claim that without Beeching the idea of government subsidies for loss-making lines would not have occured is absurd!

Has anybody made that claim? That is like saying that George Stephenson should not be given any credit for his steam railway because somebody else would have surely come along later with the idea!

 

[d9009alycidon]

The version I heard (which could be very inaccurate) was that the Central Low Level lines were closed in large part because it wasn't considered possible to electrify them at 25 kV/6.25 kV within the then state of the art; by the time the decision was taken to reopen, this was no longer a problem. I've also heard that the track, signalling etc. were actually left in situ initially but ended up being removed due to vandalism.

That is correct, when making the decision to electrify the Queen Street route rather than the Central low-level lines one of the factors taken into account was the more generous clearance margins available although subsequent experience with 25kV overhead operation had shown that earlier calculations were over-cautious. Even as late as 1966 it was still considered impossible for even the reduced 6.25kV to be used on this route and it took the development of concrete slab track in the 1970s to provide the necessary clearance, giving an incidental benefit of lower maintenance costs. If you look at the columns on the platform at Central Low Level, the step that people use as a seat at the base of the column is actually the old platform level. Passenger services over the Central low-level lines were withdrawn on October 6, 1964, but the formation and track were retained in view of the Greater Glasgow Transportation Study then proceeding. Nevertheless, there was vandalism on such a scale that, ten months later, the then Minister of Transport agreed to removal of track and signalling equipment.

 

[Train Maniac]

Scotland (like the rest of BR) only needed 1 type of diesel loco-the class 33. Unfortunately Beeching was employed too late in the day

Why specifically the class 33?

I would of thought the class 37 is a better example of a 'jack-of-all-trades' type of loco?

 

[eldomtom2]

Failing to predict the future is not exactly a black and white concept, and failing to predict the future of a relatively small detail within a massive work such as The Reshaping of British Railways, in the knowledge and context of the times [as far as we are aware of those] is unlikely to be a mistake. Circumstances changed and a small part of the line re-opened 13? or so years later.

Well if we look at the broader scope, Beeching's vision for the railway of the future was very far off what it ended up being...

Correct, but there was no doubt political boundaries, but closure of lightly used parallel lines in poor/outdated infrastructure condition was presumably within them.

Those "political boundaries" didn't stop the publication of the Trunk Routes report...

Has anybody made that claim? That is like saying that George Stephenson should not be given any credit for his steam railway because somebody else would have surely come along later with the idea!

I'll be direct - where is the evidence for the claim that Beeching introduced subsidies into the conversation?

 

[GRALISTAIR]

I would of thought the class 37 is a better example of a 'jack-of-all-trades' type of loco?

my thought too.

 

[Magdalia]

I would of thought the class 37 is a better example of a 'jack-of-all-trades' type of loco?

The EE Type 3 was not an option for Scotland at the time of the Modernisation Plan because it didn't exist.

The EE Type 3 is a 1958 design with the first locos delivered (late) at the end of 1960. By that time Scotland were already committed to Type 2s, especially the BRCW version.

The Great Eastern ordered the first batch of EE type 3s to replace Britannias on their premier express trains, when first built they were not regarded as a "jack of all trades" loco.

 

[Grumpy]

Why specifically the class 33?

I would of thought the class 37 is a better example of a 'jack-of-all-trades' type of loco?

Probably not much in it but the 37 was approx. 30 tons heavier for not much extra power i.e. cost of fuel and performance through having to lug this weight around throughout it's life. The 33 was simpler i.e. fewer cylinders and traction motors to maintain so hopefully easier/cheaper to maintain. It also came with more durable Crompton Parkinson electrics and ETH.

 

[QueensCurve]

Edinburgh to Glasgow via Bathgate was proposed for closure but is now electrified!

Airdrie to Bathgate did close but was reopened and electrified.

 

[Dr Hoo]

Well if we look at the broader scope, Beeching's vision for the railway of the future was very far off what it ended up being...

Those "political boundaries" didn't stop the publication of the Trunk Routes report...

I'll be direct - where is the evidence for the claim that Beeching introduced subsidies into the conversation?

Have you ever read the Reshaping Report (in full and with an open mind)? I do wonder sometimes.

Some 15 'steps' were identified (pages 59-60), including closures, improvement of inter-city services, withdrawal of coaches for seasonal peaks, co-ordination of suburban train and bus services, block train movement of coal, winning new private siding-private siding block train traffic, liner trains (containers), freight wagon fleet rationalisation and continued elimination of steam traction. Ticked most of the boxes as I see it, albeit that some initiatives such as re-organisatation of sundries traffic were overtaken by the next government establishing the National Freight Corporation. I can't think of another railway 'plan' that was more comprehensively implemented.

As noted many times previously, the Trunk Routes report specifically said that it was not about closures.

The section on Suburban Services Outside London (as obviously applicable to Glasgow in a Scottish context) clearly endorses 'Total Social Benefit Studies', as already initiated by Ernest Marples. The Report specifically states, "In cases of the type under consideration it may be cheaper to subsidise the railways that to bear the cost burdens which will arise if they are closed". There is an earlier dig at "subsidised municipal bus services in competition with unprofitable railway services". There is no doubt that this was referring to Glasgow (possibly as well as some other places), given that the city's transport undertaking had been racking up losses back to the early 1950s.

To be frank, I don't recall any official government or BR publication specifically advocating consideration of subsidies before this (but am happy to have it demonstrated otherwise).

 

[Kingston Dan]

Airdrie to Bathgate did close but was reopened and electrified.

Well before the Beeching report was published.

 

[JamieL]

I believe some of my local stations on the Southern portion of the West Highland Line were closed in the wake of Beeching. Closing Shandon was probably a mistake - shut in 1964 when it was widely anticipated that a major Naval Base was going to be built for nuclear Submarines. The base was active by 1967 but they still pressed on and demolished the station to the joy of the local taxi firms!

 

[Falcon1200]

Airdrie to Bathgate did close

The route from Airdrie through Bathgate to Newbridge Junction (on the Edinburgh/Glasgow Queen Street main line) lost its regular passenger service in 1956!

Closing Shandon was probably a mistake - shut in 1964 when it was widely anticipated that a major Naval Base was going to be built for nuclear Submarines. The base was active by 1967

Interesting point, but given the service frequency on the West Highland Line would many workers actually have used the train?

 

[nanstallon]

Well before the Beeching report was published.

Was Scotland treated rather harshly in the 50s/early 60s? That line was part of a through route between two major cities, with some sizeable towns in between.

 

[Mcr Warrior]

Airdrie to Bathgate did close but was reopened and electrified.

Well before the Beeching report was published.

Didn't a freight only line remain until the early 1980s?

 

[D6130]

The route from Airdrie through Bathgate to Newbridge Junction (on the Edinburgh/Glasgow Queen Street main line) lost its regular passenger service in 1956!



Interesting point, but given the service frequency on the West Highland Line would many workers actually have used the train?

Probably not, given the distance of the station from the base. However, prior to closure in 1964, Shandon had a slightly more frequent service provided by the Craigendoran-Arrochar local railbus shuttle.

Didn't a freight only line remain until the early 1980s?

Yes....closed in 1982. I was on the final railtour, hauled by 40 084.

 

[eldomtom2]

Have you ever read the Reshaping Report (in full and with an open mind)? I do wonder sometimes.

Some 15 'steps' were identified (pages 59-60), including closures, improvement of inter-city services, withdrawal of coaches for seasonal peaks, co-ordination of suburban train and bus services, block train movement of coal, winning new private siding-private siding block train traffic, liner trains (containers), freight wagon fleet rationalisation and continued elimination of steam traction. Ticked most of the boxes as I see it, albeit that some initiatives such as re-organisatation of sundries traffic were overtaken by the next government establishing the National Freight Corporation. I can't think of another railway 'plan' that was more comprehensively implemented.

But that was not Beeching setting forth his vision for the railway of the future. The Trunk Routes report was, and it was comprehensively ignored.

As noted many times previously, the Trunk Routes report specifically said that it was not about closures.

So you keep claiming, yet you still have not answered the following points:

• What were the implications of the report's statement that the railways should focus on "bulk transport" over "medium to long distance" "routes of heavy demand" for regional and branch lines?
• What were the implications of the report's statement that the railways should leave "shorter distances and cross country journeys to coaches and the private car" for regional and branch lines?
• Why were the only types of routes mentioned as not planned for closure despite not being through routes "selected for development" freight feeder lines and urban commuter routes?
• Why did the report say it was a basis for "planning of route rationalisation"?
• Why did the report say it provided greater context for "future proposals for trunk line closure or diminutions of line utilisation"?
• Why did Gerard Fiennes write the following in I Tried To Run A Railway?

At this moment, the great and good Doctor threw a spanner into the works. [...] He had not many outward and visible signs of human frailty, but one sign was his love of maps and another his love of publishing them. There began to be rumours of another map: then that it was to be trunk routes: then it was to be black lines, grey lines and no lines. Presently Planning Member James Ness took off the wraps.

[...] He summoned the brass of the Centre and the Regions to a hall. There he said that four people had gone into cells to peer into the geographical future of the trunk network. Here were the four people; an economist, an operational researcher, a planner, and an operator; and here - flick, flick, flick, flick on the screen - were the maps. The four maps, arrived at by such different people, were to all intents and purposes the same. [...]

Back in the office, I sat forlornly in front of my authorised version. No railway west of Plymouth. No Exeter-Salisbury. No Taunton-Westbury-Reading. In a while I rallied. I said to myself "[...]this map ensures the next [Transport Act]. A lot of is nonsense. The person who wants something is stronger than the person who doesn't want him to have it. Do you want these railways? So..."

There was one thing wrong with that philosophy. I wanted the railways and eventually got them. The Doctor wanted publication: and he got it. In the teeth of the General Managers and a majority of the Board he published it.

[...]

I had at least saved a little. West of Plymouth; Exeter-Salisbury; Taunton-Westbury-Reading were in as grey "routes not for development".

The section on Suburban Services Outside London (as obviously applicable to Glasgow in a Scottish context) clearly endorses 'Total Social Benefit Studies', as already initiated by Ernest Marples. The Report specifically states, "In cases of the type under consideration it may be cheaper to subsidise the railways that to bear the cost burdens which will arise if they are closed".

The Reshaping report only advocated subsidies for commuter routes outside London, and was explicit that maintaining any of the lines proposed for closure would not in its view pass a cost-benefit study - and of course circumstances changed quite heavily and quite rapidly on that front.

To be frank, I don't recall any official government or BR publication specifically advocating consideration of subsidies before this (but am happy to have it demonstrated otherwise).

You have further narrowed down what Beeching can take credit for. Now he can only take credit for being the first to advocate subsidies in an official government publication.

 

[Deepgreen]

Coming late to this thread, but it all has to be seen completely in the context of the time - roads/cars were seen to be the future and the railways were also expected to be in a significant decline to become essentially trunk routes only. Of course, views changed over the decades after Beeching, but for Scottish routes, many that went would probably have gone anyway under most political regimes.

 

[eldomtom2]

Coming late to this thread, but it all has to be seen completely in the context of the time - roads/cars were seen to be the future and the railways were also expected to be in a significant decline to become essentially trunk routes only. Of course, views changed over the decades after Beeching, but for Scottish routes, many that went would probably have gone anyway under most politiical regimes.

Of course this ignores that "cars are the future" was not an uncontroversially accepted truth...

 

[Deepgreen]

Of course this ignores that "cars are the future" was not an uncontroversially accepted truth...

Of course, but the 'progressive' governments of the time were of that view.