EE v Sulzer

[Richard Scott]

Purely from a maintenance and reliability point of view which were the better engines, EE or Sulzer? I'd rather it was just facts and not emotive as we all probably have our favourite but am interested to hear from people who worked with them and on them.

 

[Pigeon]

There's a fair bit of information scattered around derbysulzers.com about things that used to go wrong, mostly with Sulzer engines of course but the occasional mention of EE, including stuff from actual engineers. But what stands out both from there and from anywhere else I've found that discusses failures from a technical angle is how very many of the things that went wrong were not due to deficiencies in the design of the engine itself, but were the consequences, primary or secondary, of things like badly-engineered and unreliable auxiliary systems, poor quality execution of maintenance, and bloodyminded insistence on inappropriate maintenance procedures because that's how they thought they ought to be doing it even if the engine manufacturer said different (eg. using the wrong type of coolant additives instead of that specified, leading to leaks, foaming and overheating; "reconditioning" injectors by regrinding until the case hardening was all gone instead of replacing them, leading to excessive clag and subsequent exhaust system failures, and unatomised unburnt fuel getting into the sump, diluting the lubricating oil and causing all sorts of aargh). This kind of treatment naturally exposed weak points in the engines which would not have been significant with correct installation and maintenance, and confuses the question of which were the "better" engines by intermingling considerations of the quality of the deliberate process of designing for the intended operating conditions with the accidental consequences of the ability or otherwise of random design features to stand up to abuse.

After the 12LDA28C crankcase fiasco and the failure of the 12LVA24 to impress (where Sulzer shot themselves in the foot by supplying BR with a Manufacturer's Special Tool for bearing replacement that was out of spec, leading to destruction of crankshafts), Sulzer reckoned that supplying railway engines wasn't worth the candle, and pulled out of it. EE on the other hand continued, through various changes of name and ownership, to produce what was still basically the good old LMS 10000/10001 engine with new clothes, for as long as they could possibly hang on to it. This must have had some consequences for the relative withdrawal rates of the two types.

 

[Richard Scott]

There's a fair bit of information scattered around derbysulzers.com about things that used to go wrong, mostly with Sulzer engines of course but the occasional mention of EE, including stuff from actual engineers. But what stands out both from there and from anywhere else I've found that discusses failures from a technical angle is how very many of the things that went wrong were not due to deficiencies in the design of the engine itself, but were the consequences, primary or secondary, of things like badly-engineered and unreliable auxiliary systems, poor quality execution of maintenance, and bloodyminded insistence on inappropriate maintenance procedures because that's how they thought they ought to be doing it even if the engine manufacturer said different (eg. using the wrong type of coolant additives instead of that specified, leading to leaks, foaming and overheating; "reconditioning" injectors by regrinding until the case hardening was all gone instead of replacing them, leading to excessive clag and subsequent exhaust system failures, and unatomised unburnt fuel getting into the sump, diluting the lubricating oil and causing all sorts of aargh). This kind of treatment naturally exposed weak points in the engines which would not have been significant with correct installation and maintenance, and confuses the question of which were the "better" engines by intermingling considerations of the quality of the deliberate process of designing for the intended operating conditions with the accidental consequences of the ability or otherwise of random design features to stand up to abuse.

After the 12LDA28C crankcase fiasco and the failure of the 12LVA24 to impress (where Sulzer shot themselves in the foot by supplying BR with a Manufacturer's Special Tool for bearing replacement that was out of spec, leading to destruction of crankshafts), Sulzer reckoned that supplying railway engines wasn't worth the candle, and pulled out of it. EE on the other hand continued, through various changes of name and ownership, to produce what was still basically the good old LMS 10000/10001 engine with new clothes, for as long as they could possibly hang on to it. This must have had some consequences for the relative withdrawal rates of the two types.

Thanks for the comprehensive reply.

 

[Taunton]

The difference between the companies is that Sulzer only supplied the drawings; the UK engines were built by Vickers-Armstrong at their shipyard engine shop at Barrow-in-Furness, where they formed a significant part of their workload in the 1960s. Same approach was taken in France, with SNCF the next largest European user, and some in Eastern Eurpoe as well. There was just a small production facility in Switzerland where prototypes and some oddball engines were hand-built. This approach was normal for Sulzer with ship engines, which are far too large to be transported from Switzerland.

English Electric in contrast had their own factories to build the engines and, more importantly, feed back directly the various early experiences.

Experience with the MAN-licensed North British engines in WR hydraulics was the same, in that it was the various auxiliary components where most of the trouble arose. Turbochargers, fuel pumps, radiator fans, starter motors, etc. It was compounded by North British building much of these themselves, instead of going out to industry standard suppliers of them. When they went out of business at the end of the WR hydraulic production it was a double nuisance.

 

[Pigeon]

Experience with the MAN-licensed North British engines in WR hydraulics was the same, in that it was the various auxiliary components where most of the trouble arose. Turbochargers, fuel pumps, radiator fans, starter motors, etc. It was compounded by North British building much of these themselves, instead of going out to industry standard suppliers of them. When they went out of business at the end of the WR hydraulic production it was a double nuisance.

That did happen, but it was also a significant factor that the licensing of MAN designs for North British manufacture was among the most unfavourable such combinations of designer and manufacturer that arose: an unusually complicated engine design intended for skilled manufacture, and a builder who did a sloppy conversion from metric to imperial, played fast and loose with material specifications, and blacksmithed it together as if it was a steam engine, with hammers. So for instance you got turbocharger failures because NBL wilfully used the wrong grade of steel in the exhaust manifolds and bits fell off and went through the vanes. Too many desperate politically-motivated choices all around with diesels and NBL. Combinations like Sulzer and Vickers weren't perfect, but at least they did basically know what they were about and weren't frantically useless.

 

[Strathclyder]

EE on the other hand continued, through various changes of name and ownership, to produce what was still basically the good old LMS 10000/10001 engine with new clothes, for as long as they could possibly hang on to it. This must have had some consequences for the relative withdrawal rates of the two types.

Indeed, that proved to be a long-lived line of engines to say the least. The last incarnation of the LMS 10000/10001 (the 16SVT) prime mover to appear in a British mainline locomotive design was the Ruston-Paxman 16RK3CT in the Class 56s. To the untrained ear, a 50 (which had the 16CSVT version of the powerplant) and 56 sound completely different to each other, but listening to a 56 under full power, that distinctive EE-esque baseline thump/throb can plainly be heard underneath that screaming turbo (linked vid from the New Gold Dreamer YT channel).

 

[Rob F]

Would it have been relatively simple to put the engine from a 56 into a 50? I wonder if it was ever considered when the 50s were being refurbished. The WR could have had a fleet of 50 Deltic equivalents!

 

[Taunton]

That did happen, but it was also a significant factor that the licensing of MAN designs for North British manufacture ... an unusually complicated engine design intended for skilled manufacture

However, the MAN engine was derived from a WW2 submarine engine, assembled latterly by slave prisoner labour at the MAN works in Augsburg. Not a lot of skilled content there. High speed minimum size compared to the EE/Sulzer approach as needed for that application, of course. The same applied to US engines, particularly by Fairbanks-Morse, which were developed for the same use.

 

[Ken H]

We must also consider the tight UK loading gauge making it hard to get all the bits in while keeping the loco balanced. And with an acceptable axle loading.
Also trying to maintain diesel locos in dirty steam sheds wasn't ideal.

 

[Richard Scott]

Would it have been relatively simple to put the engine from a 56 into a 50? I wonder if it was ever considered when the 50s were being refurbished. The WR could have had a fleet of 50 Deltic equivalents!

Heard a rumour one 50 (50010, I believe) had a 56 engine block. May be total fabrication, of course!

 

[Western Lord]

Indeed, that proved to be a long-lived line of engines to say the least. The last incarnation of the LMS 10000/10001 (the 16SVT) prime mover to appear in a British mainline locomotive design was the Ruston-Paxman 16RK3CT in the Class 56s. To the untrained ear, a 50 (which had the 16CSVT version of the powerplant) and 56 sound completely different to each other, but listening to a 56 under full power, that distinctive EE-esque baseline thump/throb can plainly be heard underneath that screaming turbo (linked vid from the New Gold Dreamer YT channel).

Well, of course, the last incarnation of the EE/Ruston Paxman SVT/RK series to appear in a BR loco was the 12RK3ACT in the Class 58, rated at 3,300 bhp. I wonder if one of these would fit in a Class 37........

 

[43096]

Would it have been relatively simple to put the engine from a 56 into a 50? I wonder if it was ever considered when the 50s were being refurbished. The WR could have had a fleet of 50 Deltic equivalents!

They would have had to change the generator for an alternator if they had. It should have been done regardless (as with the refurbished Class 37s): it’s a huge “what if” had they been done as reliability would have been much improved.

 

[Taunton]

Heard a rumour one 50 (50010, I believe) had a 56 engine block. May be total fabrication, of course!

There have been various stories about Class 50 engines, one was that the wrecked hulk of DP2 was raided for the engine to fit in a Class 50, another that there were still only 49 engines left for the 50 locomotives after some unrepairable failures.

 

[Richard Scott]

There have been various stories about Class 50 engines, one was that the wrecked hulk of DP2 was raided for the engine to fit in a Class 50, another that there were still only 49 engines left for the 50 locomotives after some unrepairable failures.

I'd heard that too. One was always in works when all 50 were in service. Believe two engine blocks were written off in the early days.

 

[delt1c]

Heard a rumour one 50 (50010, I believe) had a 56 engine block. May be total fabrication, of course!

Its not a simple case of uprating the engine. Many ancillaries have to be modefied / adapted for the extra power. One of the reasons that the 31’s were so long lived was the derated engine which took stress away from other components. The reverse of an uprating.
Anyone who has uprated a car will know that is the easy big replacing the engine with a more powerful unit

 

[Cowley]

Its not a simple case of uprating the engine. Many ancillaries have to be modefied / adapted for the extra power. One of the reasons that the 31’s were so long lived was the derated engine which took stress away from other components. The reverse of an uprating.
Anyone who has uprated a car will know that is the easy big replacing the engine with a more powerful unit

Agreed, but when you get down to the basic engine block it would be interesting to know how similar a class 56 power unit is to a class 50 or older class 40?
I wonder if all the ports, oil gallery’s, stud patterns etc are in the same positions?

 

[delt1c]

Agreed, but when you get down to the basic engine block it would be interesting to know how similar a class 56 power unit is to a class 50 or older class 40?
I wonder if all the ports, oil gallery’s, stud patterns etc are in the same positions?

I would imagine very similar

 

[Richard Scott]

Its not a simple case of uprating the engine. Many ancillaries have to be modefied / adapted for the extra power. One of the reasons that the 31’s were so long lived was the derated engine which took stress away from other components. The reverse of an uprating.
Anyone who has uprated a car will know that is the easy big replacing the engine with a more powerful unit

Was only the block reputed to be of class 56 origin, rest was standard class 50.

 

[Grumpy Git]

I would take an educated guess that the de-rating of early loco's was done by simply imposing a lower rev limit for the diesel engine? This reduces the rotating and reciprocating masses inside the engine thus making a catastrophic (or indeed any) mechanical failure much less likely (i.e. a broken connecting rod).

 

[randyrippley]

I would take an educated guess that the de-rating of early loco's was done by simply imposing a lower rev limit for the diesel engine? This reduces the rotating and reciprocating masses inside the engine thus making a catastrophic (or indeed any) mechanical failure much less likely (i.e. a broken connecting rod).

the 31 engine was lacking the intercooler used on the 37.

==edit==
It's worth noting the 37 engine was already detuned: in 1960 the 12CSVT mk2 in the Kenyan 90 class was putting out 2025 / 1840 HP (peak / continuous) in hot & high conditions with rudimentary servicing.

 

[Irascible]

The difference between the companies is that Sulzer only supplied the drawings; the UK engines were built by Vickers-Armstrong at their shipyard engine shop at Barrow-in-Furness, where they formed a significant part of their workload in the 1960s.

I'm a little surprised they didn't use their tank workshop, given stressful environment & very tight packaging is common to both installations... I guess it was busy building tanks though.

 

[randyrippley]

I'm a little surprised they didn't use their tank workshop, given stressful environment & very tight packaging is common to both installations... I guess it was busy building tanks though.

Completely different scale of engine. Not sure when UK tanks moved to diesel, but in the 1950s many were still using what were effectively detuned petrol aircraft engines - some derived from Merlins
Loco engines were much larger, diesel and followed ship / submarine practice - which Barrow was well versed in

 

[Irascible]

Completely different scale of engine. Not sure when UK tanks moved to diesel, but in the 1950s many were still using what were effectively detuned petrol aircraft engines - some derived from Merlins
Loco engines were much larger, diesel and followed ship / submarine practice - which Barrow was well versed in

Still using the Meteor ( Merlni with no supercharger ) in the 50s - but it's more about being used to packing a reliable set of ancilliaries in than the engine specifically. Ship primary diesels are enormous, and the secondary generator installs that tended to share engines with rail have huge amounts of space to work with, and the movement the install is subjected to is generally fairly smooth.

 

[D1537]

I would take an educated guess that the de-rating of early loco's was done by simply imposing a lower rev limit for the diesel engine? This reduces the rotating and reciprocating masses inside the engine thus making a catastrophic (or indeed any) mechanical failure much less likely (i.e. a broken connecting rod).

That was certainly the case for the 47s - from 800rpm to 750rpm. Ironically it appears to have been the uprating from 750 to 800rpm that occured during the transition from the 12LDA28B to 12LDA28C that was the main cause of the problems with crankcase cracking.

 

[Strathclyder]

Well, of course, the last incarnation of the EE/Ruston Paxman SVT/RK series to appear in a BR loco was the 12RK3ACT in the Class 58, rated at 3,300 bhp. I wonder if one of these would fit in a Class 37........

Of course, totally forgot about the 12RK3ACT in the 58s. Guess the reason I did was because it sounds completely different to all it's forebears (as you'd expect, but still).

 

[Pigeon]

I would take an educated guess that the de-rating of early loco's was done by simply imposing a lower rev limit for the diesel engine? This reduces the rotating and reciprocating masses inside the engine thus making a catastrophic (or indeed any) mechanical failure much less likely (i.e. a broken connecting rod).

Yes - very straightforward on a diesel engine - just twiddle the stop on the governor. Another method is to twiddle the limit stop on the fuel rack. You can "customise" both maximum speed and maximum power over a fairly wide range with these settings.

Sometimes people find out about this and decide to twiddle their stops the other way, leading to brief ecstasy along with volcanic smoke emission followed by a big bang and much gloom. There has probably been at least one train driver among such people somewhere in the world, but I don't think one has done it in Britain.

That was certainly the case for the 47s - from 800rpm to 750rpm. Ironically it appears to have been the uprating from 750 to 800rpm that occured during the transition from the 12LDA28B to 12LDA28C that was the main cause of the problems with crankcase cracking.

AIUI they changed from a cast crankcase to a fabricated one in order to save weight, as part of the struggle to get the axle loading on the 47s down, and they started to fall apart at the welds. This led to all sorts of argument over whether it was bad design or bad welding and how practical was the huge operation that replacing them all would be and who would pay for it, which looked like it was never going to get anywhere; trials with derating were undertaken with a view to a temporary fix, and to everyone's relief found to answer so well that it could be adopted as a permanent solution. At some point it was found that a lot of the problem was that going up to 800rpm hit the natural frequency of something or other, and the reason dropping it to 750rpm worked so well was that it stayed safely below that resonance, but I can't remember if they found this out first and decided to try dropping the revs in consequence, or if they were checking whether the reduction really would be as effective long term as it looked like it was going to be and discovered the resonance in the course of that research.

 

[Grumpy Git]

The "something or other" was the resonant frequency of the crankcase.

Google "Tacoma Narrows bridge", the same effect is also when someone can break a wineglass just by singing!

 

[randyrippley]

Of course, totally forgot about the 12RK3ACT in the 58s. Guess the reason I did was because it sounds completely different to all it's forebears (as you'd expect, but still).

Possibly because there's a lot of Sulzer technology in that engine. After the 12LVA24 fiasco and lack off interest in the bigger version in Kestrel, Sulzer sold their intellectual rights in locomotive V-engine designs to GEC. Much of that went into the 12RK3ACT - especially in the cylinder head design

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

Indeed, that proved to be a long-lived line of engines to say the least. The last incarnation of the LMS 10000/10001 (the 16SVT) prime mover to appear in a British mainline locomotive design was the Ruston-Paxman 16RK3CT in the Class 56s. To the untrained ear, a 50 (which had the 16CSVT version of the powerplant) and 56 sound completely different to each other, but listening to a 56 under full power, that distinctive EE-esque baseline thump/throb can plainly be heard underneath that screaming turbo (linked vid from the New Gold Dreamer YT channel).

Are you sure they've not attached an audio clip from a class 40 onto that class 56 video!?

Sulzer engines live on as part of the Finnish Wärtsilä group, powering many of the largest ships in the world.
Swiss Sulzer now concentrates on industrial pumps.

 

[ac6000cw]

That was certainly the case for the 47s - from 800rpm to 750rpm. Ironically it appears to have been the uprating from 750 to 800rpm that occured during the transition from the 12LDA28B to 12LDA28C that was the main cause of the problems with crankcase cracking.

They certainly weren't the only railway diesel engine manufacturer to push up full-power RPM up and have issues...

When EMD introduced the SD50 in the US in 1981 (as the successor to the phenomenally successful SD40-2), they wanted to match the 3600 hp that GE had been offering for a while in their U36C/C36-7 locos. As part of the power upgrade EMD pushed the V16 645-series engine from 900 to 950 rpm.

This turned out to be a step too far, resulting in crankcase issues, and contributed to the reliability problems that the SD50 suffered from, souring its reputation with customers.

They fixed the issues over time (and three years later introduced the 710-series engine in the much more successful SD60), but the SD50 period probably marked the beginning of the end of EMD's domination of the US diesel loco market.