GWML / Elizabeth line disruption due to OLE down near Paddington

[43096]

I am only going on what has been reported here, but clearly a tentative reflection is not a conclusion.

What Haines is getting at is individual actors managing down their own risk by passing it on to somebody or somewhere else. It is interesting that it has taken Haines actually being caught up in something like this to reach that point of tentative reflection.

Possibly because with previous incidents the message has been “managed” before it got to him. As he’s now seen it first hand, there may just be a chance that things might be done differently in future.

 

[hwl]

It was initiated by a lighting strike on a 400kV transmission line connected to Little Barford but then super sensitive software on nearby wind farms tripped their units off. Too much clever software and over reliance on computers in that industry as well. Then we see them doing away with lineside phones which work on simple technology that just keeps going.

Part of the problem was that the software installed on the UK equipment was fairly basic (because Nat Grid hadn't though about requirements enough) and wasn't sophisticated enough and lacked the ability to reconnect and align with the grid post stabilisation. This was quickly rectified (software already used elsewhere in europe) along with more local battery and /or flywheel combinations to maintain frequency alignment across disconnections to enable very rapid reconnection. NatGrid quickly learnt lessons and the changes will ultimately have the electricity industry and users money in the long run.

 

[Pakenhamtrain]

I believe so, I also believe some started self evacuating after an hour.
You could also look at it as the only trains where passengers self evacuated were DOO services.

That is preventable if you equip trains correctly.
Our HCMT fleet pulling an emergency door handle triggers a 20 second delay to which the driver of the train can prevent the doors being released.

 

[Annetts key]

I have been in that exact position, both as a Controller and, once as a passenger; During a massive signalling failure affecting Glasgow Central, I was on a train stuck between stations which both Signallers and Controllers had forgotten about, or more likely, had simply not had time to think about; Only by borrowing a mobile phone was I able to advise Control and get the train back to the nearest station where we could all detrain, safely.

It must be remembered that the Controls involved in the Paddington incident, ie mainly NR and GWR, were not dealing just with the trains immediately involved but also those heading towards the area, all of which had to be managed, in conjunction with the Signallers; There may also have been, as was especially the case with Carmont, other incidents elsewhere on the network demanding Control attention.

And that is part of the problem. With centralised control arrangements, the staffing is normally only designed for normal day to day operations. If multiple incidents occur at or about the same time, or a major incident occurs, the on duty staff can get overwhelmed.

I once required control to make a decision, as there were multiple problems that needed attention, and it was not clear which should get priority. An hour later I got a phone call from control that unhelpfully asked for all the problems to be attended without answering the question that I asked…

I’ve also seen this while on the operating floor of a PSB. Some signallers had some choice words for some of the decisions made by control…

The other problem with a centralised control system, is that when they are overwhelmed, they are the last to know about changes in the situation. So they can be making decisions on out of date information.

 

[Garulon]

Even without trains running, detraining hundreds, or in this case, thousands, of passengers from multiple trains, onto a surface totally unsuitable for walking on, in the dark, has to be done safely, which requires staff, and quite a few of them, on the ground to assist people; Getting on with it cannot mean simply opening train doors and saying 'Paddington is that way, jump down and on you go'.

But that's exactly what happened, the passengers gave the railway a good few hours and without any training or protocols or drills managed to quickly evacuate themselves.

Why were the passengers better at it than the railway?

Why wasn't keeping the passengers updated (even via a megaphone) with a view to evacuating them the #1 priority?

 

[zwk500]

But that's exactly what happened, the passengers gave the railway a good few hours and without any training or protocols or drills managed to quickly evacuate themselves.

Why were the passengers better at it than the railway?

Do we know that the passengers who evacuated themselves managed to move quickly to the nearest access point?

We know that they didn't inform relevant staff on the railway when they had made themselves safe, and therefore extended the reactionary disruption to other passengers.

Why wasn't keeping the passengers updated (even via a megaphone) with a view to evacuating them the #1 priority?

This is a fair question. Although you'd have had to get a staff member out to each train to deliver a megaphone, and if you have the staff to do that surely just evacuate passengers at that point.

 

[Taunton]

The electrical failure was caused by a catastrophic failure on one wind farm which caused the wind farms whole output to trip. This in turn caused a cascade trip of another wind farm and there was insufficient capacity on the grid to prevent loadshedding.

Whilst it was an extremely rare event it should have been planned for. To have trains in service that cant be reset either locally by an operator or remotely following a low frequency event was foolish in the extreme.

A classic example of the loss of corporate awareness. There were certainly momentary frequency failures in the 1974 electricity industry strikes, they were even described in rail magazines at the time, and doubtless seasoned electrical engineers can recollect others. Of course, traditional AC traction just carried on regardless.

 

[AdamWW]

We know that they didn't inform relevant staff on the railway when they had made themselves safe, and therefore extended the reactionary disruption to other passengers.

What should they have done, and how would they have known what was expected of them?

 

[zwk500]

What should they have done, and how would they have known what was expected of them?

I'm not blaming the passengers - the rail staff should never have let it get to that point. I was just remarking that saying the passengers were 'better' at evacuating than if it had been done with staff is not necessarily accurate.

 

[HSTfan!!!]

Do we know that the passengers who evacuated themselves managed to move quickly to the nearest access point?

We know that they didn't inform relevant staff on the railway when they had made themselves safe, and therefore extended the reactionary disruption to other passengers.

This is a fair question. Although you'd have had to get a staff member out to each train to deliver a megaphone, and if you have the staff to do that surely just evacuate passengers at that point.

Don’t know what equipment 345’s carry but 800’s have a megaphone in their emergency equipment.

 

[12LDA28C]

That's interesting - the total opposite on LU with their connect system!

That's because on the LU the cab radio I believe connects directly with Control whereas on NR infrastructure the driver has a direct line to the controlling signaller, not Control.

 

[Horizon22]

But that's exactly what happened, the passengers gave the railway a good few hours and without any training or protocols or drills managed to quickly evacuate themselves.

Why were the passengers better at it than the railway?

Why wasn't keeping the passengers updated (even via a megaphone) with a view to evacuating them the #1 priority?

Passengers evacuating is one thing, but as others have said going onto ballast in the dark with no idea where the nearest access point to get off the railway is another matter. Probably be some herd mentality thinking.

That's because on the LU the cab radio I believe connects directly with Control whereas on NR infrastructure the driver has a direct line to the controlling signaller, not Control.

They can call control via GSMR quite easily.

 

[12LDA28C]

This is a fair question. Although you'd have had to get a staff member out to each train to deliver a megaphone, and if you have the staff to do that surely just evacuate passengers at that point.

I would suggest that one member of staff would hardly be sufficient to safely evacuate 1,000 passengers from a train.

 

[Taunton]

Why wasn't keeping the passengers updated (even via a megaphone) with a view to evacuating them the #1 priority?

No budget authorised for a megaphone ...

 

[Horizon22]

And that is part of the problem. With centralised control arrangements, the staffing is normally only designed for normal day to day operations. If multiple incidents occur at or about the same time, or a major incident occurs, the on duty staff can get overwhelmed.

The other problem with a centralised control system, is that when they are overwhelmed, they are the last to know about changes in the situation. So they can be making decisions on out of date information.

I’m curious as to what you believe is the alternative to “centralised control arrangements”? Having lots of controllers all in various places, is probably not very helpful for communications flows.

Again in this incident it was very clear how many stranded trains there were, where they were, passenger numbers etc. It was also clear a controlled evacuation to track would be the most likely outcome relatively quickly after all options are assessed. The main issue was then getting the response to them, and it will have to be ascertained why it was this long, or if fundamentally - based on other instances - aiming for less than 90 minutes is impractical.

If the latter is the case, then that offers fundamental questions for how to deal with stranded trains knowing people are likely to self-evacuate before they can be reached by trained personnel.

 

[12LDA28C]

They can call control via GSMR quite easily.

Yes of course by scrolling through the phone book, but the direct point of contact is the signaller.

 

[Horizon22]

Yes of course by scrolling through the phone book, but the direct point of contact is the signaller.

Indeed. But there’s still a direct line as such (I.e they don’t have to go through the signaller to reach them).

 

[Elecman]

Why are the GWR 800s driven with leading pantograph used rather than the trailing Pantograph as per the Avanti Pendolinos annd the East Coast 800s?

 

[357]

Yes of course by scrolling through the phone book, but the direct point of contact is the signaller.

Many TOCs control rooms can now send a "Contact Control" message to the GSMR in the same way the signaller can send a "Contact Signaller". Same as with a signaller, just press the tick and you will get put through to the person who wants to talk to you.

 

[Bikeman78]

Do we know that the passengers who evacuated themselves managed to move quickly to the nearest access point?

We know that they didn't inform relevant staff on the railway when they had made themselves safe, and therefore extended the reactionary disruption to other passengers.

With close to 1000 people on some trains, how would they account for everyone during an evacuation? It would be very easy to lose count with such a large number.

 

[357]

With close to 1000 people on some trains, how would they account for everyone during an evacuation? It would be very easy to lose count with such a large number.

Count them off the train, count them through the access gate.

 

[dangerousdids2]

What has the world become! When a single piece of ole breaks and half the network comes to a halt and is put into chaos.

 

[Bikeman78]

Count them off the train, count them through the access gate.

That's what I thought. But as I said, what happens when you miss miscount? Spend hours searching for someone that doesn't exist?

 

[12LDA28C]

Count them off the train, count them through the access gate.

For a thousand people constantly moving about, in the dark and the chaos you think it's that simple? If only.

 

[357]

For a thousand people constantly moving about, in the dark and the chaos you think it's that simple? If only.

I'm just going by what happened when the train that I was driving needed to be evacuated. One person with a counter at the cab door and one at the access gate with another counter, and hope they get the same number at the end of it all. Logic would say that in a case like this, there should be enough staff around to be able to keep people from different trains away from each other.

That's what I thought. But as I said, what happens when you miss miscount? Spend hours searching for someone that doesn't exist?

Not entirely sure, but there are existing procedures for trespassers that might be relevant.

 

[silverfoxcc]

Our company policy on mobile devices is quite clear. Other TOCs may be different.
Do you have access to my companies mobile device policy?

VP is there a situation where you WOULD use your phone, or would you just sit there?

 

[VP185]

VP is there a situation where you WOULD use your phone, or would you just sit there?

Only if Control has authorised me to on a recorded line.

Why are the GWR 800s driven with leading pantograph used rather than the trailing Pantograph as per the Avanti Pendolinos annd the East Coast 800s?

Because the rulebook states certain situations where you can coast after losing the line light provided the pantograph is on the front 3 vehicles.

 

[silverfoxcc]

So there could be a situation where peoples lives were in danger for whatever reason, and you would not ring 999 etc until your conversation has been recorded to give you permission?

 

[VP185]

So there could be a situation where peoples lives were in danger for whatever reason, and you would not ring 999 etc until your conversation has been recorded to give you permission?

That’s done via the GSMR direct to the signaller.

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

That’s done via the GSMR direct to the signaller.

What i find quite staggering is that the GSMR system has such a short shelf life after losing the traction system. I would have thought that it and on train PA should have at least 3hrs duration as the key to managing passenger behaviour is what you communicate to them.