Have railways became too expensive to build/improve?

[Yew]

HS2 is perhaps not representative of overall projects.

People don't produce documents for the sake of it - every document that is produced has a purpose, and that purpose is usually defined in either law or one of the engineering standards that the railway must adhere to.

It's all very fashionable to slam people in offices for hoarding all the money but the reality is that the railway is a very strictly regulated and highly qualified environment and the Engineers designing the projects usually don't have a vested interest in artificially extending the project, because they'd rather have the completion bonus and move on to the next one.

I have had a very tangential experience with a couple of rail projects and my observations are that the biggest avoidable costs come from: (in ascending order):
- Lack of accurate documentation at the start, forcing re-surveys and prep work. This is partly bad record-keeping, partly bad project handover and partly just a really old railway.
- The quality of the individual project manager is highly variable. I worked on 2 project simultaneously that were, prima facie, equivalent. One has gone to public consultation already and the other just stayed forever stuck in treacle predominantly because of the skills and abilities of each PM.
- The strictness of the regulations and standards is such that it is often more expensive to get permission from the ORR/RSSB to go with a more cost-effective option.
- Politicians refusing to accept the technical conclusions of qualified engineers. They are determined to have something so go with the options not recommended.
- Politicians changing their mind (either because the elections have changed people around or because the first set of bills have arrived).

The number of feasibility reports required and the cost of them is problematic, but fundamentally the railway is a complex beast and requires highly skilled, highly qualified people to design and build it. The railway does not do very much that is not required by law or the regulating body. So if you want e.g. less environmental impact reports (a modest cost in the scheme of projects, much overblown by the tabloids) then you will need to change the law to drop that requirement.

Don't forget asking for requirements, and then designing to meet them all, no matter the cost; instead of having a pragmatic discussion of the cost/benefit of a particular feature.

 

[zwk500]

Given that RETB allows the issauance of multi-block tokens.... would the number of token exchanges really be that large?

This increases complexity and therefore cost.

The bulk of the Cumbrian Coast has an hourly DMU service and thats pretty much it. 2hr30-ish journey time (Barrow-Carlisle) implies only five or six trains in motion at any given time.
Could issue tokens covering the bulk of the line without seriously damaging the service!

How many non-stop trains do you see on the Cumbrian Coast Line or the S&C?

Don't forget freight, railtours and RHTTs.

Even if there was, there would still be no will to force deployment on the UK railway.

Freight operators would make noise about it being unaffordable etc etc etc.

FOCs would complain about RETB fitment for S&C/Cumbrian coast anyway. Fitting ECP brakes is beneficial to them in other ways, so I don't see that FOC objections would be stronger to ETCS L3 than to RETB. And don't forget RETB frequencies got reallocated, so you'd need to double check which bands are available in the area.

Don't forget asking for requirements, and then designing to meet them all, no matter the cost; instead of having a pragmatic discussion of the cost/benefit of a particular feature.

That's bad project management from the client side and bad workflow management from the contractor side.

 

[squizzler]

There was an attempt by some academics to look at this, primarily focused on America. They blamed political meddling, lack of in-house capacity requiring the use of consultants, not giving contractors enough freedom, lack of coordination with other agencies resulting in gold-plating to get buy-in, overstaffing, unions, lack of standardization, and preferring more expensive but less disruptive methods like tunnnel boring rather than cheaper but more disruptive methods like cut-and-cover. Now considering that at least one of the contributors is definitely on the "crank" end of things it should be treated with a very very large grain of salt and absolutely not cited as gospel, but it's perhaps food for thought.

Could you elaborate on the disclaimers that you yourself have emboldened? I am familiar with Levy and whilst his mathematical analysis on some matters might leave many of us in the dust — and thus beyond my ability to critique — I don’t disagree with his written explanations.

 

[eldomtom2]

Could you elaborate on the disclaimers that you yourself have emboldened? I am familiar with Levy and whilst his mathematical analysis on some matters might leave many of us in the dust — and thus beyond my ability to critique — I don’t disagree with his written explanations.

The fact of the matter is that Levy tends to make extremely provocative statements with little to back them up. Recently they have declared that there is no difference in economic policy between solidly Democratic and solidly Republican states, to say nothing of their frequeny calls to have the entirety of American transit agencies' management fired for incompetence (the question of what political pressures they may be operating under tends to be ignored). I also remember that when I brought up their claim that Euston post-HS2 should only need the 16 platforms it already has here it was widely mocked.

 

[Xavi]

At a recent meeting we were discussing how well the Okehampton reopening had gone - completed in nine months and £10m under budget. But this was essentially a track laying project - no consultants,

There were consultants involved and their input was critical to the speed and savings.

 

[LesF]

UK rail works have rocketted in cost because HS2 is gobbling up so much resource, and, being financed by the bottomless pocket of the taxpayer, is not being built economically.

 

[zwk500]

At a recent meeting we were discussing how well the Okehampton reopening had gone - completed in nine months and £10m under budget. But this was essentially a track laying project - no consultants, no resignalling and no new stations (Okehampton station will have needed some work but basically it was already there).

The big difference with Okehampton is that the politicians made up their mind and then that was it. It helped that the consultants had already identified the business case and timetable/crew/diagram availability, of course.

In 2005, a report by management consultant Arthur D. Little for Alistair Darling, then Secretary of State for Transport, argued that the string of rail disasters over the past few years had created a "pervasive and self-sustaining culture of risk-averse or over-cautious behaviour in the UK rail industry". "Decisions that in the past were made by competent, front-line staff are being taken by more senior management who lack the technical expertise," the report says. The rail industry relies on "excessive analysis instead of professional judgment, to protect against personal liability," it argues. Any know what happened to this report? Maybe it went into the "too difficult" tray.

If you are quoting directly, do you have a copy of it?

 

[Starmill]

The industry cannot keep using the excuse that they provide steps for people to reach trains if they can use them, but nothing else comparable for those who can't use them unless you book well in advance. This situation in certain circumstances isn't lawful. There has to be a plan in place to expand step-free access in order to show that the government and the train companies are actually making the reasonable adjustments which the law requires. Progress has hardly been quick on that front.

 

[bspahh]

The big difference with Okehampton is that the politicians made up their mind and then that was it. It helped that the consultants had already identified the business case and timetable/crew/diagram availability, of course.

If you are quoting directly, do you have a copy of it?

This is a report by Arthur D. Little Limited on Risk Aversion in the UK Rail Industry from 2005

UK Government Web Archive

This Page is [ARCHIVED CONTENT] and shows what the site page http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/groups/dft_railways/documents/page/dft_railways_035013.pdf looked like on 15 Feb 2006 at 23:48:18

webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk

Page 4 says:

There is a pervasive and self-sustaining culture of risk averse or over-cautious behaviour in the UK rail industry, which increases cost and reduces performance. It has arisen from and been reinforced by the magnitude of the criticism brought on the industry following the series of major accidents at Southall, Ladbroke Grove, Hatfield, and Potters Bar, including recent and pending prosecutions

Risk aversion is manifest in various ways:
− Decisions that in the past were made by competent front line staff being taken by more senior management who lack the technical expertise – with a view to minimising corporate risk
− Senior management taking quick, expensive action – to be seen to be doing something
− Reliance on decisions by committee – to spread responsibility
− Reliance on excessive analysis instead of professional judgement – to protect against personal liability
− Reliance on strict compliance with standards instead of professional judgement about whether compliance is necessary given other mitigation
− Approval for non-compliance is rarely sought, even when justified – the process is seen as too time consuming and expensive, and not politically correct

• The effects are amplified or reinforced by:
− Lack of incentives to keep the railway running or to develop new or improved services
− The fragmented structure of the industry – managing the contract has become more important
− Confusion over roles within the industry and a lack of clear leadership – no single vision for the railway and the safety objectives it should achieve
− Poor relationships and communication both within and between organisations, leading to ‘urban myths’ – that what is acceptable on the railway is more onerous than in reality − The poor state of the infrastructure provides no leeway – maintenance is costly and decisions are critical
• Risk aversion can also be an excuse for poor management or aversion to change

 

[zwk500]

This is a report by Arthur D. Little Limited on Risk Aversion in the UK Rail Industry from 2005

UK Government Web Archive

This Page is [ARCHIVED CONTENT] and shows what the site page http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/groups/dft_railways/documents/page/dft_railways_035013.pdf looked like on 15 Feb 2006 at 23:48:18

webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk

Page 4 says:

Much obliged!

No wonder politicians didn't like the criticism of managers lacking technical expertise

 

[bspahh]

This is a 320 page report from 2011 with the title "Realising the Potential of GB Rail Final Independent Report of the Rail Value for Money Study". The report was originally commissioned by Lord Adonis at the end of the last Labour government, but it says that the the Study’s general approach was endorsed by the new Secretary of State, the Rt Hon. Philip Hammond MP from May 2010.

Rail Value for Money study | Office of Rail and Road

This study puts forward a wide range of recommendations focused on creating an industry environment which encourages cost reduction, changes which deliver new efficiencies, and mechanisms to drive implementation. The Study estimates that implementing these recommendations could deliver savings...

www.orr.gov.uk

 

[crablab]

This is a 320 page report from 2011 with the title "Realising the Potential of GB Rail Final Independent Report of the Rail Value for Money Study"

Quoting directly from this a section which is relevant to previous discussion:

High Speed 2
As part of the work to identify high speed rail unit costs, HS2’s top-down international benchmarking found that unit cost rates for high speed rail construction in the UK were typically up to double those being achieved in Europe. Potential causes were identified as:
• the extent to which high speed rail was a discrete project rather than a programme which could lead to additional one-off costs such as skills development;
• a more prescriptive approach to the transposition of EU legislation;
• multiple layers of technical and commercial supervision due to the trend for multiple sub-contracting;
• more complex contractual relationships and a dependency on large external Programme Management teams to achieve confidence in overall integration; and
• the potential through the addition of optimism bias to create self-fulfilling project price inflation.

Infrastructure UK
Infrastructure UK undertook further detailed work looking at project specific comparisons, which, while reinforcing the findings of the top-down benchmarking, generally found a more complex picture. Of particular relevance to rail were the following findings:
• While the examination of seven high speed lines across Europe showed that construction costs in the UK were significantly higher, when compared with the four most directly comparable projects, HS1 costs were at least 23% higher.
• Comparisons of station development costs indicate that the UK is 50% more expensive, for example, than Spain. However, UK stations are designed to serve a significantly higher peak passenger demand (up to 2.7 times) which could cause higher costs.
• While tunnelling civil engineering costs are similar to Europe, total outturn costs that involve significant tunnelling are more expensive than Europe, suggesting higher pre-construction and indirect costs.
Infrastructure UK also found higher infrastructure costs on UK road projects. Section 10.2 sets out potential reasons for the cost differences between UK and Europe.

 

[Broucek]

Don't forget asking for requirements, and then designing to meet them all, no matter the cost; instead of having a pragmatic discussion of the cost/benefit of a particular feature.

I've heard this more than once from senior people in the construction industry

Gov't tries to pass on risk to building firms who then over-engineer everything in response

 

[HSTEd]

− Reliance on strict compliance with standards instead of professional judgement about whether compliance is necessary given other mitigation
− Approval for non-compliance is rarely sought, even when justified – the process is seen as too time consuming and expensive, and not politically correct

The ORR got the railway culture it demanded, in short.

The risk assessment process is so onerous that any fully compliant solution is inevitably cheaper than trying to pursue it.
Especially as approval for non-compliance de-facto depends on the whims of regulator personnel.

EDIT:

One of the major points of having standards in the first place is to avoid the insane costs inherently involved in risk assessments by providing rules that can be used to build a suitable system without such activities.
But the regulator now seems to believe that risk assessments are a good way to do things, and thus sets insanely onerous standards (because people can always risk assess their way out of them).

See the absurd decision to abandon decades of 25kV electrification practice on clearances.

No engineer I have ever met enjoys risk assessments and many go to great lengths to avoid doing them, because they are tedious time sinks that achieve nothing and have no guarantee of success.

 

[Yew]

No engineer I have ever met enjoys risk assessments and many go to great lengths to avoid doing them, because they are tedious time sinks that achieve nothing and have no guarantee of success.

I do find it odd in British Engineering culture how we seem to have decided to bring the collective decision making of large teams down onto a "single wring able neck"; even if the system is so complex that there is virtually no hope of a single person being able to understand it all.

 

[stuu]

The recent and simplest station rebuilding project - Barrow Haven - in Lincolnshire cost £1.3 million. That is one platform being replaced in 3 months. Normally, I'd be the first to say that's crazy on both the time and cost but I respect now that to shut the whole line and do it in a fortnight would be very detrimental in a poorly served region. I'm tempted to say they could have tried to get the cost down to £1 million but an extra £300,000 isnt that painful.

Most stations nowadays are being built in the same copycat style. See Bow Street, Newcourt, Pye Corner etc... I expect some savings due to this repetition.

This is absolutely bizarre. How did anyone ever think that was value for money? There must be some odd groupthink which takes over, and stops people standing back and saying "hang on a minute"... That's £8,000 per square metre of platform. What did the business case look like for spending that much on a tiny station that barely sees any passengers? If a station is absolutely necessary, how about building a 10m long platform and only opening one door on the train?

 

[HSTEd]

This is absolutely bizarre. How did anyone ever think that was value for money? There must be some odd groupthink which takes over, and stops people standing back and saying "hang on a minute"... That's £8,000 per square metre of platform. What did the business case look like for spending that much on a tiny station that barely sees any passengers? If a station is absolutely necessary, how about building a 10m long platform and only opening one door on the train?

It's likely the bulk of the cost was more to do with working next to an open railway than the material and labour necessary to build the platform.

If they had temporarily closed the line it would probably have cost a fraction of that.

 

[zwk500]

This is absolutely bizarre. How did anyone ever think that was value for money? There must be some odd groupthink which takes over, and stops people standing back and saying "hang on a minute"... That's £8,000 per square metre of platform. What did the business case look like for spending that much on a tiny station that barely sees any passengers? If a station is absolutely necessary, how about building a 10m long platform and only opening one door on the train?

A big chunk of that £1.3m will be the costs of the possession and construction compound.

 

[BrianW]

This is absolutely bizarre. How did anyone ever think that was value for money? There must be some odd groupthink which takes over, and stops people standing back and saying "hang on a minute"... That's £8,000 per square metre of platform. What did the business case look like for spending that much on a tiny station that barely sees any passengers? If a station is absolutely necessary, how about building a 10m long platform and only opening one door on the train?

Beauly Station is IIRC about 5m long (short!): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beauly_railway_station
It was long enough for Michael Portillo to alight on one of his Great British Railway Journeys, and several thousand passengers.
If I read it right Real Time Trains shows 25 trains as calling today.

 

[stuu]

It's likely the bulk of the cost was more to do with working next to an open railway than the material and labour necessary to build the platform.

If they had temporarily closed the line it would probably have cost a fraction of that.

Yes I'm sure that is true. So why didn't they close the line? It seems the height of madness to spend such a ludicrous sum when the coffers aren't exactly overflowing

 

[geoffk]

If you are quoting directly, do you have a copy of it?

This is a link to The Engineer of March 2005 and the report should be accessible from it.

Risky railways

A complete copy of the report can be downloaded from the Department For Transport site here: www.dft.gov.uk//stellent/groups/dft_railways/documents/page/dft_railways_035013.pdf.

www.theengineer.co.uk