The Transport Select Committee held a hearing today into the power failure and its consequences with the main players
Thomas Woldbye, Chief Executive at Heathrow Airport Ltd (HAL)
Alice Delahunty, President, UK Electricity Transmission at National Grid (where the fire took place)
Nigel Wicking Chief Executive at Heathrow Airline Operators' Committee Limited (looks after airlines interest)
Eliane Algaard Operations Director at Scottish and Southern Electricity Networks (provides the power to the airport)
https://committees.parliament.uk/event/22760/formal-meeting-oral-evidence-session/
Each representative gave an overview.
HAL CEO says as a result of the loss of Heathrow Nth S/Stn (fed from North Hyde substation at 66kV) they had lost all power to Terminal two, lighting in the approach road tunnel and their operations centre was affected. All aerodrome safety critical systems were maintained and that other terminals and facilities fed from the other two supply points remained operational.
National Grid stated that at North Hyde substation /stns two 275/66kV transformers were on line but one tripped off after the fire started so they reconfigured the site to a standby transformer but shortly after the remaining two transformers also tripped off (one was adjacent to the fire so not surprising given the ferocity of the fire but the other was some distance away but NG say wait for the NESO report for sequence of events and cause). They had one 275kV supply restored at 1000hrs once the fire was secured and a second supply available at 1600hrs.
Scottish & Southern Energy Networks (SSEN) were able to reconfigure there local network to restore domestic and business customers from 0400 onwards and importantly they were able to reconfigure their 66kV system at 0930 and give Heathrow a supply to their North substation at 1000.
Under questioning HAL are pointing the finger at NG/SSEN as its up to them to provide HAL with resilience. Basically HAL run the airport as three discrete load centres and interconnecting isn’t designed for the scenario that happened. The rep from Heathrow airline operators group claims that HAL waited till 0600 before they decided to reconfigure, SSEN confirmed to HAL they could have provided additional load from their two other s/stns. Also UK Power Networks run the internal HAL HV network and sounds like they needed to call people in.
Sounds to me HAL have too many systems that can’t cope with a loss of supply and be satisfied they will self restore so they are taking lowest risk approach and basically booting up every system from scratch and confirm they are working satisfactorily. In contrast railway signalling systems are expected to self restore under a loss of supply or where thats not acceptable be provided with UPS backup but seems outside of aerodrome safety systems (air traffic tower, landing lights and certain fire suppression assets) HALs protocol is to "cold start" all other assets like baggage handling, border control, escalators etc and check they are fully functioning before the output can be considered to be operational. HAL have instigate their own investigation being undertaken by Ruth Kelly former MP and chair of TSC although now a HAL board member so not much independence. CEO wasn't clear that full report could be issued due its security issues of the airport but let see.
What was interesting was several references made that Network Rail can cope with this sort of outage with remote switching and the way it runs its network.