How are mainline steam tours crewed and do the locomotive have AWS & TPWS?

[king_walnut]

Hi,

The people who drive the steam trains that are used on special rail tours, are they usually drivers employed by a TOC? If not, do they still have to keep theor route knowledge refreshed? How does that work?

Also I'm guessing steam trains are not fitted with AWS or TPWS? I thought that was a requirement? Any safety systems at all on them?

 

[hexagon789]

Hi,

The people who drive the steam trains that are used on special rail tours, are they usually drivers employed by a TOC? If not, do they still have to keep theor route knowledge refreshed? How does that work?

Also I'm guessing steam trains are not fitted with AWS or TPWS? I thought that was a requirement? Any safety systems at all on them?

All steam locos registered for use on Network Rail must be fitted with AWS, TPWS and I believe also OTDRs.

 

[UP13]

Safety equipment is one of the reasons why having an engine mainline operable is so expensive.

 

[king_walnut]

So if a steam train were to SPAD, there's the technology on them to bring them to a halt? I thought it was all manual wheels and handles and whatever?

 

[ainsworth74]

So if a steam train were to SPAD, there's the technology on them to bring them to a halt? I thought it was all manual wheels and handles and whatever?

Yup. I believe the relevant system (be it AWS or TPWS) is fitted such that it can just dump the main brake pipe when required. It doesn't need to operate a handle or wheel, all it has to do is actuate a valve.

There was an incident back in 2015 where the crew of a mainline steam tour deliberately isolated the AWS after an activation due to missing a warning approaching a speed restriction which also isolated the TPWS (they share a control system even though they have different functions) which allowed the train to SPAD.

Summary

At around 17:25 hrs on Saturday 7 March 2015, train reporting number 1Z67, the 16:35 hrs steam hauled charter service from Bristol Temple Meads to Southend, passed signal SN45 at danger. Signal SN45, which is situated on the approach to Wootton Bassett Junction, was being maintained at danger to protect the movement of a scheduled passenger train. At the time that the incident occurred, this scheduled passenger train had already passed through the junction. No injuries, damage or derailment occurred as a result of the incident.

Train 1Z67 was operated by West Coast Railways and consisted of the steam locomotive ‘Tangmere’ and 13 coaches. Although Tangmere is a heritage locomotive, it is fitted with modern safety systems including the Automatic Warning System (AWS) and the Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS).

RAIB’s investigation has found that signal SN45 was passed at danger because the driver did not reduce the train’s speed on approach to the signal. This meant that he was unable to stop the train in time, once he realised it was at danger. The driver had not reduced the train’s speed because he had not seen the preceding signal, which was at caution and should have alerted him that SN45 was at danger. He missed this preceding signal because he had become distracted by activity within the cab and possibly also because he was experiencing a higher workload than normal.

Train 1Z67 also passed signal SN45 at danger because the TPWS system was unable to reduce the speed of the train by automatically applying the brakes. This was because TPWS had been rendered ineffective by Tangmere’s crew when they had isolated the AWS system in order to by-pass an automatic brake application which had occurred at a speed restriction. Isolating AWS in this way was in contravention of the relevant rules but RAIB has found that it had almost certainly become an accepted practice among some train crews on this locomotive. This was probably because warnings from AWS were not always apparent to drivers, who were also anxious to avoid delays resulting from brake demands. Measures intended to prevent the misuse of AWS isolations had either not been adopted by West Coast Railways or had not been effectively implemented.

(Emphasis mine)

Source (Full report pdf at the bottom of the page)

 

[John Webb]

Steam locos have had the ability to automatically react to the lineside signals for over 100 years, as the GWR introduced their ATC system in 1906; this was a mechanical contact system with a ramp in the centre of the track. This was followed in the 1930s by the magnetic induction system by Strowger & Hudd which avoided the need for physical contact. Both these systems operate on the brake pipes via valves.
Steam locos working on the London Underground lines were also equipped with the same sort of trip cock as fitted to the electric trains when they regularly worked over that network. This included the Metropolitan "Widened" lines, Rotherhithe Tunnel, etc.

 

[king_walnut]

Thanks for the replies, I'm guessing they'd also have a GSMR radio in the cab too? I've tried Googling about all this but really to no avail.

 

[ainsworth74]

Thanks for the replies, I'm guessing they'd also have a GSMR radio in the cab too? I've tried Googling about all this but really to no avail.

Yes they'll have GSMR fitted.

Basically in order to be used on the mainline they have to be fitted with everything that you'd expect to find on a modern train (in terms of safety features). Grandfather rights can see you get around some safety requirements (LNER being able to use HSTs without selective door opening at short platforms in the Scottish Highlands for example) but when it comes to fundamental safety systems there are no exemptions.

 

[AngusH]

you might be interested to read this (slightly old) article on Tornado's systems:

https://eandt.theiet.org/content/ar...o-steam-locomotive-embraces-microelectronics/


add: also, more up to date, with pictures!

https://www.cambridgewireless.co.uk/media/uploads/resources/Auto & Transport Group/02.04.15/Auto-02.04.15-A1_Steam_Locomotive_Trust-Rob_Morland.pdf

 

[martin2345uk]

How about the drivers then, where do they usually come from, to be able to have detailed route knowledge like they do?

 

[edwin_m]

Here's the report into the Wootton Bassett near-miss mentioned above:
https://www.gov.uk/raib-reports/dangerous-occurrence-at-wootton-bassett-junction-wiltshire

Train 1Z67 was operated by West Coast Railways and consisted of the steam locomotive ‘Tangmere’ and 13 coaches. Although Tangmere is a heritage locomotive, it is fitted with modern safety systems including the Automatic Warning System (AWS) and the Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS).

How about the drivers then, where do they usually come from, to be able to have detailed route knowledge like they do?

In this particular case (from the report linked above):

The driver of 1Z67 had over 50 years of railway experience. Witness evidence was that he worked as an engine cleaner and a fireman on steam locomotives during the 1960s and that he continued to work for British Rail as train crew before becoming a driver of diesel traction in 1976. He continued to be employed full-time as a driver on the mainline railway until 2007, when he retired. He then started work for West Coast Railways on a zero-hours contract, initially as a driver of diesel locomotives. The driver started training as a mainline steam locomotive driver with West Coast Railways in August 2010 and was assessed as being competent in this role by the company in May 2011. The driver was supervised by an operations manager working from West Coast Railways’ Rugby offices.

While working for West Coast Railways, the driver was also employed as a manager on a heritage railway. He had previously been a volunteer on this railway and had driven steam locomotives of a similar design to Tangmere on its infrastructure. The driver also had experience as a volunteer member of the support crew for another steam locomotive while it was running on the mainline. In late 2013, the driver left his employment on the heritage railway and started working as a driver for Colas Rail, a freight operating company, on a part-time contract. After a period of training, the driver was assessed as being competent to drive on the mainline by Colas Rail in November 2013. The driver continued to work for West Coast Railways after starting to work part-time for Colas Rail.
...
The files also showed that the driver passed his two-yearly Rule Book knowledge test with West Coast Railways in March 2014 and that he attended an annual safety briefing day with West Coast Railways on 5 March 2015, two days before the incident. At this briefing day, the driver signed his route and traction knowledge card to confirm that he had retained his route knowledge of the route which included Wootton Bassett Junction and his traction knowledge of steam locomotives.

DB Cargo also operates steam locomotives, using drivers who have route knowledge from their regular freight duties.

 

[JonathanP]

Some crews will be employed full time by the operating company, and in the case of DB Cargo will primarily work freight trains, others work full time for a 'regular' passenger or freight train operating company and work special trains as side job.
Freight drivers often have a extensive route knowledge. However, if no steam qualified driver can be found with the required route knowledge, this is not a problem, a 'pilotman' can be used, a second driver who knows the route and advises the steam-qualified driver(although exactly how this advising works on the footplate of a steam engine travelling at high speed I'm not sure!).

Exactly what it takes to obtain and maintain route knowledge is a internal matter for the operating company. There have been murmerings, and some evidence, that companies operating special trains take a rather more 'flexible' approach to route knowledge that normal operators do.

 

[Highlandspring]

If no steam qualified driver can be found with the required route knowledge, this is not a problem, a 'pilotman' can be used

The term is Route Conductor. Pilotman is a completely seperate role/competence.

 

[theironroad]

The term is Route Conductor. Pilotman is a completely seperate role/competence.

To confuse things further, route conducting on schedule cards will be shown as pilot or piloted or iirc PLT /PLTD

 

[Journeyman]

Thanks for the replies, I'm guessing they'd also have a GSMR radio in the cab too? I've tried Googling about all this but really to no avail.

The locos used on The Jacobite between Fort William and Mallaig will also have to carry Radio Electronic Token Block equipment. There's portable radios available for this - I don't think they have any interface with brakes or other equipment on the loco.

 

[Journeyman]

There was an incident back in 2015 where the crew of a mainline steam tour deliberately isolated the AWS after an activation due to missing a warning approaching a speed restriction which also isolated the TPWS (they share a control system even though they have different functions) which allowed the train to SPAD.

The possible consequences of this incident don't bear thinking about - had the timing of it been only marginally different, we could have been looking at a collision with an HST, which would have resulted in absolute carnage. It was pretty shocking how lax things had got with the safety culture at West Coast at the time.

 

[LordCreed]

To confuse things further, route conducting on schedule cards will be shown as pilot or piloted or iirc PLT /PLTD

We use a note line on ours, stating "Route Conducted by XXX" or something similar.

 

[theironroad]

We use a note line on ours, stating "Route Conducted by XXX" or something similar.

Probably makes more sense and is clearer.

 

[Highlandspring]

The locos used on The Jacobite between Fort William and Mallaig will also have to carry Radio Electronic Token Block equipment. There's portable radios available for this - I don't think they have any interface with brakes or other equipment on the loco.

The locos used for the Jacobite season have permanent wiring harnesses and brackets to mount a standard RETB CDR just like on any other traction type. Usually found in a cupboard in the tender along with the GSM-R cab mobile and handset. There is no interface/interlocking between the CDR and power or brakes, again as per any other traction type.

 

[UP13]

Regarding the Wooton Basset incident I'm amazed that drivers are able to isolate the AWS or whatever it was.

 

[edwin_m]

There has always been a means to isolate the AWS, so as to get the train moving again if the system creates a brake application that can't be cancelled. Like all isolations for safety-critical equipment it should be used only when essential to do so, and monitored by management.

 

[43096]

There has always been a means to isolate the AWS, so as to get the train moving again if the system creates a brake application that can't be cancelled. Like all isolations for safety-critical equipment it should be used only when essential to do so, and monitored by management.

The AWS isolation (and other safety isolation systems) are usually tagged so the tag is broken if the isolation switch is operated. Since the advent of OTMR, I believe the data recorder will also record that equipment has been isolated.

 

[HLE]

How about the drivers then, where do they usually come from, to be able to have detailed route knowledge like they do?

Quite a few are either current or ex TOC/FOC drivers. Some very experienced and competent men currently driving for them. I know one or two ex TOC dm's have gone to heritage operators just as drivers

Route knowledge......well that's been an area of scrutiny in recent years especially with WCRC. I think that was one of the reasons their licence got suspended.

In the incident mentioned above the chap who was driving mayflower at the time and instructed the fireman to isolate the TPWS valve had never drove trains regularly on the mainline. He'd driven steam trains on a heritage line, at a dizzying maximum speed of 25mph, it was an accident waiting to happen.
Same as the Stafford SPAD incident a few years back.

 

[HLE]

There has always been a means to isolate the AWS, so as to get the train moving again if the system creates a brake application that can't be cancelled. Like all isolations for safety-critical equipment it should be used only when essential to do so, and monitored by management.

And then the fun starts when even after isolating all that the damn brake still won't come off!!

 

[jamieP]

Any steam engine moved on the network will either be from WCRC, DBC, LSL or Vintage Trains. The majority of tours are operated by WCRC.

All crews are trained and have to pass the same test to drive on the national network including the relevant route learning.