Larissa, Greece: Freight train collides with passenger train (01/03/2023)

[MarkyT]

Frankly this rather parcohial view of "hobby signalmen" only shows you don't really know what you are talking about.

I am a signalman on a major heritage line and we have the following procedures:

• All signalmen are formally re-examined on their rules knowledge every 2 years
• All signalman must work at least 10 turns per year, if not they have to re-do their practical exam
• All signalmen will be observed every year in each signalbox they work by an examiner
• There are additional requirements for more extensive recent experience in a box that must be satisifed before a signalman can work a non-standard timetable.

A couple of times I was able to observe the large box at Kidderminster SVR with 55 working levers controlling two platforms with loops, a short section of double track and a large yard, on a busy day the signalman there has to combine continous shunting moves with running the train service and has a job vastly more complex that plenty of Network Rail signalmen. Even working at a smaller box I regularly have 3 seperate signalled moves underway simultaneously. So... don't trust me I guess.

Well said sir. Don't want to divert this thread but each railway must have a robust safety and competence system appropriate for their activities. At its heart, that's a basic H&S requirement for any organisation, whether utilising employees or volunteers. The ORR can and do inspect, comment and sometimes enforce on heritage railways to make sure their systems are appropriate and implemented properly. Note some heritage railways also have employees who are passed signallers; these can sometimes cover unpopular turns that don't always attract volunteers, e.g. for winter engineering work or late-evening dining specials.

 

[Annetts key]

Absolutely, but I'm a mainline driver and have had a signaller say to me before "it's likely I'll call you back and you'll be passing it at danger, but we need to run some checks first"

I'd assume those checks are for things like conflicting routes, train in section etc.

In my mind, declaring the signal failed should be the bottom thing on the list once all other reasons for it not clearing are exhausted.

I’m not a signaller, however, back when it was routine to visit the operating floor of the PSB when a signaller reported a problem with a signal failing to clear (normally reported directly to us, before ‘fault control’ existed in my area), I would check, while asking them, what the position was for each and every signal switch (for every conflicting route and every opposing route) and the position of each relevant set of points and the position of said point switches. I would also ask if there were any other trains in the area, to see if the track circuits on adjacent lines would have affected the situation. This was never done to catch them out, but to help in diagnosing the failure.

However, occasionally it would be found that a individual point was locked in the incorrect position, or flank protection was the cause. But do keep in mind, these problems normally only occurred in the complex station junction areas.

 

[357]

Frankly this rather parcohial view of "hobby signalmen" only shows you don't really know what you are talking about.

I am a signalman on a major heritage line and we have the following procedures:

• All signalmen are formally re-examined on their rules knowledge every 2 years
• All signalman must work at least 10 turns per year, if not they have to re-do their practical exam
• All signalmen will be observed every year in each signalbox they work by an examiner
• There are additional requirements for more extensive recent experience in a box that must be satisifed before a signalman can work a non-standard timetable.

A couple of times I was able to observe the large box at Kidderminster SVR with 55 working levers controlling two platforms with loops, a short section of double track and a large yard, on a busy day the signalman there has to combine continous shunting moves with running the train service and has a job vastly more complex that plenty of Network Rail signalmen. Even working at a smaller box I regularly have 3 seperate signalled moves underway simultaneously. So... don't trust me I guess.

To me if sounds like your railway takes competency seriously. Unfortunately not all do.

The three incidents I saw all happened on the EOR.

I’m not a signaller, however, back when it was routine to visit the operating floor of the PSB when a signaller reported a problem with a signal failing to clear (normally reported directly to us, before ‘fault control’ existed in my area), I would check, while asking them, what the position was for each and every signal switch (for every conflicting route and every opposing route) and the position of each relevant set of points and the position of said point switches. I would also ask if there were any other trains in the area, to see if the track circuits on adjacent lines would have affected the situation. This was never done to catch them out, but to help in diagnosing the failure.

However, occasionally it would be found that a individual point was locked in the incorrect position, or flank protection was the cause. But do keep in mind, these problems normally only occurred in the complex station junction areas.

And when that point was locked incorrectly it was fixed and everyone got on with their day. No problem there at all, the danger comes when the person authorizing the movement says "just pass it, it must be broken again".

 

[MarkyT]

I’m not a signaller, however, back when it was routine to visit the operating floor of the PSB when a signaller reported a problem with a signal failing to clear (normally reported directly to us, before ‘fault control’ existed in my area), I would check, while asking them, what the position was for each and every signal switch (for every conflicting route and every opposing route) and the position of each relevant set of points and the position of said point switches. I would also ask if there were any other trains in the area, to see if the track circuits on adjacent lines would have affected the situation. This was never done to catch them out, but to help in diagnosing the failure.

However, occasionally it would be found that a individual point was locked in the incorrect position, or flank protection was the cause. But do keep in mind, these problems normally only occurred in the complex station junction areas.

UK signallers are also provided with route-setting cards which enumerate the point numbers and positions for each route from entrance to exit signal. These are supposed to be referred to when a failure prevents a signal's clearance. In the DO during the 1980s and 90s we used to prepare a drawing detailing this information and the operations department transcribed that to their card system.

 

[Annetts key]

And when that point was locked incorrectly it was fixed and everyone got on with their day. No problem there at all, the danger comes when the person authorizing the movement says "just pass it, it must be broken again".

Exactly.

When it comes to system safety, never get into the trap of making assumptions.

UK signallers are also provided with route-setting cards which enumerate the point numbers and positions for each route from entrance to exit signal. These are supposed to be referred to when a failure prevents a signal's clearance.

Yeah, but if they thought it was a failure, they generally called us first before looking at their “box instructions” as they called them. Being a PSB, another signaller would then check, then they would look at their documentation.

But yes, a signaller is supposed to check the points to the route-setting card before authorisation is given to a driver.

Not mentioned so far, but yes, the signaller will check to see if there are any occupied track circuits, or if the next signal is showing lit. If possible, they will try changing the aspect of this signal to see if it makes any difference (for example, if it was red due to a train ahead, once said train has cleared that section, that signal would be cleared).

If there is an alternative valid route, the signaller may try that. Or if there is an adjacent line with a signal that can be routed to the same destination, they may try routing that to see if that works.

The experience of the signaller also comes into play.

 

[yoyothehobo]

Getting back to the point at hand (not that the side discussions are not interesting) it is amazing that this area, which when i drove through in August i thought, wow, thats an impressive new railway line construction has essentially been in service without adequate signalling.

It is can also be thankful that this didnt happen within the nearby Tempi tunnels otherwise you would be looking at a much worse accident than it already is.

Greece does seem to be a bit paradoxical with some spectacular infrastructure combined with some awful stuff, but then again nearly a third of the population live in Athens and the remainder is very rural.

 

[w0033944]

It sounds as though, sadly, certain regional sterotypes have been shown in this tragic case to have been fulfilled.

I'm also amazed that Abermule practice is still common in Europe.

 

[Lawrence18uk]

The British press normally immediately asks questions about the drivers of the trains (whether they were injured, whether they had acted correctly), so it's interesting that that didn't happen here... Different culture I guess

 

[USRailFan]

The British press normally immediately asks questions about the drivers of the trains (whether they were injured, whether they had acted correctly), so it's interesting that that didn't happen here... Different culture I guess

Have you seen the photo showing both the wrecked locos? I'd think even a journalist would be able to figure out that it'd be extremely unlikely for any driver to have survived, and therefore have the sense not to mention it.

 

[Bertiethebobby]

Frankly this rather parcohial view of "hobby signalmen" only shows you don't really know what you are talking about.

I am a signalman on a major heritage line and we have the following procedures:

• All signalmen are formally re-examined on their rules knowledge every 2 years
• All signalman must work at least 10 turns per year, if not they have to re-do their practical exam
• All signalmen will be observed every year in each signalbox they work by an examiner
• There are additional requirements for more extensive recent experience in a box that must be satisifed before a signalman can work a non-standard timetable.

A couple of times I was able to observe the large box at Kidderminster SVR with 55 working levers controlling two platforms with loops, a short section of double track and a large yard, on a busy day the signalman there has to combine continous shunting moves with running the train service and has a job vastly more complex that plenty of Network Rail signalmen. Even working at a smaller box I regularly have 3 seperate signalled moves underway simultaneously. So... don't trust me I guess.

Thanks for posting and clarifying the inspection procedure.
I too am a "hobby signalman" almost certainly on the same heritage railway as yourself. I feel confident that the signalling inspectorate hold
us to the same standards as NR. The grilling we get when re-examined on rules and regs is very thorough and always covers all the emergency scenarios.
Although the line speed is only 25mph there's still plenty of scope to cause death and destruction.

I imagine that things have changed for the better on NR now but when I was a signalman on BR in the 80's I was never re-examined on rules and regs in 10 years, only for the special instructions appertaining to the box in which I was being examined.

 

[Lucan]

I'm also amazed that Abermule practice is still common in Europe.

Single line tokens were being used at Abermule, which is a safe system as long as the driver checks that he is given the correct token. At Abermule the driver was given the wrong token and did not check it. Are you saying that tokens were being used in this Greek crash? That is not the impression I am getting.

 

[Bertiethebobby]

Single line tokens were being used at Abermule, which is a safe system as long as the driver checks that he is given the correct token. At Abermule the driver was given the wrong token and did not check it. Are you saying that tokens were being used in this Greek crash? That is not the impression I am getting.

I think maybe the post referred to the fact that the stationmaster was responsible for signalling trains rather than a dedicated signalperson in a box.

 

[Lawrence18uk]

This euronews article has a small CCTV clip which captures the moment of impact. (select 720p for hi res)

Anger erupts in Greece after train collision kills more than 45 people

Greece began three days of national mourning on Wednesday, while flags flew at half-mast outside all European Commission buildings in Brussels.

www.euronews.com

 

[etr221]

I think maybe the post referred to the fact that the stationmaster was responsible for signalling trains rather than a dedicated signalperson in a box.

I think that for many countries (and hence systems), for many years, the principle was that the 'station master' was the senior, most experienced, and most reliable person at the station, and hence in overall charge of operations - including whatever safe working system was in place (with 'signallers' often being underlings) - and frequently was the person to give the 'right away' allowing trains to proceed.

But as technology has advanced, and working practices have changed, operational and safe working methods have developed so that such responsibilities have moved away from him on many systems.
Without knowing much more about Greek practice - in normal and degraded operations - it is not possible to say more.

 

[JBuchananGB]

My great grandfather was badly shaken up, travelling on the train at Hall Road 27 July 1905. Interlocking prevented the signalman from clearing the signal for the main line so he green flagged the express driver, straight into the occupied turnback siding. Terrible what has happened in Greece. Unbelievable that disaster like Norwich in 1874 and Hall Road in 1905 can happen in 21st century.

 

[IanXC]

I think that for many countries (and hence systems), for many years, the principle was that the 'station master' was the senior, most experienced, and most reliable person at the station, and hence in overall charge of operations - including whatever safe working system was in place (with 'signallers' often being underlings) - and frequently was the person to give the 'right away' allowing trains to proceed.

But as technology has advanced, and working practices have changed, operational and safe working methods have developed so that such responsibilities have moved away from him on many systems.
Without knowing much more about Greek practice - in normal and degraded operations - it is not possible to say more.

Indeed. Plenty of references as late as the 1960s in GB describe the Station Master being responsible for any number of roles including Signallers.

 

[43096]

Two passenger cars "disintegrated", according to media reports, one is seen in photos overturned and totally burnt. Both locos are obviously total write-offs, going by the photos the loco from the passenger train is almost totally crushed. Several container cars are also obviously heavily damaged.
The Wikipedia article confirms the locomotive numbers - apparently 120 022 in the original white/red/blue livery pulled the passenger train and 120 012 in the new dark blue livery pulled the container train

Perhaps it has been edited since, but the Wikipedia piece says three locomotives involved: 120022/012 hauling the freight and 120023 working the passenger train.

 

[w0033944]

Single line tokens were being used at Abermule, which is a safe system as long as the driver checks that he is given the correct token. At Abermule the driver was given the wrong token and did not check it. Are you saying that tokens were being used in this Greek crash? That is not the impression I am getting.

No, I meant in terms of staff who were not signallers being responsible for allowing trains to enter sections.

I think maybe the post referred to the fact that the stationmaster was responsible for signalling trains rather than a dedicated signalperson in a box.

Indeed.

 

[185]

Am I right in saying OSE is a wholly owned, managed, and track/train operated by Ferrovie dello Stato aka Trainitalia? If so, I wonder with such shocking disregard for safety on their subsidiary network, should they have any place anywhere on our UK railway?

 

[Watershed]

Am I right in saying OSE is a wholly owned, managed, and track/train operated by Ferrovie dello Stato aka Trainitalia? If so, I wonder with such shocking disregard for safety on their subsidiary network, should they have any place anywhere on our UK railway?

TrainOSE (aka Hellenic Train), the train operator, is owned by Ferrovie dello Stato. OSE, the infrastructure manager (aka equivalent to Network Rail) remains under the ownership of the Greek government. In this instance it looks like the stationmaster and the inadequate signalling infrastructure - both the responsibility of OSE - were at fault, not Hellenic Train.

Frankly I don't see what relevance a distantly related overseas subsidiary has to whether Trenitalia should be allowed to own a minority stake in Avanti and c2c.

 

[185]

It seems Wikipedia isn't telling the truth. On the English page it lists the infrastructure manager as FS, however on the Greek language page it confirms it is the Greek state.

 

[the sniper]

No, I meant in terms of staff who were not signallers being responsible for allowing trains to enter sections.

I may be totally wrong regarding Greece, but I don't think it's uncommon in that part of the world for the 'station master' to officially be what we would considered to be a hybrid of a signaller/dispatcher, but based out of the station building, rather than do what we would consider to be the role of a Station Master. Here's a video from Serbia which give an idea of the role:

EDIT: I missed that @Taunton already pointed this out.

 

[John Palmer]

A translation of communications between Larissa and the passenger train's crew at https://www-protothema-gr.translate..._sl=el&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wapp may be of interest. I have no idea how accurate the reporting is, but I am struck by the potential significance of the statement that "In fact, as railway sources said, the station master did not even realize that the [freight] train had entered the opposite track, so there was no chance of correcting his mistake in the few minutes remaining".

At the time of the Norwich collision the Great Eastern appears to have been competently managed, and operated by staff normally equal to the duties they were required to perform. So the analogy that immediately occurred to me was the 1876 collision at Foxcote on the Somerset & Dorset, at that time a railway in a similarly parlous financial condition to that of the current Greek system. In the Foxcote case, the trains involved had disappeared into the blue so far as the train control office at Glastonbury was concerned, so the question of what knowledge Larissa had of the freight's whereabouts does seem to me important.

A very sad event, underlining in blood the fact that if you run trains at 21st century speeds subject to controls already revealed as unsatisfactory during the second half of the 19th century, bad things are very likely to happen. I sincerely hope that investigations do not follow the deplorable pattern of those following the Santiago accident, in which the completeness and objectivity of the findings (principally that only the driver was to blame) were open to question on the ground that the investigators had 'skin in the game'.

 

[USRailFan]

Perhaps it has been edited since, but the Wikipedia piece says three locomotives involved: 120022/012 hauling the freight and 120023 working the passenger train.

It must've been edited since then

 

[43096]

It must've been edited since then

I thought that was probably the case. Not surprising, too, as the third loco was only (barely) visible after one of the coaches had been moved.

 

[duesselmartin]

It sounds as though, sadly, certain regional sterotypes have been shown in this tragic case to have been fulfilled.

I'm also amazed that Abermule practice is still common in Europe.

may I repeat that the comparision UK vs. Europe is really not valid.
You cannot compare Greece to Sweden, Poland to Portugal. Each are different countries in different stages of developement.

 

[USRailFan]

I thought that was probably the case. Not surprising, too, as the third loco was only (barely) visible after one of the coaches had been moved.

Just makes this even more horrific really. It was logic to assume that the dark blue loco was the freight train's loco, as it'd have been travelling slower, and taken less damage, and the other one the passenger loco, being quite seriously damaged due to the higher speed. Of course, with the passenger train's loco being even _more_ crushed, and the freight train's front loco being as crushed as it is just shows the scope of this.... It is said the passenger train was running at 140-160 km/h, the freight train likely 100-120 km/h - has there ever been a frontal collision between two trains at these speeds before?
(Compare, for example, the destruction of the two locos from Colwich, where one train was heavily braking and moving at close to a walking pace, with the other close to line speed...)

 

[ac6000cw]

A translation of communications between Larissa and the passenger train's crew at https://www-protothema-gr.translate..._sl=el&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wapp may be of interest. I have no idea how accurate the reporting is, but I am struck by the potential significance of the statement that "In fact, as railway sources said, the station master did not even realize that the [freight] train had entered the opposite track, so there was no chance of correcting his mistake in the few minutes remaining".

So after reading the translated text, it appears that those controlling train movements at Larrisa were the stationmaster and also a 'locksmith' (which I guess is basically a signalling equipment operator) who was under the direction of the stationmaster. The signalling equipment looks like it was faulty or disabled at the time, so trains were being verbally authorized to pass red 'stop' signals. A crossover had been set to route a local train into a platform, was left in that position afterwards and was then forgotten/not checked so one of the trains involved in the collision was mis-routed onto the same track as the other train (after being verbally authorized to leave).

Basically a complete shambles... a combination of the UK Norwich (GE) and Foxcote (S&D) Victorian-era problems/failings...

If you're going to have a 'human interlocking', at least that must be just one person (no divided responsibility or communication issues) dedicated to the task and who is responsible enough to do basic stuff like checking the state of track switches before authorizing train movements.

I may be totally wrong regarding Greece, but I don't think it's uncommon in that part of the world for the 'station master' to officially be what we would considered to be a hybrid of a signaller/dispatcher, but based out of the station building, rather than do what we would consider to be the role of a Station Master. Here's a video from Serbia which give an idea of the role:

From what I've seen and read about over the years, the equivalent of a stationmaster also controlling train movements/signalling is pretty common all over the world at smaller wayside stations. From what I've read, we used to have staff grades like 'porter-signalman' in the UK in quiet places.

 

[Nompere]

I think that for many countries (and hence systems), for many years, the principle was that the 'station master' was the senior, most experienced, and most reliable person at the station, and hence in overall charge of operations - including whatever safe working system was in place (with 'signallers' often being underlings) - and frequently was the person to give the 'right away' allowing trains to proceed.

But as technology has advanced, and working practices have changed, operational and safe working methods have developed so that such responsibilities have moved away from him on many systems.
Without knowing much more about Greek practice - in normal and degraded operations - it is not possible to say more.

I have just found

It is thought that trains going both ways on that section of the line had been diverted onto a single track after an overhead cable was cut.

On https://socialistworker.co.uk/inter...re-a-result-of-privatisation-and-safety-cuts/

 

[Meerkat]

I have just found

It is thought that trains going both ways on that section of the line had been diverted onto a single track after an overhead cable was cut.

On https://socialistworker.co.uk/inter...re-a-result-of-privatisation-and-safety-cuts/

That looks a really unbiased source!!