Paddington rail disaster remembered 15 years on

[Cletus]

Paddington rail disaster remembered 15 years on

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-29493287

Those bereaved by the Paddington train crash are to mark the 15th anniversary of the disaster with a ceremony later.

They will lay flowers at the accident's memorial site high above the railway line at Ladbroke Grove in west London.

Just before 08:10 BST on 5 October 1999, 31 people died when two trains collided almost head-on.

The subsequent inquiry found the Thames Trains service travelling from Paddington to Bedwyn in Wiltshire had gone through a red signal.

It then crashed into the London-bound high-speed First Great Western train which had left Cheltenham Spa in Gloucestershire at 06:03.

The Thames driver, Michael Hodder, 31, and the other train driver, Brian Cooper, 52, were among those killed as the collision led to a fireball in which coach H was burnt out.

As well as the fatalities, more than 220 people were injured.

Paddington Survivors group chairman Jonathan Duckworth, now 56, from Stroud in Gloucestershire had been travelling on the First Great Western train.

Father-of-two Mr Duckworth said: "Luckily I was only in hospital for around 24 hours but then I suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder.

"I had to have about 18 months of treatment and was only able after that to take on small, part-time jobs.

"It was six or seven years before I was able to work full-time again."

The Paddington disaster was followed by fatal rail crashes at Hatfield in Hertfordshire in 2000, at Selby in North Yorkshire in 2001 and at Potters Bar in Hertfordshire in 2002.

But in the 12 years since, there has only been one passenger death in a train accident in Britain - 84-year-old Margaret Masson was killed when a Virgin Trains Pendolino derailed on a faulty set of points at Grayrigg in Cumbria in February 2007.

Michael Roberts, director-general of the Rail Delivery Group, which speaks on behalf of Network Rail and the train operators, said: "We remember those who lost their lives and all those whose lives were changed as a result of the Paddington crash.

"After serious accidents in the early 2000s, changes such as an overhaul of employee training for those doing safety-critical jobs and a better approach to staff working hours have helped improve safety on Britain's railway."

 

[Taunton]

I've never seen an explanation of why the points beyond the signal which was overrun were set left towards the opposite direction Up Main rather than right, which would have set any potential conflict from an overrun towards the same direction Down Relief. Such an arrangement was absolutely standard in mechanical and earlier power signalling. It doesn't take any additional equipment being installed or expense, just a change in the operating logic.

 

[Peter Mugridge]

I'm sure I read something recently, but I can't remember where, which explained that had the points been the other way they would have simply created another conflic with another line, but with a much shorter over-run available.

 

[Paul Kelly]

Christian Wolmar wrote it his RAIL magazine column. It makes sense if you assume the driver is aware he has passed the signal but was simply unable to stop the train, e.g. due to brake/adhesion problems - then giving him more time to get it stopped before fouling any other lines would make sense. On the other hand if you make the assumption that the driver was not aware of having passed the red signal, and would not be attempting to stop, then it makes sense to remove the possibility of a head-on collision - presumably at the trade-off of having an increased risk of a sideways collision. So it depends on what the designer saw as the biggest risk, I suppose.

 

[Hornet]

I remember going to work that morning. The sun was right in my eyes. The layout of the Paddington approach and the particular signal that was passed was such that in those early morning light conditions 'phantom aspect indictions' were likely. I wouldn't think that a risk assessment was done on the basis of those sunlight conditions as they might have occured only a few days a year. There had been concerns raised about that particular signal's visibility especially with the spagetti of OHLE around Ladbroke Grove. Regarding catch points in this case, the speed of the turbo on derailment would have meant that it could have fouled more lines, which at that time of the morning could have involved even more trains, (remember what happened at Clapham in 1988 with a derailed train fouling other lines).

 

[455driver]

I've never seen an explanation of why the points beyond the signal which was overrun were set left towards the opposite direction Up Main rather than right, which would have set any potential conflict from an overrun towards the same direction Down Relief. Such an arrangement was absolutely standard in mechanical and earlier power signalling. It doesn't take any additional equipment being installed or expense, just a change in the operating logic.

Because the way they were set gave the biggest possible overlap before a collision occurred (well over 1000 yards I think) and it was thought highly unlikely that a train would run that far past the signal.

There should have been a sand trap installed but this was not done for some reason.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

Christian Wolmar wrote it his RAIL magazine column. It makes sense if you assume the driver is aware he has passed the signal but was simply unable to stop the train, e.g. due to brake/adhesion problems - then giving him more time to get it stopped before fouling any other lines would make sense. On the other hand if you make the assumption that the driver was not aware of having passed the red signal, and would not be attempting to stop, then it makes sense to remove the possibility of a head-on collision - presumably at the trade-off of having an increased risk of a sideways collision. So it depends on what the designer saw as the biggest risk, I suppose.

Even if the driver wasnt aware they had SPADed he should have realised he was running the wrong way on the line, once he passed the points onto the down relief he was running the wrong way on a one direction line, any driver with reasonable route knowledge should now where the 'last point' is on any route they sign.

As for Christian Wolmar being a rail 'expert', no comment!

 

[Taunton]

Even if the driver wasnt aware they had SPADed he should have realised he was running the wrong way on the line, once he passed the points onto the down relief he was running the wrong way on a one direction line, any driver with reasonable route knowledge should now where the 'last point' is on any route they sign.

As I understand it this was a fast service due to run on the Down Main. The normal route would be that which it took, followed by a further crossover on this single-lead layout to the Down Main just beyond the point of collision. This is why it needed to be stopped at the signal, to allow the up train to run through; if it had been to run on the relief line it could have carried on as there was no conflicting train signalled there.

The design of 5 or 6 bidirectional running lines from Paddington, gradually reducing to 4 by Ladbroke Grove over high speed crossovers, was a recent one designed to allow the substantial number of additional Main Line services for the introduction of Heathrow Express. Prior to the alterations trains would route onto either main or relief on departing Paddington and that would be that.

 

[DY444]

As I understand it this was a fast service due to run on the Down Main. The normal route would be that which it took, followed by a further crossover on this single-lead layout to the Down Main just beyond the point of collision. This is why it needed to be stopped at the signal, to allow the up train to run through; if it had been to run on the relief line it could have carried on as there was no conflicting train signalled there.

Actually that is incorrect. Just beyond SN109 (the SPAD'd signal) on Line 3 there were two single leads, the first leading to Line 4 and the second to Line 2. Down trains on Line 3 had to use one of these and there were no routes from SN109 which did not use one or the other. The route from SN109 to the DM was from Line 3 to Line 2 then over another single lead from Line 2 to Line 1. Beyond the connection to Line 2, Line 3 is for up direction movements only. After the SPAD Hodder continued for several hundred metres in the down direction along this continuation of Line 3 which was for up direction movements only.

I agree entirely with 455driver that a driver signing the route should have known that.

 

[455driver]

As I understand it this was a fast service due to run on the Down Main. The normal route would be that which it took, followed by a further crossover on this single-lead layout to the Down Main just beyond the point of collision. This is why it needed to be stopped at the signal, to allow the up train to run through; if it had been to run on the relief line it could have carried on as there was no conflicting train signalled there.

Wrong again, read my earlier post!

The design of 5 or 6 bidirectional running lines from Paddington, gradually reducing to 4 by Ladbroke Grove over high speed crossovers, was a recent one designed to allow the substantial number of additional Main Line services for the introduction of Heathrow Express. Prior to the alterations trains would route onto either main or relief on departing Paddington and that would be that.

And your point is?

 

[Bill EWS]

Hey, guys, how about giving it a rest. The incident was fully covered and the blame shared amungst those involved. I'm a retired driver and I knew Driver Cooper from when he started on the job and knew of Driver Hodder. Mistakes were made by Driver Hodder. I find it annoying, after all these years, reading tittle-tattle and guess work and accusations from those who should know better, or possibly little, at all. I prefer to remember Driver Cooper as he was and for Driver Hodder for the errors he made, probably not all of his own making due to the circumstances at that time and remember them with respsect and sadness of two lives ended before their time.

 

[Flamingo]

Hey, guys, how about giving it a rest. The incident was fully covered and the blame shared amungst those involved. I'm a retired driver and I knew Driver Cooper from when he started on the job and knew of Driver Hooder. Mistakes were made by Driver Hopper. I find it annoying, after all these years, reading tittle-tattle and guess work and accusations from those who should know better, or possibly little, at all. I prefer to remember DriverCooper as he was and for Driver Hodder for the errors he made, probably not all of his own making due to the circumstances at that time and remember them with respsect and sadness of two lives ended before their time.

Good post.

 

[455driver]

Good post.

Apart from getting the spelling of one of names wrong!
The Thames trains driver was Michael Hodder.