As previously mentioned there were far fewer problems when the majority of stations were staffed and access to platforms more strictly controlled even without automated gates.
Are we sure about this?
In my very imprecise and incomplete 'research' into railway passenger prosecutions, I had arrived at the opposite conclusion. It seemed to me that there were thousands of prosecutions for various forms of fare evasion in the 1800's, and that it was the high standards of evidence gathering required to cause a summons to be issued for an offence of fraud or theft which led to the specific offences which were written into the early railway statutes (and which evolved though Railway Clauses Consolidation Acts into the current
Regulation of Railways Act).
But Stiri is concerned with the Railway Byelaws, which as secondary legislation, fall into a different regime of analysis.
The private companies, not satisfied with the need to show some level of dishonesty under RORA or Penalty Fares, and with the approval of the DfT, created an offence that makes criminals of honest people whose behaviour was entirely reasonable, with no application of discretion or any public interest test (c.f. the public prosecutor).
I will disregard your introduction of opinion, and refute your claim that any legislation, primary or secondary, "makes criminals of honest people . . . .".
Of course honest people can commit crimes. It is irrational to propose that 'honest people' cannot be 'made' criminal by virtue of their actions, choices or neglect.
I'm happy to support a critical analysis of the legislative framework, but as we have Byelaws which were introduced long before the DfT was conceived, and have evolved with time to regulate behaviour on the railways which includes imposing a penalty on those who travel without a ticket and do so by their own choosing.
Lets not conflate the issues and thereby confuse Stiri in her/his attempt to challenge a principle which might succeed.
. . . As another example, just consider the complexity of the ticketing system now and how there can be disagreements over validity even amongst experts!
Let's not. That 'complexity' is of absolutely NO assistance in challeging the underlying problem.
created an offence that makes criminals of honest people whose behaviour was entirely reasonable, with no application of discretion or any public interest test (c.f. the public prosecutor).
I'm not sure what point you are making here. There are compelling and impressive reasons for enabling private prosecutions, notably in the spheres of creativity, environmental management and economic and educational growth, despite this forum's administration's absolute opposition to private prosecutions.
In contrast, I am an enthusiastic supporter of the right of an individual, an incorporated body, a charitable body or other group to have the ability to prosecute a crime when they find one.
In
E v Duckenfield [2000] 1 WLR 55, the Court found that held that the very premise of section 6(1) is that some cases will go to trial which the DPP himself would choose not to prosecute.
The idea of applying a "public interest" test to a "private prosecution" involves a contradition in terms. It's either public or it is private. There is regular discussion of the "public interest" when private prosecutions come to Court. I'd be pleased to hear exactly what point of public interest is not engaged by bringing a prosecution for fare evasion, such as that in
Bremme.
In
R, Virgin v Zinga, the LCJ said in the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division:
“…the retrenchment of the state is evident in many areas, including the funding of the Crown Prosecution Service … it seems inevitable that the number of private prosecutions will increase, particularly in areas relating to the criminal misuse of intellectual property. In the overwhelming majority of such cases, a prosecution will serve the public interest in addressing such criminal conduct.”
