Russia invades Ukraine

[Trackman]

Further to my previous post, I really do think Trump severely underestimated the difficulty of playing "negotiator" here, and has no real plan. Or maybe he's cleverer than most of us think he is, and does have a strategy. I'm not convinced, but none of us really know....

Don't think he knows.

 

[edwin_m]

Trump is now threatening Russia with new tariffs and sanctions

It's just possible this is him providing cover to pivot towards a more balanced deal rather than favouring Russia on all counts.

 

[Ivor]

It's just possible this is him providing cover to pivot towards a more balanced deal rather than favouring Russia on all counts.

Yet again he’s just said not for the first time “Russia has all the cards”

I’m yet to see what Russia wants other than indicated they want to keep The Donbas, Crimea, no European troops on the ground in Ukraine (Lavrov on repeat mode on that one) no entry into NATO, in other words they want it 100% their way end of.

I don’t think Trump has any interest in a balanced deal as history will show it was a war he stopped, mind you he’s way past the 24 hours he said he would stop it within coming back into power. Bloke never puts his brain into gear before opening his mouth.

As indicated previously in this thread what does Putin have on him?

 

[Giugiaro]

I don’t think Trump has any interest in a balanced deal as history will show it was a war he stopped...

So did Chamberlain.

 

[Ivor]

So did Chamberlain.

Indeed but due to the planned pantomime at The Oval Office Zelensky did not have an opportunity to say his piece whatsoever.

In any walk of life the easiest thing in the world is to get a crowd of cowards collectively jump & mug a single individual.

 

[Tetchytyke]

It's just possible this is him providing cover to pivot towards a more balanced deal rather than favouring Russia on all counts.

He’s more likely to stop drinking Diet Coke than do that!

 

[Wilts Wanderer]

Trump has just said that he is finding it easier to deal with Russia than with Ukraine when negotiating his big ‘peace deal’.

Funny that, when your proposal basically hands Russia all of its war aims and proposes to dismember Ukraine

The guy is an absolute burger-fed prize moron.

(This forum desperately needs a facepalm, or preferably a head-banging-wall emoji.)

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/cg70jylp32gt?post=asset:fc9801fb-4126-4a9f-975c-0391c4c48e0e#post

We're hearing now from Donald Trump, who was delivering an update on the US economy, but is now answering questions on the war in Ukraine.

He's asked if he still believes that Putin is committed to peace.

Trump says that he does, adding: "I think we're doing very well with Russia. But right now they're bombing the hell out of Ukraine."

He also says that he is "finding it more difficult, frankly, to deal with Ukraine".

He adds that to get a final peace deal, that it may be "easier to deal with Russia, which is odd, as they have all the cards".

He looks ahead to next week's meeting in Saudi Arabia - where US and Ukraine teams are due to meet to discuss a peace framework. The president adds that he is trying to help Ukraine but says they "have to get on the ball, to get the job done".

 

[Annetts key]

What does Russia want?

From here

Putin’s three-principle demands have been clear since the inception of the Ukraine crisis in December:

• Prevent NATO’s expansion. This demand includes assurances that Ukraine will never be permitted to join NATO.
• Cancel weapon deployment near Russian borders.
• Return NATO’s military facilities to positions at the time that the 1997 Russia-NATO Act was signed.

But Russia also wants:

• Neutrality and demilitarization of Ukraine (including reducing their military to a token force)
• A puppet government in what is left of Ukraine,
• Crimea,
• Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson provinces,
• Control of the Black Sea in Ukrainian waters.

 

[Shaw S Hunter]

What does Russia want?

From here

But Russia also wants:

• Neutrality and demilitarization of Ukraine (including reducing their military to a token force)
• A puppet government in what is left of Ukraine,
• Crimea,
• Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson provinces,
• Control of the Black Sea in Ukrainian waters.

All that's missing is renaming it South Belarus.

 

[Wilts Wanderer]

What does Russia want?

From here

But Russia also wants:

• Neutrality and demilitarization of Ukraine (including reducing their military to a token force)
• A puppet government in what is left of Ukraine,
• Crimea,
• Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson provinces,
• Control of the Black Sea in Ukrainian waters.

What worries me is how much of that I can absolutely see Trump giving up to Putin, in order to be able to announce his ‘peace’. Someone should explain to him the difference between negotiated armistice and surrender.

 

[brad465]

But Russia also wants:

• Neutrality and demilitarization of Ukraine (including reducing their military to a token force)
• A puppet government in what is left of Ukraine,
• Crimea,
• Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson provinces,
• Control of the Black Sea in Ukrainian waters.

I really wish whenever the world "neutral" or any other version of it is used at government/dilplomatic level, someone would quote the late Desmond Tutu: "If you're neutral in times of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor."

 

[dangie]

I’m reading that the U.S.A. (Trump) are considering imposing more sanctions on Russia. I thought that the West had already imposed full sanctions on Russia?

Trump 'strongly considering' large-scale sanctions and tariffs on Russia

The president has reversed US policy and says he trusts Putin and finds dealing with Ukraine difficult.

www.bbc.co.uk

 

[Killingworth]

For any who may still doubt Putin's game plans they should visit the Baltic nations and learn their 20th century history. There is no doubt there that he's coming for them as soon as a casus belli can be found. It's the normal course of actions in that region. On current form Trump would ally with Putin rather than taking any action against.

Unfortunately there are actions that could be built up to provide such a cover. In Estonia and Latvia there are minorities that might be invoked. There's a good article in today's Times by Oliver Moody, "How to prepare for Putin? Heed our friends in the Baltics." Too long to quote here from my phone.

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The latest breaking UK, US, world, business and sport news from The Times and The Sunday Times. Go beyond today's headlines with in-depth analysis and comment.

www.thetimes.com

 

[Annetts key]

There's a good article in today's Times by Oliver Moody, "How to prepare for Putin? Heed our friends in the Baltics." Too long to quote here from my phone.

Latest news & breaking headlines

The latest breaking UK, US, world, business and sport news from The Times and The Sunday Times. Go beyond today's headlines with in-depth analysis and comment.

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WEEKEND ESSAY | OLIVER MOODY

How to prepare for Putin? Heed our friends in the Baltics

If western Europe can no longer rely on the transatlantic alliance it should look east to those states on the front line with Russia. They have long been among our best allies and it’s high time we listened to them closely

Oliver Moody
Friday March 07 2025, 5.40pm, The Times

On the Toompea hill that looms over Tallinn’s old town, the splendidly camp Alexander Nevsky cathedral glowers across a square at the castle housing Estonia’s parliament. The tallest building in the government district, this outpost of the Russian Orthodox church has somehow survived any number of proposed demolitions over the past century.

In a few weeks’ time, though, the MPs are expected to dismantle it from the inside instead, with a law that effectively dissolves the local branch of the church, which Estonia regards as an intolerable bridgehead of war-glorifying Kremlin propaganda and the most potent instrument of Russian influence left on its territory. The 150,000 or so believers, most of them ethnic Estonians, will be encouraged to make the theologically undemanding shuffle across from the Moscow patriarchate to its ancient rival from Constantinople.

Ordinarily the ecclesiastical status of such a minor arm of Orthodoxy would barely trouble the outside world. These days, however, it is such stuff as continental wars are made on. In a world where the US appears more closely aligned with Russia than with its transatlantic allies, where JD Vance, the vice-president, suggests security guarantees are conditional on his taste in European countries’ domestic politics, and where American intelligence, weaponry and technical support can be cut off from Ukraine in a matter of hours, all bets are off. The only way out of this moment of chaos and vulnerability has to start with recognising how much trouble we are truly in.

Imagine the following course of events: many of the Russian Orthodox believers in Estonia grudgingly accept the reform. Yet the diehard Kremlin loyalists do not. Crying religious persecution, they cling on to their churches and monasteries, defying the authorities to physically evict them. For a while, no one in the wider West really notices, since all eyes are fixed on the Trump administration as it railroads Ukraine into an unjust and unsustainable ceasefire with Russia.

That business concluded, Vladimir Putin turns his attention to the next objective. In the early hours of the morning after Midsummer, while many Estonians are sleeping off the previous evening’s festivities, Russian special forces steal across the river Narva, which marks the border. They move ten miles to the west, securing the Pühtitsa Convent, one of the Kremlin’s most cherished Orthodox institutions in the country. More units follow and start to dig in around the salient.

The Estonian armed forces, confused by a catastrophic interruption to their digital intelligence and reconnaissance systems, are swift to respond but struggle to build an accurate picture of what they are up against. Most of all, they need an immediate and unflinching signal of support from their allies. Tallinn’s diplomats and defence liaisons bash the phones to London, Washington, Berlin, Paris and Brussels until their fingers are sore. Within an hour the British-led Nato battlegroup at Tapa, scarcely 50 miles away to the west of Pühtitsa, is on standby.

By the first glimmer of sunrise, however, President Putin is making a televised address to the Russian nation. He has been left with no choice, he says, but to rescue his compatriots and coreligionists from the tyranny of a “Nazi” state. These 20 square miles of Estonian territory are now under his protection and by implication under Moscow’s nuclear umbrella. Should anyone object, Putin adds, they will feel the full fury of Russia’s holy war machine.

Thirty seconds into the speech, Vance publishes a series of tweets to the effect that the Estonian state has trampled over the inalienable rights of its Christian subjects. As such, he continues, there is nothing the US can do: not for the Estonians, and not for their European allies. No nuclear deterrent, no troops, no logistics, no air cover, no intelligence briefings, no missile defence, no battlefield communications, no targeting software. It was not the Russians that had blinded Estonia’s surveillance systems. It was the Americans. And so the Estonians and their friends in Europe, Britain foremost among them, are thrown back on the one really inescapable question of our time: can we do this on our own?

There were a few years in which we had the luxury of being able to dismiss this kind of thought experiment as histrionic. It was last in vogue about a decade ago. After the Kremlin’s occupation of Crimea in 2014, Europe’s public broadcasters were awash with documentaries displaying Dad’s Army-style maps of dark red arrows sweeping into southern Latvia or northeastern Estonia while the local Russian-speaking population hypothetically revolted.

Yet the nightmare receded as quickly as it had arrived. Nato started deploying battalion-sized multinational forces, each typically consisting of a little over 1,000 soldiers, to Poland and the Baltic states. First Barack Obama and then Donald Trump posted additional US troops and kit to the region, reversing two decades of numerical decline. The idea was not just to reassure the states of the eastern flank but to provide a “tripwire” insurance policy against Russian attack: come for Estonia or Lithuania, the implicit message went, and you come for the most powerful military alliance the world has known.

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was a nauseating shock, but in some ways a salutary one. Joe Biden dispatched another 20,000 US personnel; Nato mounted a near-continuous programme of military drills, such as the Steadfast Defender manoeuvres last year; Germany and Canada started upgrading their Baltic battlegroups to brigades, and Finland and Sweden joined the alliance. Poland’s decade-long rearmament programme reached fruition with the largest conventional Nato military on the continent. The European allies’ collective defence spending rose from 1.6 per cent to 2.2 per cent of GDP. Warsaw pushed towards the 5 per cent mark; Lithuania and Estonia pledged to break through it.

At the Vilnius summit in 2023, held under the watchful eye of half a dozen German Patriot missile batteries less than 20 miles from the Belarusian border, they signed off on a plan to defend “every inch” of their territory. A few months later Kersti Kaljulaid, a former president of Estonia, told me she was so confident of Nato’s Article 5 mutual defence guarantee that she was more anxious about a natural disaster hitting her country than a Russian invasion.

Maintaining a semblance of calm

There are still plenty of figures in the frontline states who maintain admirably stiff upper lips. A fortnight ago I asked an official how worried they were about their country on a scale of one to ten. Oh, easily a one, they replied. After a bit of poking and prodding they upped the score to a 2.5. Personally, though, I am more inclined to agree with the words President Rinkevics of Latvia posted on social media after Vance’s infamous speech at the Munich Security Conference last month: “Never stop panicking.”

Panic is decidedly not a Baltic trait. Nor is Rinkevics, who was one of Europe’s most seasoned foreign ministers before he ascended to the presidency, a man given to hysterics. There was an obvious purpose to his words: this is an epoch-defining juncture in European history, and if we are to rise to it and save ourselves we must first be honest about the scale of the problem.

I have spent much of the past three years travelling around the Baltic Sea region, reading about its history, culture and politics, and conducting more than 100 interviews for a book. This was partly out of sheer curiosity. Here are a group of eight countries — Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Sweden and Denmark — that are some of the best friends the UK has in the world.

With the exception of Germany, however, they tend to loiter around the periphery of our national consciousness. That is our loss. It is not just that their stories are intrinsically interesting and dramatic; it is that they are in various ways far better prepared for the radical instability and insecurity of the coming years than we are, and we have a great deal to learn from them.

Yet the chief reason I wanted to write the book was the ninth country that abuts the Baltic. Russia has been warring over the region for eight centuries. If you go back far enough, it has not always been the aggressor or acquitted itself terribly well in these conflicts. On a couple of occasions the Poles and the Lithuanians got as far as the walls of the Kremlin. Once they contrived to install a puppet tsar, whom the Muscovite boyars eventually overthrew, dismembered and incinerated, before jamming what was left of him into a cannon and firing it in the general direction of Warsaw.

One of Putin’s early acts as president was to establish an annual “unity day” commemorating the final expulsion of the Poles from Moscow’s territory in 1612. It attests to an enduring sense of unfinished business towards the Baltic region. By some estimates Russia has attacked Estonia more than 40 times. Today, though, the consequences of any attempt to add one more incursion to the tally would be unimaginably more severe for Europe as a whole.

The only way to prevent it is to be prepared to fight the war and win it. The good news, as far as I can gather from speaking to a couple of dozen military officers and analysts, is that there is a fairly detailed collage of plans for doing so, assuming that America plays a supportive role. In an ideal world, the preliminary build-up of Russian forces would be sufficiently obvious to galvanise some kind of solid political consensus within the alliance in favour of resistance, and a corresponding mobilisation.

By the time the first tanks rolled in, they would encounter not only national armed forces and Nato’s forward-deployed units, entrenched in the freshly constructed fortifications of the Baltic defence line, but also the alliance’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, consisting of another 6,000 troops.

Few European leaders like to talk openly about what happens alongside this phase, but it is an open secret in defence circles and a staple of modern Russian military theory: the “IMVU”, or integrated massed air strike. That is a shorthand for the devastating bombardment of military targets on Russian soil. “Look at the map,” said General Andrus Merilo, commander of the Estonian defence forces. “If you have to defend Estonia, you have to defend from the border, which means that the Russian artillery will be positioned in Russia and killing Estonians. So we have to be able to kill those artillery systems at the very beginning of aggression.”

Nor would these strikes be limited to the border areas. If some frontline allies have been stockpiling cruise missiles with a range of more than 500 miles, such as the American-made JASSM-ERs recently acquired by Finland and Poland, it is for a reason. Any ammunition dump, command node or railway junction as far east as Moscow — and especially the naval bases at St Petersburg — would be considered fair game as Nato seeks to play one of its strongest cards: rapid air superiority. “Clearly the deep strikes are something which is also part of our message,” said Hanno Pevkur, the Estonian defence minister. A senior figure in Nato put it more succinctly: “The Russians know.”

Yet Trump’s second presidency does not so much change the calculus as spirit it away to a dimension in which numbers no longer have meaning. It is not clear whether he wants to take the US out of Nato; he may not even withdraw much more than a token fraction of its troops from Europe. Deterrence, however, is not just a question of conventional war fighting capacity. It is also a compound of nuclear posturing and, crucially, political signalling. The signals from the administration are all over the place and most of them are not good. For every vague intimation that Trump would consider coming to the aid of allies that cough up more defence spending, there are three that he would cheerfully grant Putin a sphere of dominion over not just Ukraine but also other parts of what used to be the Cold War-era eastern bloc.

That leaves all of America’s European allies in an invidious position. They cannot do without US security guarantees; and yet they cannot trust them. For frontline countries such as Poland and the Baltic states, the situation is even worse: they are currently confronted with an irreconcilable choice between trying to secure Ukraine and trying to secure their own territory.

European independence from US

With enough expenditure, determination and collective political imagination, the Europeans might eventually arrive at what Friedrich Merz, Germany’s probable next chancellor, calls a position of “actual independence”. That, though, will take time: perhaps five years, perhaps ten or more, depending on what flavour of optimism you choose to adopt. The first question, then, is how you handle the transition. Do you share sensitive intelligence in the knowledge that it might be passed to the Russians? Do you give way in the face of concerted American pressure, as Romania did in handing over the Tate brothers last month?

Do you volunteer to send peacekeeping troops to Ukraine while in a state of total uncertainty about whether they would actually have to go and what they would do there? Do you invest in American weaponry, hoping it will buy you more time and favour? Or do you shun it, fretting that otherwise you will neglect your own industrial base and that your F-35 jets or Patriot missiles could be remotely disabled as suddenly as Kyiv’s Himars rocket artillery?

The second and more unsettling question is whether enough states will attempt the transition at all. I think it is our only viable choice. But the upshot of the all-encompassing ambiguity is that paranoia comes to seem like the rational basis of self-preservation. Countries are forced to reassess where their national interests really lie as the multilateral order disintegrates before their eyes.

Last weekend it was credibly reported that proxies for the Kremlin and the Trump administration had struck up secret talks about resurrecting the Russian Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines to Germany under American ownership. These tubes along the floor of the Baltic were the abiding symbol of Berlin’s myopic dependency on Russia until one of them was blown open by an underwater explosion in 2022.

Before that, Trump had invested considerable energy in unsuccessfully bullying the Germans to abandon the project. Now the idea is alleged to be that the US will inherit the Kremlin’s old energy stranglehold over central Europe. It sounds bonkers. The German government rejected it out of hand. And yet: in these times, can anything truly be ruled out?

 

[Ivor]

And at least 20 killed in Donetsk & Kharkhiv overnight hitting 8 residential buildings & the same old line trotted out by Moscow that they only hit infrastructure & not civilians, after 3 years they need to change their script.

Don’t worry though Trump has it all under control, not only in Ukraine but the world in general.

 

[dgl]

We must also remember that those is the regime that poisoned people on our shores. If that is not enough on top of everything else to Tell Trump and Putin to "do one" then I don't know what it.

 

[Ivor]

We must also remember that those is the regime that poisoned people on our shores. If that is not enough on top of everything else to Tell Trump and Putin to "do one" then I don't know what it.

Exactly but we won’t, this Government like the last will make the right noises & do nothing, even the Bulgarians recently uncovered spying in the UK for Putin it’ll be on our news for about 10 minutes.

 

[brad465]

Say what you like about Russia: they've done a superb job with their propaganda and hybrid warfare operations of making themselves look bigger and more powerful than they actually are, and as powerful as the USSR were. Russia's economy is only just over 10% of the total EU economy or US economy, and less than half the population of either. Yet despite this they've managed to convince the West to restrain itself in dealing with them, and a proportion of the far-right and far-left in various countries to sympathise with Russia, now including Trump and MAGA.

Ukraine exposed Russia for how weak it actually is, further enhanced by multiple nuclear threats from Russia that have come to nothing. But the only reason they haven't been able to kick Russia out, is because all their allies are still too timid to face up to them.

 

[najaB]

Yet despite this they've managed to convince the West to restrain itself in dealing with them...

Mainly because they inherited some 15,000 nuclear warheads and the means to deploy them. If not for that we would likely have told them where they could go a long time ago.

Even if we assume that the majority of the weapons have either been retired or no longer work, they still have enough to give any other country on earth a very sore head.

 

[DustyBin]

I’m reading that the U.S.A. (Trump) are considering imposing more sanctions on Russia. I thought that the West had already imposed full sanctions on Russia?

Trump 'strongly considering' large-scale sanctions and tariffs on Russia

The president has reversed US policy and says he trusts Putin and finds dealing with Ukraine difficult.

www.bbc.co.uk

I believe we (the UK) introduced further sanctions earlier in the week…

The ultimate sanction would be for the US to declare Russia a terrorist state, but there’s clearly no will to do so.

 

[Annetts key]

The ultimate sanction would be for the US to declare Russia a terrorist state, but there’s clearly no will to do so.

That was never very likely no matter who was or is in the White House.

In hindsight, the U.S.A. and the other supporters of Ukraine should have been far tougher on Russia much earlier on. And been less timid with supplying weapons and ammunition.

Russia is weakening every day, but if we (the countries that support Ukraine) had done more two years or even one year ago, we would likely have had a much better situation than what we actually have.

Back to the here and now, and if it’s not clear to countries that are supposed to be allies with the U.S.A., that while Trump is President, we can no longer rely on help from the U.S.A., we are in deep trouble.

I do hope that the U.K. government and the other European countries stop dilly dangling around and provide Ukraine with whatever they can to replace the important services, equipment and ammunition that Trump has cut off.

The most important things are the intelligence information (especially early warning of when Russia launches ballistic missiles, their long range bombers, or swarms of long range drones), the satellite images and Patriot missiles.

And that they are working on either buying Patriot missiles or can rapidly increase output of IRIS-T SLM systems. Or both.

More ammunition for the M2 Bradley IFV would be very helpful as well.

The GMLRS and ATACMS missiles fired by the M142 (HIMARS) or M270 MLRS are not so important. Yes, they help, but Ukraine can now make do without if they have to. Ukraine has and is continuing to develop and use their own design of drones. That’s the most effective weapon for them at the moment.

As far as we know, Starlink is still operational for Ukraine. But a replacement should be investigated ASAP just in case.

 

[edwin_m]

The most important things are the intelligence information (especially early warning of when Russia launches ballistic missiles, their long range bombers, or swarms of long range drones), the satellite images and Patriot missiles.

Does any Western state other than the US have the ability to gather this information indpendently?

 

[Ivor]

Does any Western state other than the US have the ability to gather this information indpendently?

I believe France have & continue to do so but how it stacks up against USA intelligence I’ve no idea.

 

[Broucek]

For any who may still doubt Putin's game plans they should visit the Baltic nations and learn their 20th century history. There is no doubt there that he's coming for them as soon as a casus belli can be found. It's the normal course of actions in that region. On current form Trump would ally with Putin rather than taking any action against.

Unfortunately there are actions that could be built up to provide such a cover. In Estonia and Latvia there are minorities that might be invoked. There's a good article in today's Times by Oliver Moody, "How to prepare for Putin? Heed our friends in the Baltics." Too long to quote here from my phone.

Latest news & breaking headlines

The latest breaking UK, US, world, business and sport news from The Times and The Sunday Times. Go beyond today's headlines with in-depth analysis and comment.

www.thetimes.com

There was a drama about that a few years back - Berlin Station (railway link ) Season 3(?)

 

[Mogster]

I believe France have & continue to do so but how it stacks up against USA intelligence I’ve no idea.

I think this is just more posturing from Macron.

From defence industry sites it seems real time photo recon is the problem. The UK has 7 military satellites, France has a few more, 17. The US has 247 or thereabouts… The UK and France are just continuing to do what they’ve been doing, Starmer just didn’t feel the need to tell everyone.

From aviation sites, For what it’s worth, publicly trackable US air electronic surveillance assets are continuing to occupy their usual positions near Russia and Ukraine. The RAFs RC-135 flights are also continuing. Apparently US air delivered tactical nuclear weapons may have started to arrive in the UK. Preparations for their storage were started by Biden. Trump hasn’t stopped this. Who knows what’s actually going on?

 

[sor]

Trump, as clear as ever, now seems to be indicating that intelligence sharing is back on. Which probably backs up the above post about placement of assets.

https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-says-he-expects-good-results-ukraine-talks-2025-03-09/

ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE, March 9 (Reuters) - U.S. President Donald Trump said on Sunday that the United States had "just about" ended a suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine, and that he expects good results out of upcoming talks with Ukrainian officials in Saudi Arabia. Asked if he would consider ending the suspension, Trump said, "We just about have. We just about have."

I assume if the "good results" don't materialise, he'll turn it off again.

 

[Giugiaro]

Europe's Ariane 6 deploys spy satellite in first full mission

By Tim Hepher
March 6, 20257:47 PM GMT, Updated 4 days ago

March 6 (Reuters) - Europe's new Ariane 6 rocket successfully deployed a French spy satellite in its first fully operational launch on Thursday, completing a return to space for a continent facing questions over its role amid a security rift with the United States.
The uncrewed launcher lifted off from Europe's spaceport in Kourou, French Guiana, at 1:24 p.m. local time (1624 GMT). Controllers later said its CSO-3 reconnaissance satellite had separated smoothly, completing a trio of military platforms.

The twice-postponed launch gave a symbolic boost to European efforts to expand its autonomy on a day that European leaders were holding a summit to sharply boost European defence, though Ariane launch capacity remains dwarfed by U.S. rival SpaceX.
"We are consolidating our independent access to space and helping to guarantee sovereignty on behalf of our citizens," David Cavailloles, CEO of launch operator Arianespace, said.
European nations agreed in 2014 to develop Ariane 6 for commercial and institutional launches in response to growing competition. But its arrival, originally due in 2020, was repeatedly delayed.

The delays left Europe relying on Elon Musk's SpaceX for some launches including part of its Galileo positioning system.

COMMERCIAL DEBUT​

Since the retirement of the workhorse Ariane 5 in 2023, Europe has had little independent access to space, with war in Ukraine cutting Western ties to Russian Soyuz rockets and Italy's Vega C grounded for two years until last December.
European Space Agency chief Josef Aschbacher has repeatedly warned of a "crisis" in European space access.
Ariane 6 had staged a partially successful inaugural test flight on July 9 last year, carrying out a series of trials but leaving its upper stage in orbit after a software glitch.

Thursday's launch was carried out for the French Air Force's Space Command.
Although carrying a military payload, the journey was technically considered a commercial debut because it was handled by Arianespace, rather than the European Space Agency.
Ariane 6 is built by ArianeGroup, co-owned by Airbus and Safran.
Airbus also built the satellite, while its high-definition optical instrument was built by Franco-Italian Thales Alenia Space, controlled by Thales and Leonardo.
Airbus and TAS are discussing setting up a new venture to combine money-losing satellite activities as part of their target telecoms market shifts to Musk's Starlink in lower orbit. Thales CEO Patrice Caine said this week talks remained "exploratory".

Meanwhile, American and European defence company shares last week:

 

[Cloud Strife]

I assume if the "good results" don't materialise, he'll turn it off again.

I think it's more likely that there was some pressure applied from NATO and non-NATO members in this direction. The US relies heavily on not only NATO locations, but also on some locations in non-NATO locations, such as Trodos in Cyprus or the various military installations of Australia and New Zealand. While it's true that the Americans have much more in the way of satellite monitoring capabilities, they still need these land-based surveillance stations and cooperation with non-NATO members.

As far as we know, Starlink is still operational for Ukraine.

The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by one of the most clued up and well connected politicians in Europe, Radosław Sikorski, delivered a very clear public rebuke to Musk over the issue of Starlink. The Starlink connections are paid for by the Polish MFA, and cutting it off would almost certainly sour relations badly with Poland.

Who knows what’s actually going on?

My gut feeling is that Trump overstepped the mark and now he's being reigned in by the real movers and players in Washington.

 

[robbob700]

The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by one of the most clued up and well connected politicians in Europe, Radosław Sikorski, delivered a very clear public rebuke to Musk over the issue of Starlink. The Starlink connections are paid for by the Polish MFA, and cutting it off would almost certainly sour relations badly with Poland.

Musk responded: "Be quiet, small man. You pay a tiny fraction of the cost. And there is no substitute for Starlink" and Marco Rubio added "And say thank you because without Starlink Ukraine would have lost this war long ago and Russians would be on the border with Poland right now"

 

[YorkshireBear]

Musk responded: "Be quiet, small man. You pay a tiny fraction of the cost. And there is no substitute for Starlink" and Marco Rubio added "And say thank you because without Starlink Ukraine would have lost this war long ago and Russians would be on the border with Poland right now"

Pathetic.