Steam Loco "driver side"

[Taunton]

I agree - but on this occasion there would presumably nothing in the relevant Train registers , (1940's Britain did not have data loggers !) , and the station staff around at that ghastly time of night would have been very few. Regrettably we shall never really know what happened.

Plus of course a disaster to a prime overnight train heading for Plymouth with a high % of military and naval staff was not good news.

The official report states that the driver said they had pulled off signals to cross to the Down Main, but later changed that. The fireman who would have confirmed this was killed. The signalman stated this was not done, the signals were never pulled off until the train left on the (unusual) Down Relief. The inspector believed the signalman.

Word from the Taunton staff in the 1960s was that indeed the signals had been handled as the driver said. There's a bit of a clue in the report - the train was an hour late but was stuck at Taunton platform for a further 20 minutes. Something had arisen on the platform, the train had been expected to be away well before it did and ahead of the newspaper train. It was only the delay that caused the change of plan. There was some issue why the signalman represented otherwise which became known afterwards. A Taunton railman of the era later wrote a book which also described exactly this. The signals were only pulled off up to the Taunton advanced starter, the ones on the well-known signal gantry west of the station, so had not been offered yet to Taunton West Junction box. There was another train behind on the Down Relief they were keen to get into the platform.

Apart from the rail staff, our family doctor when I was young there had been in position for a long time, and was one of those called out to the accident site in the middle of the night. He had been right up close with the dreadful scenes.

 

[Harvester]

The accident could have been a lot worse, as the newspaper train only pulled ahead in the nick of time. With their blackout sheets down its crew were unaware they were running alongside 6028, and were only alerted when flying ballast and a rivet head from the King’s bogie frame hit the rear van. If they had been slightly behind they would have ploughed into the crowded carriages strewn across the track.

 

[ChiefPlanner]

The official report states that the driver said they had pulled off signals to cross to the Down Main, but later changed that. The fireman who would have confirmed this was killed. The signalman stated this was not done, the signals were never pulled off until the train left on the (unusual) Down Relief. The inspector believed the signalman.

Word from the Taunton staff in the 1960s was that indeed the signals had been handled as the driver said. There's a bit of a clue in the report - the train was an hour late but was stuck at Taunton platform for a further 20 minutes. Something had arisen on the platform, the train had been expected to be away well before it did and ahead of the newspaper train. It was only the delay that caused the change of plan. There was some issue why the signalman represented otherwise which became known afterwards. A Taunton railman of the era later wrote a book which also described exactly this. The signals were only pulled off up to the Taunton advanced starter, the ones on the well-known signal gantry west of the station, so had not been offered yet to Taunton West Junction box. There was another train behind on the Down Relief they were keen to get into the platform.

Apart from the rail staff, our family doctor when I was young there had been in position for a long time, and was one of those called out to the accident site in the middle of the night. He had been right up close with the dreadful scenes.

Thank you - I expected a good reply to this conundrum.

 

[6Gman]

Essentially, to be taken with a pinch of salt, and it's depressing how many things stated in what should be specialised programmes are far too generalised or poorly-researched. In general (and all this excludes the GWR), the driver of a modern UK steam loco sat on the left, and the fireman would either be firing or observing from the right hand side. The signals would normally be sited to the left of the line such that the driver would see them and much care was taken with gantries, etc., to ensure that the relevant signals were as visible as possible. On right-hand curves, clearly the signals would not be visible until quite late on the approach which is when the fireman's observations were particularly important. Clearly, any system of driving a vehicle where the visibility of the route ahead is so compromised is very unsatisfactory and I often marvel at the relatively low number of accidents that resulted. The long times for progressing through the ranks probably contributed to the safety that was achieved to a large degree.

@Deepgreen beat me to it! As someone from an LNW/LMS/BR background driving on the left to look at signals conveniently placed to the left of the running lines (and therefore away from other running lines on two track sections) just seems obvious.

And learning signal positions (and which were better viewed from the offside) would have been key to route learning.

 

[Loppylugs]

We also used other aids at night to assist us with our location such as building lights, bridges, roads etc. It was crucial for the driver to know when to close the regulator, although signals were easier to pick out in the dark. Also the fireman needed to know when to let the water drop slightly before coming into a station so as to be able to put water into the boiler on approach to avoid the safety valves lifting and drowning out the station announcer. This happened to me once as we came into Reading with 5076 "Gladiator" but in my defence we had been held for some time outside. The passengers all had their ears covered, it was deafening !

 

[midland1]

The RCTS LNER books (Vol. 1, page 59) say that 'generally speaking' the English constituents used right-hand drive whereas the Scottish ones were left-hand. Supposedly NB drivers were unhappy when they started getting LH locomotives and made representations. After 1925 all new-builds were right-hand (except a few B12s), but few locomotives were converted.

Just looked at the RCTS book and it should say "started getting RH locomotives".

 

[WesternLancer]

We also used other aids at night to assist us with our location such as building lights, bridges, roads etc. It was crucial for the driver to know when to close the regulator, although signals were easier to pick out in the dark. Also the fireman needed to know when to let the water drop slightly before coming into a station so as to be able to put water into the boiler on approach to avoid the safety valves lifting and drowning out the station announcer. This happened to me once as we came into Reading with 5076 "Gladiator" but in my defence we had been held for some time outside. The passengers all had their ears covered, it was deafening !

That's something I'd never have thought of, risk of drowning out announcers!

 

[oldman]

Just looked at the RCTS book and it should say "started getting RH locomotives".

Are you saying the RCTS book is wrong? It says

From 1925 onwards all new engines had LH drive except [48 locos in various classes, including A1s] (all built in 1925) and [10 B12s] (built in 1928).

 

[midland1]

Are you saying the RCTS book is wrong? It says

No the book is right but you put "NB drivers were unhappy when they started getting LH locomotives" when you should put "RH locomotives".

 

[oldman]

No the book is right but you put "NB drivers were unhappy when they started getting LH locomotives" when you should put "RH locomotives".

Sorry. My mistake.