Weaver Junction accident c. 1975

[MarkWi72]

Was there a collision in the 1970s, at Weaver Junction? Freightliner and a tank train? I seem to recall someone mentioned on this forum some time ago and think I read about it in an article some time ago. I cant recall the detail. Anyone on here recall this incident?

 

[hexagon789]

Was there a collision in the 1970s, at Weaver Junction? Freightliner and a tank train? I seem to recall someone mentioned on this forum some time ago and think I read about it in an article some time ago. I cant recall the detail. Anyone on here recall this incident?

This one presumably:

Report on the Collision that occurred on 6th August 1975 at Weaver Junction in the London Midland Region British Railways :: The Railways Archive

Archive of UK railways documents

www.railwaysarchive.co.uk

"The driver of tank wagon train 6F52, before departing from Folly Lane, Runcorn, was informed that the train was fully braked and thus drove up to the maximum permitted speed for a train of this type of 60 mile/h. When descending the 3¼ mile falling gradients on the line approaching Weaver Junction the train ran out of control due to only eight of the wagons being fitted with vacuum brakes instead of the whole train being so fitted as the driver had been led to suppose. The train ran past Signal WJ 11, protecting the Junction, at Danger and struck the side of Freightliner train 4068 at the Junction.

The Up Liverpool and Up Warrington lines run approximately parallel to each other for a distance of approximately one mile before the Junction and the driver of the Freightliner train, which was travelling at about 70 mile/h under clear signals, saw sparks being emitted by the brake blocks on a number of wagons on 6F52 on the Liverpool line. As it appeared to him that the train would over-run the Junction, he gave his locomotive more power in an effort to clear the junction before the other train reached it and thus avert a collision. His efforts unfortunately were not successful, but at least a collision between the two locomotives was avoided.

The electric locomotive and leading four Freightliner vehicles of train 4068 were not derailed. The trailing bogie of the fifth vehicle was derailed, the roller bearing assembly was damaged, as were two of the clamping brackets; one brake and wheel was broken. Thereafter all the ten vehicles were derailed, the wheels and bogies suffering extensive damage."

 

[Jack Hay]

There was. I don't remember any details of the incident, only details of the diversions around it. InterCity services between Warrington and Crewe attached diesels on the front and were towed to Chester where they propelled along the west side of the triangle to the west of the station and then passed through the station a second time. As this was being done for trains in both directions, the station and the junctions were rather busy.

 

[MarkWi72]

Ah thanks, I'll have a read of that.

 

[Rail Ranger]

Some InterCity trains were diverted via the Manchester area (Denton-Ashton Moss). The accident was often called "whisky and soda" because the Runcorn train was conveying soda ash and the Freightliner train included containers of Scottish whisky.

 

[D1511]

Sometimes referred to as the whisky & soda incident. 40189 was the destroyed loco.

 

[Taunton]

Commonly known as the "Whisky and Soda accident". An Up block chemical train of caustic soda tankers from the Liverpool line overran signals at Weaver Junction and collided side-on with an Up Freightliner from Scotland, carrying several containers of whisky for export. The alkaline caustic soda ash ran down the embankment from the railway and contaminated the river Weaver underneath. It became very challenging for the recovery crews with the chemically contaminated land.

It was a substantial derailment. I recall passing a short while afterwards, and while the railway itself had been cleared and sorted out, the farm fields on the Down side were strewn with wrecked freight wagons and crushed containers, which appeared to have been just pushed to one side over the fence to clear the line.

 

[jfollows]

November 1975 Railway Magazine for sale covers this: https://railroadtreasures.com/produ...5-november-whisky-and-soda-at-weaver-junction

 

[Grumpy Git]

Sometimes referred to as the whisky & soda incident. 40189 was the destroyed loco.

Photograph of loco after the crash on Flickr here:

40189 sits forlornly in Crewe Works awaiting the scrap man - one of the first casualties of the class

Crewe Works open day - Saturday 20th September 1975 I was fortunate to catch this early Class 40 casualty on my first visit to the Railway Mecca of Crewe Works (aged 13). As you can see, 40189 had been involved in a collision and was never to run again, being one of only a handful to be...

www.flickr.com

 

[Jack Hay]

This one presumably:

Report on the Collision that occurred on 6th August 1975 at Weaver Junction in the London Midland Region British Railways :: The Railways Archive

Archive of UK railways documents

www.railwaysarchive.co.uk

I suppose there was no requirement in those days for drivers to conduct a running brake test soon after starting a journey? This would have revealed to the Runcorn driver the shortage of brake power on his train and thereby prevented the accident. The same rule, incidentally, would have prevented the major crash and fire at Chester station three years earlier.

 

[hexagon789]

I suppose there was no requirement in those days for drivers to conduct a running brake test soon after starting a journey? This would have revealed to the Runcorn driver the shortage of brake power on his train and thereby prevented the accident. The same rule, incidentally, would have prevented the major crash and fire at Chester station three years earlier.

I think the regular RBTs are a post-defensive driving thing, no? I'm sure a driver will correct on that if they have been around longer than that.

(Bar the snow-related RBT requirements at least, which I understand have been a thing since the 70s at least.)

 

[Taunton]

This was one of a number of serious runaway accidents in the area at the time with inadequately braked heavyweight company trains; there were also two separate ones at Chester, one struck diesel units in a bay platform and the other was diverted into the diesel depot and destroyed a considerable number of dmu cars in there. The concept of modern block trains and wagons seemed to get ahead of adequate braking of them.

The issue with a running brake test here was similar to the recent runaway between Carstairs and Edinburgh, that you can't do them if the start is immediately uphill, where if you only shut the power off the train pretty much stops anyway. From the chemical sidings at Runcorn it is an immediate steep climb from the riverside up to the station, and then up further before the summit, just about where the driver first applied the brakes anyway.

 

[Gloster]

This was one of a number of serious runaway accidents in the area at the time with inadequately braked heavyweight company trains; there were also two separate ones at Chester, one struck diesel units in a bay platform and the other was diverted into the diesel depot and destroyed a considerable number of dmu cars in there. The concept of modern block trains and wagons seemed to get ahead of adequate braking of them.

The issue with a running brake test here was similar to the recent runaway between Carstairs and Edinburgh, that you can't do them if the start is immediately uphill, where if you only shut the power off the train pretty much stops anyway. From the chemical sidings at Runcorn it is an immediate steep climb from the riverside up to the station, and then up further before the summit, just about where the driver first applied the brakes anyway.

The Chester accident of 9 July 1969 saw four Class 24 written off and one more damaged. The culprit was a Class 47 hauled Birkenhead-Etruria iron-ore train, which was diverted into the depot. That on 8 May 1972 saw the hauling Class 24, five DMU vehicles and much of the station roof destroyed by an Ellesmere Port-Mold Junction goods, which included some fuel tanks.

 

[vidal]

Photograph of loco after the crash on Flickr here:

40189 sits forlornly in Crewe Works awaiting the scrap man - one of the first casualties of the class

Crewe Works open day - Saturday 20th September 1975 I was fortunate to catch this early Class 40 casualty on my first visit to the Railway Mecca of Crewe Works (aged 13). As you can see, 40189 had been involved in a collision and was never to run again, being one of only a handful to be...

www.flickr.com

It always struck me as pretty strange that depot open days would have a selection of accident damaged locos on display - some of which had been involved in fatal accidents.

James

 

[Efini92]

Commonly known as the "Whisky and Soda accident". An Up block chemical train of caustic soda tankers from the Liverpool line overran signals at Weaver Junction and collided side-on with an Up Freightliner from Scotland, carrying several containers of whisky for export. The alkaline caustic soda ash ran down the embankment from the railway and contaminated the river Weaver underneath. It became very challenging for the recovery crews with the chemically contaminated land.

It was a substantial derailment. I recall passing a short while afterwards, and while the railway itself had been cleared and sorted out, the farm fields on the Down side were strewn with wrecked freight wagons and crushed containers, which appeared to have been just pushed to one side over the fence to clear the line.

Didn’t BR get ICI to come and treat the leaked chemicals?

 

[Elecman]

Didn’t BR get ICI to come and treat the leaked chemicals?

I think the Fire Service did that

 

[Ash Bridge]

Some InterCity trains were diverted via the Manchester area (Denton-Ashton Moss). The accident was often called "whisky and soda" because the Runcorn train was conveying soda ash and the Freightliner train included containers of Scottish whisky.

I can well remember those diversions lasting for around three days as I live alongside the line in the Heaton Chapel district of Stockport midway between Reddish South and Ash Bridge Junction, not just IC services but several Freighliner trains also - Locations are Reddish South & passing Ash Bridge signal box respectively (please excuse the poor image quality)

 

[Bevan Price]

I saw 40189 at Crewe Works on that open day, and the damage did not look catastrophically bad. In earlier years, it would probably have been repaired, but by 1975, serious withdrawals of 40s had commenced, so it had little chance of getting repaired. Unfortunately it and D322 were the only 40s I failed to get for haulage.
(And ironically D322 had also been destroyed in a collision near Moore, just a few miles north of Weaver Jn)

 

[Taunton]

I saw 40189 at Crewe Works on that open day, and the damage did not look catastrophically bad.
(And ironically D322 had also been destroyed in a collision near Moore, just a few miles north of Weaver Jn)

More ironically, when I went around Crewe Works in 1966 (posted about in past) the hulk of D322 was laid to one side at the back. That was substantially wrecked, much of one end was cut away.

 

[Wilts Wanderer]

This was one of a number of serious runaway accidents in the area at the time with inadequately braked heavyweight company trains; there were also two separate ones at Chester, one struck diesel units in a bay platform and the other was diverted into the diesel depot and destroyed a considerable number of dmu cars in there. The concept of modern block trains and wagons seemed to get ahead of adequate braking of them.

The issue with a running brake test here was similar to the recent runaway between Carstairs and Edinburgh, that you can't do them if the start is immediately uphill, where if you only shut the power off the train pretty much stops anyway. From the chemical sidings at Runcorn it is an immediate steep climb from the riverside up to the station, and then up further before the summit, just about where the driver first applied the brakes anyway.

Out of interest, why do you actually need to shut off power to perform an uphill brake test? This might be my lack of understanding of the driving task, but surely you can still prove the train is being retarded by applying brakes while the locomotive is powering?

 

[Efini92]

Out of interest, why do you actually need to shut off power to perform an uphill brake test? This might be my lack of understanding of the driving task, but surely you can still prove the train is being retarded by applying brakes while the locomotive is powering?

You wouldn’t do a running brake test on a rising gradient as the gradient will mask the actual performance of the brakes.

 

[Bevan Price]

You wouldn’t do a running brake test on a rising gradient as the gradient will mask the actual performance of the brakes.

I was once on a Class 319 when the driver did that heading north from Wigan North Western - on a wet day. Bad mistake, we slipped most of the way to Coppull, hardly reaching 40 mph until the gradient flattened.

 

[Dieseldriver]

I was once on a Class 319 when the driver did that heading north from Wigan North Western - on a wet day. Bad mistake, we slipped most of the way to Coppull, hardly reaching 40 mph until the gradient flattened.

If it’s struggling to get away, it’ll more than likely struggle to stop. I’d hardly say that’s a ‘bad mistake’. I’d rather be at the controls of a train struggling to accelerate due to wheelslip than at the controls of a train unexpectedly struggling to stop due to wheel slide.

 

[Efini92]

If it’s struggling to get away, it’ll more than likely struggle to stop. I’d hardly say that’s a ‘bad mistake’. I’d rather be at the controls of a train struggling to accelerate due to wheelslip than at the controls of a train unexpectedly struggling to stop due to wheel slide.

319’s were great at stopping. They were really poor at getting the power down in the wet.

 

[D6130]

Surely if a brake continuity test had been carried out by the guard from the rear of the train before starting - as required by the Rule Book - it would have been immediately apparent that the traib was not continuously-braked?

 

[Efini92]

Surely if a brake continuity test had been carried out by the guard from the rear of the train before starting - as required by the Rule Book - it would have been immediately apparent that the traib was not continuously-braked?

IIRC the brake continuity test was carried out, but the train was heavier than what was stated on the TOPS sheet.

Edit.
The train had a brake continuity test and the driver was informed that the whole train was braked. Only 8 of the 20 wagons had vacuum brakes, the rest were air braked and using a vacuum pipe.

 

[Taunton]

It seems an oddball combination that, while the vacuum brake was continuous to the rear, which is what 'brake continuity' is all about, not all the vehicles (in fact the majority) actually had vacuum brakes, and were just through piped. Traditionally, of course, the braked ones would be at the front, as a 'fitted head', the unbraked ones behind, and a guards' van with handbrake at the rear. The service had a guard, but was riding in the rear cab. Presumably there was some requirement for a number of braked wagons to be at the back, to stop them in the event of a breakaway.

 

[Merle Haggard]

Surely if a brake continuity test had been carried out by the guard from the rear of the train before starting - as required by the Rule Book - it would have been immediately apparent that the traib was not continuously-braked?

Mentioned in the report - it was vac. piped through, so the guard did hear air rushing in when he did the brake test. Problem seemed to be confusion between piped and braked; I remember the standard question (white or red standpipes?) and I was only a freight trains office clerk
//

I suppose there was no requirement in those days for drivers to conduct a running brake test soon after starting a journey? This would have revealed to the Runcorn driver the shortage of brake power on his train and thereby prevented the accident. The same rule, incidentally, would have prevented the major crash and fire at Chester station three years earlier.

I thought that this was mentioned in the report - the first stretch of track that wasn't climbing was the descent to the junction.

 

[Strathclyder]

Image of 40189 on the day of the accident, taken on it's penultimate working (6F56, the balancing working of the ill-fated 6F52) at Cheadle. Taken by Richard Clayton:

40189 Earles Sidings-Widnes cement at Cheadle Later in the day 40189 would be involved in a collision at Weaver Jnc 6.8.1975

Explore richardclayton3's 999 photos on Flickr!

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