Avanti explains oxenholme incident

[MotCO]

I sometimes work late, if there's something that needs finishing off (although the consequences of not doing so would be far less than for your daughter).

But not everyone can work late at short notice. The staff we're discussing may have had kids at home with a babysitter who needed to be relieved. They may have needed to get home so a partner could use the shared car to get to their own job. All sorts of things that could prevent staff from working extra hours, even if they had a burning desire to help their employer out.

Or as noted above they may simply have been told the train was cancelled in which case there would be no need for anyone to stay behind.

All of which would be valid excuses. If the station staff could not stay to wait for the train, would they not have fed that back, and the Stop order revoked? Which leads me to suggest that a Not to Stop order was issued, but did not reach the train crew.

 

[DelayRepay]

All of which would be valid excuses. If the station staff could not stay to wait for the train, would they not have fed that back, and the Stop order revoked? Which leads me to suggest that a Not to Stop order was issued, but did not reach the train crew.

Yeah - I was more commenting on the suggestions made by others in this thread that the station staff should have stayed late. We don't know why they didn't but shouldn't assume they just abandoned their posts without a thought.

It also depends on the discussion. In a previous job I was sometimes asked to stay late to cover sickness. Whether I did or not depended on what I had planned for the evening, and what I was offered as an incentive to stay ('take the hours back another time' didn't cut it. 'We'll pay you double time and provide a taxi home' was usually enough for me).

 

[norbitonflyer]

The physical paper goes to the traincrew, the other people who need to know, such as station staff, social media team, customer information manager, will be told via other means.

Which train crew? Manager or driver?

I don't know what day of the week this was.

It was 16th/17th August - a Tuesday night

 

[43066]

Which train crew? Manager or driver?

Both guard and driver.

 

[DelayRepay]

Both guard and driver.

As an outsider looking in, the system of station staff handing over pieces of paper seems outdated, and prone to failure.

In practice does it normally work well, or are there regular problems all be it not with the same impact as the event that's being discussed here?

 

[43066]

As an outsider looking in, the system of station staff handing over pieces of paper seems outdated, and prone to failure.

In practice does it normally work well, or are there regular problems all be it not with the same impact as the event that's being discussed here?

It generally works fine. It’s also desirable to have physical proof you’ve been asked not to call/to call additionally.

 

[Bantamzen]

It generally works fine. It’s also desirable to have physical proof you’ve been asked not to call/to call additionally.

Do you or station staff have to rely back to control that a variation has been received & understood? Because in this particular case it seems that some assumptions were made, i.e. staff at Oxenholme were aware (presumably) that the service was not booked to stop there but one or more of train crew were not.

 

[Trackman]

A quote from the original poster from Avanti:

"There should have been a 'not to stop' order issued for Oxenholme, but unfortunately the Train Manager and Driver were not made aware of this instruction. This is an extremely rare situation. ... '

You cant start stopping at stations willy-nilly, obviously not in the case of an emergency. I reckon the driver/TM were told by control to stop there.
The way I saw it on RTT; the service was CAPE'd (cancelled) at Preston then after whatever was blocking the line was removed then it went on its merry way again.
Basically someone has taken their eye off the ball in control, which basically is what the quote is.

 

[43066]

Do you or station staff have to rely back to control that a variation has been received & understood? Because in this particular case it seems that some assumptions were made, i.e. staff at Oxenholme were aware (presumably) that the service was not booked to stop there but one or more of train crew were not.

No. The instruction comes to the platform staff from control and they prepare the order albeit it’s their responsibility to ensure they give it to you. I always make a point of checking it’s been filled in correctly and has the correct head code. I’ve been given one meant for a different train previously!

I’d always confirm my understanding with the guard, who must be given a separate order.

 

[357]

A quote from the original poster from Avanti:

You cant start stopping at stations willy-nilly, obviously not in the case of an emergency. I reckon the driver/TM were told by control to stop there.
The way I saw it on RTT; the service was CAPE'd (cancelled) at Preston then after whatever was blocking the line was removed then it went on its merry way again.
Basically someone has taken their eye off the ball in control, which basically is what the quote is.

Was the train scheduled to stop there originally?

 

[Trackman]

Was the train scheduled to stop there originally?

I don't think it was...
Someone may correct me.
I dont think it was on RTT after the cancellation at Preston.

 

[jfollows]

I don't think it was...
Someone may correct me.
I dont think it was on RTT after the cancellation at Preston.

See post #52 above for RTT

 

[357]

I don't think it was...
Someone may correct me.
I dont think it was on RTT after the cancellation at Preston.

The RTT in post 52 suggests it was, so it looks like the traincrew just followed their stopping pattern and weren't told otherwise.

However, following on from mine and others comments up thread, I can't even find an altered stopping pattern for the train was posted on Tyrellcheck. Below is the only message on that day for that headcode:

NEW

1 VT Altered facilities 1505 19:30 from London Euston.

17/08/22

20:10

Facilities on the 1S05 19:30 London Euston to Glasgow Central due

00:06. Disabled toilet facilities are reduced.

Additional Information:

Unfortunately, the accessible toilet in coach (D) isn't available today.

You can still use the toilet in coach (B&J), which is also accessible.

Hide More Information Further Information:

Avanti West Coast Control-XXXX XXX XXXX

Internal Information:

Set Number = 390121 Vehicle Number =69721

 

[Surreytraveller]

As an outsider looking in, the system of station staff handing over pieces of paper seems outdated, and prone to failure.

In practice does it normally work well, or are there regular problems all be it not with the same impact as the event that's being discussed here?

Prone to failure? How else would you suggest its issued that would be less prone to failure?

 

[Bletchleyite]

Prone to failure? How else would you suggest its issued that would be less prone to failure?

The whole issue wouldn't have been one if there was a way of exiting all stations even when locked up, e.g. a push bar or a key in a break glass box. It really is silly that there isn't, because the absence of an exit means people are more likely to trespass to get out. Yes, the dispatch one door at a time would have been slow but not insurmountable.

 

[IanXC]

A quote from the original poster from Avanti:

You cant start stopping at stations willy-nilly, obviously not in the case of an emergency. I reckon the driver/TM were told by control to stop there.
The way I saw it on RTT; the service was CAPE'd (cancelled) at Preston then after whatever was blocking the line was removed then it went on its merry way again.
Basically someone has taken their eye off the ball in control, which basically is what the quote is.

Looking at the RTT schedule saved in post #52, the train *was* booked to call at Oxenholme in the WTT schedule. Adding all the clues together it seems something like:

2202 - 1S05 arrives at Preston and is delayed/cancelled due to the disruption
2255 - 1S05 departs Preston 72 late (potentially reinstated to do so)
2332 - 1S05 departs Lancaster 94 late

At some point between 2255 and 2344 Control realise or Oxenholme call advising, that the station will be closed/cannot be kept open and Control therefore decided to issue a Not To Stop order for 1S05 to skip Oxenholme. Assuming Avanti only do this in writing that would imply that either Preston or Lancaster were requested to issue the order. At some stage for some reason this Not To Stop order doesn't make it to the Driver (and very probably the Train Manager too) and the train calls anyway leading to the situation described.

 

[357]

The whole issue wouldn't have been one if there was a way of exiting all stations even when locked up, e.g. a push bar or a key in a break glass box. It really is silly that there isn't, because the absence of an exit means people are more likely to trespass to get out. Yes, the dispatch one door at a time would have been slow but not insurmountable.

Having worked stations I can guarantee you that you'd need all of them like this. People will climb over the first exit they come to.

 

[Bantamzen]

No. The instruction comes to the platform staff from control and they prepare the order albeit it’s their responsibility to ensure they give it to you. I always make a point of checking it’s been filled in correctly and has the correct head code. I’ve been given one meant for a different train previously!

I’d always confirm my understanding with the guard, who must be given a separate order.

So therein in lies a potential flaw, there's no confirmation fed back to control to confirm the train crew have received and acknowledged the change? I'm sure you are aware of the Swiss cheese model in risk analysis, but for those that are not it basically tries to look at flaws in a flow of procedures as holes in layers of cheese stacked side by side. On their own, the holes in each layer (read procedural step) may not amount to much, but if these holes line up then the procedure can quickly fall apart, and where safety critical ones exist can lead to accidents.

In this case the lack of communication not only of the changes, but that all concerned in the chain acknowledged them led to the service stopping where it was not planned to & led to passengers getting off only to find locked gates. Luckily the final two layer's holes did not also line up, i.e. passengers ending up on the tracks & another service passing through. But it goes to show how something seemingly innocuous can suddenly become more serious.

Now at this point I have to confess that I know nothing about onboard comms systems or existing procedures, but it seems this particular problem could have been prevented with some fairly simple steps. One could be to have a unique code attached to the change, based on the headcode of the path. Once the traincrew receive & confer these, one of them relays the unique code back to control, giving them confirmation that the crew knows not only what the remaining path is expected to be, but also what to correctly convey to the passengers. Alternatively on passing the changes to the train crew, the station staff get a unique code back from the crew (assigned based on headcode and/or crew) which they then convey back to control. Either way, control will know that as of the time of the change being communicated the train crew know what is expected, and can pass this information to everywhere else that needs it. Yes it might mean a bit more work for all, but it takes the assumptions that the changes have been successfully communicated out of the process flow, sealing at least a couple of holes in the layers of Swiss cheese.

 

[357]

w at this point I have to confess that I know nothing about onboard comms systems or existing procedures, but it seems this particular problem could have been prevented with some fairly simple steps. One could be to have a unique code attached to the change, based on the headcode of the path. Once the traincrew receive & confer these, one of them relays the unique code back to control, giving them confirmation that the crew knows not only what the remaining path is expected to be, but also what to correctly convey to the passengers. Alternatively on passing the changes to the train crew, the station staff get a unique code back from the crew (assigned based on headcode and/or crew) which they then convey back to control. Either way, control will know that as of the time of the change being communicated the train crew know what is expected, and can pass this information to everywhere else that needs it. Yes it might mean a bit more work for all, but it takes the assumptions that the changes have been successfully communicated out of the process flow, sealing at least a couple of holes in the layers of Swiss cheese.

Other TOCs speak to the driver directly via GSMR and use normal safety critical procedures of repeating the message back to make sure it's understood. In my experience it is much easier.

 

[Bantamzen]

Other TOCs speak to the driver directly via GSMR and use normal safety critical procedures of repeating the message back to make sure it's understood. In my experience it is much easier.

This would be the preferable method, as its done in the airline industry. It cuts out the middle person & reduces the risk of confusion down the line.

 

[357]

This would be the preferable method, as its done in the airline industry. It cuts out the middle person & reduces the risk of confusion down the line.

Yes, I think the paperwork method dates back to before GSMR days, when it wasn't so easy to contact a driver without stopping the train at a red.

Nowadays I get "contact control" on the GSMR screen and call them at my convince when it's safe to do so.

 

[HSTEd]

Having worked stations I can guarantee you that you'd need all of them like this. People will climb over the first exit they come to.

If you had signage for 'Out of hours' exit I think people would follow it

 

[357]

If you had signage for 'Out of hours' exit I think people would follow it

Seriously, we did, people didn't care, especially when intoxicated.

Even since I became a driver and moved elsewhere, my local station has an out of hours exit, but now they have to leave the main building open too as people kept trying to break the windows to go into the building and then out the main exit.

 

[Bletchleyite]

Having worked stations I can guarantee you that you'd need all of them like this. People will climb over the first exit they come to.

By "trespass" I meant wander on the track. If an exit is signed and people climb over another one, their choice. But the key is nobody is stuck in the station.

 

[Carlisle]

The whole issue wouldn't have been one if there was a way of exiting all stations even when locked up, e.g. a push bar or a key

Indeed, I noticed such a facility on Haymarket’s platform 4 the other day

 

[Peter Sarf]

A quote from the original poster from Avanti:

You cant start stopping at stations willy-nilly, obviously not in the case of an emergency. I reckon the driver/TM were told by control to stop there.
The way I saw it on RTT; the service was CAPE'd (cancelled) at Preston then after whatever was blocking the line was removed then it went on its merry way again.
Basically someone has taken their eye off the ball in control, which basically is what the quote is.

I think you mis-understood. The train normally stops there but on this evening a NOT TO STOP order was allegedly issued.

Was the train scheduled to stop there originally?

From what others have said the train was normally meant to stop there.

 

[kkong]

Indeed, I noticed such a facility on Haymarket’s platform 4 the other day

Please provide more details.

AFAIK, there is no public exit from Haymarket (Edinburgh) station from platform 4.

 

[Trackman]

I think you mis-understood. The train normally stops there but on this evening a NOT TO STOP order was allegedly issued.

From what others have said the train was normally meant to stop there.

As per my previous posts, I am under some understanding it was CAPE'd at Preston, I unable to find details, I just remember it was unless I confusing it with something else.
Hence the confusion, cancelled then reinstated and no stop order from control etc..
If it wasn't cancelled and re-instated I'd put money on control not knowing Oxenholme would be locked up.

The RTT in post 52 suggests it was, so it looks like the traincrew just followed their stopping pattern and weren't told otherwise.

However, following on from mine and others comments up thread, I can't even find an altered stopping pattern for the train was posted on Tyrellcheck. Below is the only message on that day for that headcode:

 

[357]

As per my previous posts, I am under some understanding it was CAPE'd at Preston, I unable to find details, I just remember it was unless I confusing it with something else.
Hence the confusion, cancelled then reinstated and no stop order from control etc..
If it wasn't cancelled and re-instated I'd put money on control not knowing Oxenholme would be locked up.

If it was initially cancelled it would explain staff locking up and going home.

 

[Carlisle]

Please provide more details.

AFAIK, there is no public exit from Haymarket (Edinburgh) station from platform 4.

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