Croydon Tram Crash

[Taunton]

Although roads are line of sight (like trams); they are not based on route knowledge (unlike trams).

Trams are not directly comparable to roads nor mainline rail.

Trams are indeed line of sight. When running on roads.

This is on a section of the tramway with the speed and alignment characteristics of a railway - up to the sudden change. If you brake from the expected speed on this section when you see the curve, it's far too late. The report specifically makes this point. You would have expected one of the myriad Risk Assessments everyone has to do nowadays to have at least picked up on this previously.

Bear in mind it was still dark, down in an unlit cutting (so no other light cues) and raining heavily. The good old railway concept of "knowing your braking points" was all that there was to guard this.

Would be good to know the driver's experience and training. The RAIB was meant to have been advised by the equivalent Air Accident Board. Reports there always start with the exact experience (flying hours, dates of licensing, etc) of the crew. There's nothing on that here.

 

[ainsworth74]

Well it is only an interim report not the final thing. What we've had so far seems to be focusing on mitigation to try and prevent a similar accident rather than getting into the detail of the accident itself. I'd expect a lot more detail on the window issue, for example, in the final report.

 

[neonison]

The Tram structure and fittings did not deform in the impact and passengers inside were mostly unhurt. The failure was the windows (6mm toughened glass with 4mm toughened glass on doors and an anti-vandal coating) which seems to have accounted for nearly 100% of the fatalities/serious injuries.

How many tram rollovers have there been? I'm thinking modern articulated saloons here, not double deck heritage cars and the like.

Would that number of rollovers justify windows strong enough to remain intact in a rollover?

 

[ainsworth74]

Indeed, having now had a look the RAIB do include details on the staff involved in incidents in their full reports:

From the report into the Plymouth collision:

Staff involved

21 The driver of train 2E68 qualified to drive trains for GWR in May 2015. He was based at GWR’s Penzance depot. The driver’s competence assessments were up to date and no concerns about his competence had been identified. His training, experience and actions are discussed further at paragraphs 61 to 85.

22 The signaller involved in the accident had been a signaller at Plymouth signal box for over 30 years. All the signaller’s relevant competence assessments were up to date and no concerns had been identified relevant to the accident.

Derailment at Ealing Broadway:

Staff involved

18 The train operator joined LUL in 2007 and became a train operator in September 2013.

19 The District line service controller who managed the incident had over 40 years’ service with LUL. He became a service controller for the District line in 2006.

20 The District line service controller who was responsible for the rest of the train service during the incident, had been with LUL since 1990 and became a service controller in 2010. He has been a service controller on both the Piccadilly and District lines.

21 The District line service manager joined LUL in 2002, qualified in his current role in December 2014 and began full-time work in the role in July 2015.

22 The Piccadilly line service manager also joined LUL in 2002 and first became a service manager in 2014, transferring to the Piccadilly line in April 2015.

23 The signaller commenced his employment in 2002 and reached level four in 2007. He started working at Earl’s Court in 2013.

24 The station supervisor at Ealing Broadway joined LUL in 2007 and was promoted to station supervisor in 2013. He has been at Ealing Broadway station for two years.

25 The duty signal incident manager has 18 years’ service with LUL and was employed as a duty signal incident manager from 2012, although he had been working at this higher grade for 12 months before he was made permanent in the role.

26 The signal operations manager started his career with LUL in 1980, took on the role of signal operations manager in 2013 and retired in May 2016.

27 All the staff involved had current licences and were up to date in the relevant sections of LUL’s competence management system.

To pick two examples of RAIB reports...

 

[daikilo]

Well it is only an interim report not the final thing. What we've had so far seems to be focusing on mitigation to try and prevent a similar accident rather than getting into the detail of the accident itself. I'd expect a lot more detail on the window issue, for example, in the final report.

I think this interim report leaves little uncovered concerning the cause of the accident. As you say, no doubt the final report will cover any other contributory factors to the overturning, and of course the injuries and deaths that then occured.

Concerning my previous post concerning road signs etc, I was thinking of several specific examples on main roads, but I admit that they are not universal. However, my point was that any one of the elements I gave provide a cue whereas there apparently was nothing on the approach to the curve. Cues are important even where route knowledge is the principle method of controlling speed.

 

[physics34]

think its clear that Light Rail has got to be looked at more as a mainline railway than an "enhanced bus on rails", this includes such things as build quality and safety systems.

Obviously now stronger windows (or even smaller windows) need to be considered, or railings or some kind of preventative measure such as bars across the windows to prevent ejection.

Also the more open plan of designs of the modern era mean that standing passengers will be violently thrown about in accidents of this nature.

Iam still shocked that a TPWS derivative has not been quickly developed or even talked about in depth yet for the tram system.

 

[rebmcr]

Cues are important even where route knowledge is the principal method of controlling speed.

My considered opinion is that this is the single biggest factor of the whole situation, by quite some way.

TPWS-like systems and reinforced bodysides are very relevant and with merit, but they are secondary mitigation measures; they do not address the root cause.

 

[Chris M]

How many tram rollovers have there been? I'm thinking modern articulated saloons here, not double deck heritage cars and the like.

Would that number of rollovers justify windows strong enough to remain intact in a rollover?

In the UK, there has been exactly 1 rollover of a modern articulated tram - this incident in Croydon.

I've spent the best part of an hour searching for others, and I can't find any other rollover accidents on tramways since 1954 in Zagreb (photo of the type of tram I think involved) and 1955 in Wellington, New Zealand.
There were "tram" accidents involving vehicles overturning at Kao Suan Kwang Zoo, Thailand in 2015 and Kartchner Caverns, Arizona, USA in 2016, however both of these actually involved open-sided road vehicles.

I would expect the RAIB to mention any similar accidents in their final report.

 

[Busaholic]

The insurers for both TfL and the tram company have written to solicitors representing at least two of the injured passengers to admit liability for the accident, which should save litigation and some stress. The driver remains on police bail until May.

 

[Class455]

Has the tram involved, 2551 been formally written off yet?

 

[BestWestern]

Has the tram involved, 2551 been formally written off yet?

I wouldn't imagine the insurers have been anywhere near it yet. It'll presumably sit in a warehouse somewhere until all investigations are fully complete? Particularly as the internal CCTV wasn't functioning, and so everything is having to be established by painstaking estimation and reconstruction.

 

[Class455]

I wouldn't imagine the insurers have been anywhere near it yet. It'll presumably sit in a warehouse somewhere until all investigations are fully complete? Particularly as the internal CCTV wasn't functioning, and so everything is having to be established by painstaking estimation and reconstruction.

I heard it was moved to a RAIB location in Farnborough after the crash.

 

[littlerock]

In the UK, there has been exactly 1 rollover of a modern articulated tram - this incident in Croydon.

I've spent the best part of an hour searching for others, and I can't find any other rollover accidents on tramways since 1954 in Zagreb (photo of the type of tram I think involved) and 1955 in Wellington, New Zealand.
There were "tram" accidents involving vehicles overturning at Kao Suan Kwang Zoo, Thailand in 2015 and Kartchner Caverns, Arizona, USA in 2016, however both of these actually involved open-sided road vehicles.

I would expect the RAIB to mention any similar accidents in their final report.

Asking if there have been other similar tram accidents needs to be more specific for comparison purposes. Where have there been similar tram accidents, in similar vehicles, built and run under similar regulations in similar conditions i.e. run in part over over former railway tracks and cuttings but built and run subject to bus not train regulations, like the Croydon tram. It may be that the unique circumstances of the Croydon tram require unique build and running conditions.

 

[Clip]

I have noticed they have put up big reflective arrows on both sides of the curves now to show the sharp curve.

 

[littlerock]

As a matter of interest do we know, was the CCTV turned off or broken?

 

[edwin_m]

Asking if there have been other similar tram accidents needs to be more specific for comparison purposes. Where have there been similar tram accidents, in similar vehicles, built and run under similar regulations in similar conditions i.e. run in part over over former railway tracks and cuttings but built and run subject to bus not train regulations, like the Croydon tram. It may be that the unique circumstances of the Croydon tram require unique build and running conditions.

If there have been no overturning accidents for many years on any tramway (and I'm certainly not aware of any in recent decades), then it follows there have been none on a Croydon-like tramway.

The operation at Croydon is very similar to large parts of Manchester Metrolink, Midland Metro and Nottingham Express Transit, and quite similar to large parts of Sheffield Supertram and the Edinburgh tram route. So there is a reasonable precedent in the UK for this kind of operation, although one emerging conclusion is that some of the other networks have been better than Croydon at providing signs to alert the driver of imminent severe reductions in speed.

Applying a cost per fatality avoided of approximately £1.5m as used in the UK road and rail industries, a spend of maybe £10-15m would be justifiable to eliminate the possibility of similar accidents on all these off-street tramways over the next 20 years or so. That won't buy a TPWS or similar heavy rail system, but it might buy something that uses GPS to monitor speed and location and applies the brakes if going too fast in the wrong place.

 

[Chris M]

How many tram rollovers have there been? I'm thinking modern articulated saloons here, not double deck heritage cars and the like.

In the UK, there has been exactly 1 rollover of a modern articulated tram - this incident in Croydon.

I've spent the best part of an hour searching for others, and I can't find any other rollover accidents on tramways since 1954 in Zagreb (photo of the type of tram I think involved) and 1955 in Wellington, New Zealand.
There were "tram" accidents involving vehicles overturning at Kao Suan Kwang Zoo, Thailand in 2015 and Kartchner Caverns, Arizona, USA in 2016, however both of these actually involved open-sided road vehicles.

I would expect the RAIB to mention any similar accidents in their final report.

Asking if there have been other similar tram accidents needs to be more specific for comparison purposes. Where have there been similar tram accidents, in similar vehicles, built and run under similar regulations in similar conditions i.e. run in part over over former railway tracks and cuttings but built and run subject to bus not train regulations, like the Croydon tram. It may be that the unique circumstances of the Croydon tram require unique build and running conditions.

As best I am able to tell, this is the only rollover incident of any modern tram vehicle. And possibly the first rollover incident on any tramway anywhere in the world (certainly the English-speaking world) since the early 1980s.

In December 2015 a tram derailed in Vienna apparently due to excessive speed on a curve (circa 30km/h for a 15km/h restriction). This occurred on an on-street section and the tram did not overturn so it is not really that similar.

In May 2016 a light rail vehicle in Salt Lake City derailed due to excessive speed on a curve (37mph on a 15mph curve). This occurred on an off-street section in a built-up area but not in a cutting (the land appears to be essentially flat). The curve is a short distance after a stop and the tram did not roll over, so again not really comparable.

12 years ago today, 16 March 2005, a 20-year-old tram derailed in Prague due to excessive speed on a curve. This occurred on an on-street section and did not involve a roll-over. The first of the two non-articulated cars remained on the tracks but the rear vehicle swung out and killed 2 people waiting on the opposite direction platform. There is a video of this incident on YouTube (I wont link it as I don't recall this forum's policy about videos of fatal accidents, but it's not hard to find).

There was a tram accident in Prague in 1982 that killed 7 people, but I can't find any detailed information on it in English (Google translation of Czech Wikipedia article). A 1950s-built T1 tram derailed at an on-street turnout. The driver was travelling at excessive speed (40-45km/h rather than circa 15km/h) and didn't notice the points set to the left rather than the expected straight ahead. The tram overturned after derailing and slid along the road, impacting lamposts and at least one car. Those killed were mainly ejected through the rear door and presumably crushed beneath the tram.
This latter point is the only real way in which the accident seems similar to the circumstances in Croydon.

 

[Taunton]

And possibly the first rollover incident on any tramway anywhere in the world (certainly the English-speaking world) since the early 1980s.

Less than a year ago a Snaefell Mountain tram ran away on the steep gradient and was reduced to matchwood after cartwheeling down the mountainside.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-isle-of-man-35934041

I think they speak English in the Isle of Man.

 

[edwin_m]

Less than a year ago a Snaefell Mountain tram ran away on the steep gradient and was reduced to matchwood after cartwheeling down the mountainside.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-isle-of-man-35934041

I think they speak English in the Isle of Man.

True but not really comparable with Croydon. It appears to have rolled away with nobody on board, rather than overspeeding when under the control of a driver, so it's unlikely that any of the measures suggested for Croydon would have prevented it.

 

[Chris M]

Less than a year ago a Snaefell Mountain tram ran away on the steep gradient and was reduced to matchwood after cartwheeling down the mountainside.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-isle-of-man-35934041

I think they speak English in the Isle of Man.

True but not really comparable with Croydon. It appears to have rolled away with nobody on board, rather than overspeeding when under the control of a driver, so it's unlikely that any of the measures suggested for Croydon would have prevented it.

The Snaefell Mountain Tram is a rural fell incline railway, Croydon is a partially-segregrated urban tramway and so they are not comparable at all.
The vehicle involved in the IoM incident was a 121-year old single car of wooden construction, and other than being an electrically-powered wheeled-vehicle with seats and windows transporting paying passengers on rails shares almost no characteristics with then 16-year-old aluminium articulated low-floor vehicle involved in Croydon. The consequences of either vehicle being involved in the very different type of accident the other had (very unlikely) would be very significantly different, further reducing the utility of the comparison.

 

[Taunton]

And here's another overturning in the Isle of Man, 18 months ago.

http://www.manxradio.com/news/isle-of-man-news/tram-derails-at-laxey/

A Manx Electric Railway tram has derailed at Laxey this morning.

Trailer 58 came fell onto its side in the incident, which happened around 10am.

No passengers were on the tram at the time and there are no reports of any injuries.

The MER says services between Laxey and Ramsey are currently suspended but services between Douglas and Laxey and the Snaefell Mountain Railway are running as normal.

A futher statement from the operators is expected around 1pm.

and that one does look more like the Croydon situation.

 

[AlterEgo]

And here's another overturning in the Isle of Man, 18 months ago.

http://www.manxradio.com/news/isle-of-man-news/tram-derails-at-laxey/

and that one does look more like the Croydon situation.

To be fair, that's not a modern tram vehicle, so I'm not sure the build standards will be comparable.

 

[Chris M]

And here's another overturning in the Isle of Man, 18 months ago.

http://www.manxradio.com/news/isle-of-man-news/tram-derails-at-laxey/

and that one does look more like the Croydon situation.

More similar yes, but still not very similar -
The car that derailed is a trailer which dates from 1904
It was being propelled during a low-speed shunting movement
It derailed at points (source) in the vicinity of a station.

I'll grant you though that it is a tramcar overturning more recently than the 1980s. I'm not sure quite why I didn't find that during any of my searches though - the BBC report should have hit at least one of my search terms.

 

[WatcherZero]

As a matter of interest do we know, was the CCTV turned off or broken?

Broken, status said it was recording but it hadn't recorded anything for a couple of weeks.

 

[randyrippley]

And here's another overturning in the Isle of Man, 18 months ago.

http://www.manxradio.com/news/isle-of-man-news/tram-derails-at-laxey/

and that one does look more like the Croydon situation.

No it doesn't. The Manx vehicle which has derailed there is the trailer, not the lead power vehicle, and its derailed over a set of points while being shunted backwards.

 

[D365]

Has this article been posted here yet?

TfL admits liability over Croydon tram crash

Transport for London (TfL) has today begun admitting liability for its part in the Croydon tram crash of 9 November 2016, in relation to compensation claims from families of the victims of the crash.

The tram was found to be travelling at over three times the speed limit when it derailed going around a bend, killing seven people and injuring 51.
Now, legal claims being made by victims of the families are moving forward against TfL and Tram Operation Ltd, a subsidiary of FirstGroup, which run the tram network.

In a letter seen by the Press Association from the law firm handling the case of Mark Smith, one of the victims, insurers for TfL and Tram Operation said the letter was an “admission of liability for the purposes of your client’s civil claim”.

This news follows the revelation by the RAIB in an interim report last month that the driver of the tram had “lost awareness” when the accident happened and had actually been travelling at 46mph, which is even faster than the speed of 43.5mph that investigators originally thought the train was moving at.

Regarding the comments made by a well-known regular 'reader' of the website, I can't comprehend the sheer callousness of the remarks that he is coming up with.

 

[littlerock]

Why is TfL legally liable as well as the tram operating company? In what way are they legally liable for accidents like this?

Still many questions. Regarding what changes should be made in the interim - until the inquiry reports - all that seems to have happened so far is speed restrictions and better signing of speed restrictions. How will this help if a driver has a stroke or falls asleep at the wheel? It is clear the driver lost awareness or consciousness at a point on the line where the gradient and bend meant that the train was going too fast for any automatic speed regulator or braking system to cut in in time to slow it stop the train until it was too late.

Was the window design or construction faulty - glass inadequate or flexed out on impact say, and would changing that make a difference?

Would it help to change tram regulations so that they are more like those for trains and not the same as those for buses as appears to be the case at present? Why did example do coaches overturning on motorways, of which we do have recent examples, not have the same fatalities as the Croydon tram?

 

[BestWestern]

Has this article been posted here yet?



Regarding the comments made by a well-known regular 'reader' of the website, I can't comprehend the sheer callousness of the remarks that he is coming up with.

Wow. That guy needs some sort of therapy doesn't he?!

 

[edwin_m]

Why is TfL legally liable as well as the tram operating company? In what way are they legally liable for accidents like this?

Still many questions. Regarding what changes should be made in the interim - until the inquiry reports - all that seems to have happened so far is speed restrictions and better signing of speed restrictions. How will this help if a driver has a stroke or falls asleep at the wheel? It is clear the driver lost awareness or consciousness at a point on the line where the gradient and bend meant that the train was going too fast for any automatic speed regulator or braking system to cut in in time to slow it stop the train until it was too late.

Was the window design or construction faulty - glass inadequate or flexed out on impact say, and would changing that make a difference?

Would it help to change tram regulations so that they are more like those for trains and not the same as those for buses as appears to be the case at present? Why did example do coaches overturning on motorways, of which we do have recent examples, not have the same fatalities as the Croydon tram?

TfL owns the infrastructure. First are merely operating it under contract. I'm not a lawyer but I imagine this means that either party could have liability depending on the exact cause, which have not yet been established.

The RAIB and any other investigations will no doubt be looking at questions including the driver's mental state and the strength of the windows, so we just don't know the answers to these at present.

Despite this lack of knowledge, upgrading the signage to the same standards used on other tramways looks like a reasonably practicable measure to address the risk. Driver incapacitation is already addressed by the "deadman" on the traction controller, which applies the brakes if the driver doesn't hold it down. Anything more sophisticated such as a vigilance or speed monitoring system would be a major undertaking, and even if someone decided to fit it now the RAIB report would probably be out before it was completed. If and when the report establishes the driver's exact state, it will be a question of how much mitigation is appropriate given that lack of similar accidents in the past suggests they will continue to be unlikely in the future.

 

[rebmcr]

Wow. That guy needs some sort of therapy doesn't he?!

Yeah he seems to be a total nutcase.