ECML Disruption 02/11 - Huntingdon / Edinburgh

[snookertam]

Edinburgh issues apparently caused by a power surge from the electricity grid.

 

[Deepgreen]

Haven't seen a thread on this yet so apologies if there is one, there is currently a major ongoing power failure around Edinburgh, all the signals for quite some distance in all directions are blocked, not sure on what the exact nature of it is or what exactly is broken, I know someone who was offloaded at Linlithgow.

https://twitter.com/NetworkRailSCOT/status/1720121547132637233

View attachment 145863
Above image shows current state of the signals on Traksy with all signals at red. https://traksy.uk/live/M+2+SLATEFD/M+1+EDINBUR+-12

Yet only two trains are shown as being anything other than on time (i.e. green headcodes)!

Regarding Edinburgh, a 'big fuse' has blown which is affecting a wide area beyond Edinburgh Waverley.

That'll be the million amp one at the castle!

 

[Banham7]

With 91107 being stabled overnight, it's been allocated a service to Edinburgh (1S28) and Craigentinny Depot (5S28), which obviously won't be happening. https://www.realtimetrains.co.uk/service/gb-nr:G23585/2023-11-03/detailed#allox_id=0

 

[thejuggler]

The LNER service I was booked on is cancelled. Ironically the connecting service was also delayed so I may have missed it anyway.

 

[Twingo37175]

With 91107 being stabled overnight, it's been allocated a service to Edinburgh (1S28) and Craigentinny Depot (5S28), which obviously won't be happening. https://www.realtimetrains.co.uk/service/gb-nr:G23585/2023-11-03/detailed#allox_id=0

That will be from being allocated as the following (from what do they know)



I assume it will do the Leeds run and then be set swapped prior to the 18:00 given Newcastle and Edinburgh don't sign the 91's

Editing to add, looks like 09:45 cancelled (91 back to NL after a night in the capital?)

 

[malc-c]

I have no connection with the industry, but are these sort of issues a result of having one large central signalling centre that covers nearly all the signalling on the ECML, or would the same issues happen when they had three or four boxes between kings cross and Edinburgh. I believe there was a box at Peterborough, and another at Kings Cross, so presume if York or Edinburgh had a failure it would have had less of an impact as trains between London and Peterborough (or however far north it served) would not be affected?

 

[Warrior2852]

Yet only two trains are shown as being anything other than on time (i.e. green headcodes)!

I think Traksy only updates headcode colour when trains actually move signal block, which nothing here was doing.

 

[Jozhua]

I'm travelling from Nottingham to Newcastle today (via Newark).

LNER advised not to travel, but I've already got annual leave and my Sunday return ticket is out of the timescale to be able to push back... It's definitely not a necessary journey, but I can't cancel my plans every time it's a bit windy and rains...

Anyway, train is absolutely packed, but it is the one I was planning to get, so not too worried about that.

I do feel like, barring an apocalyptic event, just telling people not to travel isn't really a serious or useful response. It's not like either of these storms are anything particularly unusual.

 

[bristolian]

I was on 9J47, which left Peterborough on time at 1554. The unit was 700102. It bought down the wires passing Connington, and stopped alongside Woodwalton.
800108 was sent 1Z99 (in diesel mode) from Kings Cross to stop alongside us, whereupon we 'walked the plank' to board the 800.
We then went wrong-line slowly back towards Huntingdon, rescuing passengers from 9J42 too.

On arrival at Huntingdon, passengers for the south were put on rail-replacement buses / coaches, while those for the north were taken by the 800 back to Peterborough.

All staff involved were extremely helpful, the drinks, snacks and hot drinks provided free of charge on the 800 were greatly appreciated.

2Z99 was supposedly created to block the line...

 

[marsker]

I have no connection with the industry, but are these sort of issues a result of having one large central signalling centre that covers nearly all the signalling on the ECML, or would the same issues happen when they had three or four boxes between kings cross and Edinburgh. I believe there was a box at Peterborough, and another at Kings Cross, so presume if York or Edinburgh had a failure it would have had less of an impact as trains between London and Peterborough (or however far north it served) would not be affected?

I've thought fpr a while that, as we move to bigger and better signalling centres, we will get bigger and better signalling failures such as that at Edinburgh yesterday.

 

[D1511]

Whatever was responsible for yesterday's debacle at Edinburgh, the bald facts are that all trains to and from a national capital in this country were at a stand for 5+ hours and the disruption caused by set and staff dislocation across the network was massive. That's simply not good enough I'm afraid.
What does NRs Continuity Plan or Resilience Plan or whatever the hell they call it actually say about events like this? Phone the London guys and wait 5 hours for them to arrive?! That's not acceptable and heads should roll for this.

 

[M&NEJ]

I've thought fpr a while that, as we move to bigger and better signalling centres, we will get bigger and better signalling failures such as that at Edinburgh yesterday.

My thoughts too - it begs the question: shouldn't there be a back-up arrangement? (Sorry, ex-nuclear industry person speaking here!)

 

[43074]

Whatever was responsible for yesterday's debacle at Edinburgh, the bald facts are that all trains to and from a national capital in this country were at a stand for 5+ hours and the disruption caused by set and staff dislocation across the network was massive. That's simply not good enough I'm afraid.
What does NRs Continuity Plan or Resilience Plan or whatever the hell they call it actually say about events like this? Phone the London guys and wait 5 hours for them to arrive?! That's not acceptable and heads should roll for this.

That and today the northbound MML is shut near Market Harborough due to a bank slip. With the events at Peterborough today NR can't manage and maintain its own infrastructure adequately to deliver the business as usual, nevermind having contingency plans for the out of the ordinary.

 

[D1511]

That and today the northbound MML is shut near Market Harborough due to a bank slip. With the events at Peterborough today NR can't manage and maintain its own infrastructure adequately to deliver the business as usual, nevermind having contingency plans for the out of the ordinary.

Fair point, and I suppose it all ultimately comes back to the funding of the industry by central government......or pathetic lack thereof....

 

[800001]

That and today the northbound MML is shut near Market Harborough due to a bank slip. With the events at Peterborough today NR can't manage and maintain its own infrastructure adequately to deliver the business as usual, nevermind having contingency plans for the out of the ordinary.

Midland Mainline has been deteriorating for a while and has been constantly monitored with emergency speed restrictions in place.

Obviously it has deteriorated that bad yesterday/today that it has had to be closed on one line.

The amount of rainfall recently may play a big part in it.

This looks similar to what happened at Morpeth where the ground was literally moving down hill under the railway, NWR had to spend millions stabling the surrounding ground.

 

[nitten_travell]

Whatever was responsible for yesterday's debacle at Edinburgh, the bald facts are that all trains to and from a national capital in this country were at a stand for 5+ hours and the disruption caused by set and staff dislocation across the network was massive. That's simply not good enough I'm afraid.
What does NRs Continuity Plan or Resilience Plan or whatever the hell they call it actually say about events like this? Phone the London guys and wait 5 hours for them to arrive?! That's not acceptable and heads should roll for this.

I'm currently on the 1630 KGX-EDB. The next two are cancelled, as was one of the previous services (the 1500 to Stirling) and also cancelled was the 1530 Euston to Glasgow, (which was my own back up plan), because of problems on the west coast line. Consequently, it's heaving. I don't think matters were helped at all by conflicting information between the display boards and announcements regarding the platform allocation (this is second hand, mind you, I heard people talk about it; I got on early but no thanks to RTT which also displayed wrong information!).

Even worse, suspending reservations (which happens) but then saying "sit anywhere", which is just a recipe for frayed tempers in First (where I am, thankfully, seated) since they're the first carriages passengers come to on the platform- at Kings Cross, a lot of people hop on, sit down and subsequent First ticket holders end up standing if they can't shame the seated person into getting up. "Sit anywhere in the class of travel for your ticket" might have been better. Even so, this seems to have been decided last minute as I was able to reserve a seat on this service earlier this afternoon when LNER must have been fully cognizant of the looming problems.

I'm not sure how there could be a plan C for when both the West and East lines have major issues other than offering fee-free refunds and ticket changes to encourage those with flexible plans not to travel. This is already the case. Perhaps also proactively suspending reservations for every service for the whole day might actually help manage the flow of passengers? Then you're not looking around for a booked/vacant seat. Instead if you see an empty seat on a train going to where you want to go then its yours, you take it and things might just be a bit easier for everyone.

 

[800001]

I'm currently on the 1630 KGX-EDB. The next two are cancelled, as was one of the previous services (the 1500 to Stirling) and also cancelled was the 1530 Euston to Glasgow, (which was my own back up plan), because of problems on the west coast line. Consequently, it's heaving. I don't think matters were helped at all by conflicting information between the display boards and announcements regarding the platform allocation (this is second hand, mind you, I heard people talk about it; I got on early but no thanks to RTT which also displayed wrong information!).

Even worse, suspending reservations (which happens) but then saying "sit anywhere", which is just a recipe for frayed tempers in First (where I am, thankfully, seated) since they're the first carriages passengers come to on the platform- at Kings Cross, a lot of people hop on, sit down and subsequent First ticket holders end up standing if they can't shame the seated person into getting up. "Sit anywhere in the class of travel for your ticket" might have been better. Even so, this seems to have been decided last minute as I was able to reserve a seat on this service earlier this afternoon when LNER must have been fully cognizant of the looming problems.

I'm not sure how there could be a plan C for when both the West and East lines have major issues other than offering fee-free refunds and ticket changes to encourage those with flexible plans not to travel. This is already the case. Perhaps also proactively suspending reservations for every service for the whole day might actually help manage the flow of passengers? Then you're not looking around for a booked/vacant seat. Instead if you see an empty seat on a train going to where you want to go then its yours, you take it and things might just be a bit easier for everyone.

Regards conflicting information regards platforms, station display boards and announcements are linked so should both be the same.

The issue which comes up time and time again is the Trainline App, this displays a platform number for all services hours in advance with a small ‘estimated’ displayed next to it. As Trainline base there platform allocation off the base timetable. People see the estimated platform and believe that’s where they should be, don’t look at platform screens and go with what Trainline are telling them.

 

[nitten_travell]

Regards conflicting information regards platforms, station display boards and announcements are linked so should both be the same.

The issue which comes up time and time again is the Trainline App, this displays a platform number for all services hours in advance with a small ‘estimated’ displayed next to it. As Trainline base there platform allocation off the base timetable. People see the estimated platform and believe that’s where they should be, don’t look at platform screens and go with what Trainline are telling them.

That explains it, as I say, it's second hand info as I was already on board, just what I overheard from different conversations.

As it happens I am on my way back from Cologne, where they are so confident at Cologne Hauptbahnhof about which platform will be used that there are paper posters on each platform with an indication of where to stand for each carriage. Can't ever imagine that happening here. The flip side is that on my inbound journey on Tuesday three of the Brussels-Frankfurt ICE trains had been cancelled so DBahn isn't the model of efficiency we might imagine it is.

 

[800001]

That explains it, as I say, it's second hand info as I was already on board, just what I overheard from different conversations.

As it happens I am on my way back from Cologne, where they are so confident at Cologne Hauptbahnhof about which platform will be used that there are paper posters on each platform with an indication of where to stand for each carriage. Can't ever imagine that happening here. The flip side is that on my inbound journey on Tuesday three of the Brussels-Frankfurt ICE trains had been cancelled so DBahn isn't the model of efficiency we might imagine it is.

Yeah I’ve noticed those posters in Germany, Belgium and Austria.

Using the DB app it also shows platforms days in advance, but you get an app notification if it changes.

 

[Falcon1200]

My thoughts too - it begs the question: shouldn't there be a back-up arrangement?

There are back-up arrangements for power failures, ie loss of incoming supply; Generators or, less commonly, from the overhead line system. Plus batteries to ensure an uninterrupted supply to the signalling, thus preventing (for example) signals returning to danger in the face of Drivers when the mains supply initially fails. However last night appears to have been a massive power surge, rather than loss of supply, resulting in a catastrophic signalling failure, beyond anything I ever experienced during my time on the railway.

Whether this could have been prevented, and why it took so long to recover the signalling, is something NR will have to address and answer.

 

[Stampy]

I would have thought they'd keep Peterborough PSB "serviceable" (for a better word) - as it's due to be slap bang in the middle of 3 ROC's...

It's now controlled North/South by York ROC, to the North East by Lincoln SCC (or has that gone into York??)
West will eventually go into the EMCC ROC at Derby
East will eventually go into the Anglia area ROC (Colchester or Romford??)

Unless I've got it totally wrong.......

 

[68000]

Edinburgh SC (Ops floor and equipment room) is backed up with the incoming supply feeding a UPS and separately a stand by generator. The design philosophy is that all the critical equipment in the SC is fed from both the UPS backed supply and the generator backed supply. The issue last night is not likely to be connected to the power surge or blip into the signalling centre but more likely a power surge affecting the trackside signalling equipment which somehow affected the interlockings in the SC. These interlockings are connected to the signaller control system and the control system fails safe if it cannot get integrity from the interlockings. That is why the control system would not allow signallers to control the railway. The interlockings affected were the SSI ones in Waverley and Haymarket.

 

[zwk500]

There are back-up arrangements for power failures, ie loss of incoming supply; Generators or, less commonly, from the overhead line system. Plus batteries to ensure an uninterrupted supply to the signalling, thus preventing (for example) signals returning to danger in the face of Drivers when the mains supply initially fails. However last night appears to have been a massive power surge, rather than loss of supply, resulting in a catastrophic signalling failure, beyond anything I ever experienced during my time on the railway.

Whether this could have been prevented, and why it took so long to recover the signalling, is something NR will have to address and answer.

Are there any similarities to the East Croydon incident some years ago that took out Windmill Bridge Jn?

 

[Deepgreen]

I'm travelling from Nottingham to Newcastle today (via Newark).

LNER advised not to travel, but I've already got annual leave and my Sunday return ticket is out of the timescale to be able to push back... It's definitely not a necessary journey, but I can't cancel my plans every time it's a bit windy and rains...

Anyway, train is absolutely packed, but it is the one I was planning to get, so not too worried about that.

I do feel like, barring an apocalyptic event, just telling people not to travel isn't really a serious or useful response. It's not like either of these storms are anything particularly unusual.

The railway is becoming more and more fragile as technology makes trains ever more delicate, and railway and non-railway infrastructure which should be robust appears not to be. As a crude comparison, in the steam age, mechanical signalling was more or less immune to the weather and trains which did not rely on any external power source (and which were simple to operate and repair) pushed through almost anything, but that resilience to external factors has steadily ebbed away. On top of all that, there is now the corporate risk-aversion that sees whole routes closed as a precaution against possible severe weather, whether that materialises or not. The net effect is a railway that now probably has the lowest resilience in its history.

 

[samrammstein]

The railway is becoming more and more fragile as technology makes trains ever more delicate, and railway and non-railway infrastructure which should be robust appears not to be. As a crude comparison, in the steam age, mechanical signalling was more or less immune to the weather and trains which did not rely on any external power source (and which were simple to operate and repair) pushed through almost anything, but that resilience to external factors has steadily ebbed away. On top of all that, there is now the corporate risk-aversion that sees whole routes closed as a precaution against possible severe weather, whether that materialises or not. The net effect is a railway that now probably has the lowest resilience in its history.

And also a railway where a lot less people are being killed every year by trains running into the back of eachother.

 

[Dr Hoo]

Whatever was responsible for yesterday's debacle at Edinburgh, the bald facts are that all trains to and from a national capital in this country were at a stand for 5+ hours and the disruption caused by set and staff dislocation across the network was massive. That's simply not good enough I'm afraid.
What does NRs Continuity Plan or Resilience Plan or whatever the hell they call it actually say about events like this? Phone the London guys and wait 5 hours for them to arrive?! That's not acceptable and heads should roll for this.

That and today the northbound MML is shut near Market Harborough due to a bank slip. With the events at Peterborough today NR can't manage and maintain its own infrastructure adequately to deliver the business as usual, nevermind having contingency plans for the out of the ordinary.

Fair point, and I suppose it all ultimately comes back to the funding of the industry by central government......or pathetic lack thereof....

So far as Network Rail in Scotland is concerned, funding comes from the Scottish Government/Transport Scotland as set out in the Statement of Funds Available (SOFA) for Control Period 6 (CP6). Looking at the ORR's Final Determination for Scotland in the Periodic Review 2018 (PR18) it looks as though funding for Maintenance and Renewal in Scotland was actually increased materially (at a consistent price base) over CP5.

I realise that there have been some 'lumpies' - most obviously the Carstairs re-modelling and the response to Carmont in terms of earthworks and drainage rather than signalling - but has there really been a 'pathetic lack' of funding in Scotland?

 

[bramling]

My thoughts too - it begs the question: shouldn't there be a back-up arrangement? (Sorry, ex-nuclear industry person speaking here!)

The problem with back-up arrangements, is that even if you have a superb alternative facility somewhere, how do you staff it when it actually comes to needing to be used?

By the time you get staff to the fallback location, it’s highly likely everything will have gone to chaos, and in most cases the original problem will be well on the way to being fixed by that point.

That said, there’s certainly more to go wrong nowadays.

 

[jon0844]

I would hope that in the nuclear industry there are many back-up arrangements, but I am pretty sure that the railway is not going to get sufficient funding to have lots of spare trains, drivers, buses and other things to operate plan Bs, Cs, and Ds in the event of a major incident.

It does seem like we've had a lot more code black Do Not Travel incidents where people are basically told that's, get your money back or travel tomorrow, but perhaps that's also down to the severity of weather fronts in recent years and the possibility of more to come.. and a need to be realistic as to what can be done in such circumstances - especially if roads are also going to be impacted.

Frankly, unless the Government wants to invest more heavily in rail and for things that people will consider a waste of money for the majority of the time there are no incidents, we are going to just have to accept this sort of thing is going to keep happening.

 

[Falcon1200]

Are there any similarities to the East Croydon incident some years ago that took out Windmill Bridge Jn?

Unfortunately I don't know enough about either incident, hopefully further information about Edinburgh will come to light in due course, although @68000 has provided some excellent detail.

 

[jagardner1984]

Isn’t the heart of this the ongoing removal of backup and isolation systems and locations ? For example Glasgow is in some ways luckier in there being 2 major unconnected terminus stations, so when there is a failure at one there is the possibility of going somewhere from another. Much discussion in this thread of the various options for northbound travellers from other London termini.

However, as “Joe Public” it is hard to understand why there isn’t the possibility of for example passing control of a single locked section - for example into Edinburgh Park or even Platform 0 at Haymarket - to another control location to allow shuttle working or some form of service resilience (given the interaction with the trams at both of those places).

Obviously the answer is all in one way or another “money” - but as others have said, the language used in the “Do not travel” warnings sometimes seems to suggest lots of holidaymakers who will simply lay down their suitcases and pop back when the railway is ready for them, rather than for the vast majority who find themselves living and working routinely long distances from their home, and who really need a solution as to what they will do that night. Even cities such as Edinburgh cannot possibly absorb all the passengers on all routes from 4.30pm onwards in hotels etc. I wonder whether citylink had resource to double up any of the journeys on the 900 …

It also begs the question when all those nasty dirty diesel trains are removed from the network …. What then for those poor folks at Huntingdon ?