Moreton-on-Lugg verdict: Network Rail fined £450,000

[The Planner]

Signaller fined £1750 and 275 unpaid work according to Sky on Twitter.

http://news.sky.com/story/1076404/network-rail-fined-over-level-crossing-death

Network Rail Fined Over Level Crossing Death

Network Rail has been fined £450,000 after a "devoted" mother of one died when the car she was in was hit by a train at a level crossing.

The firm was found guilty of health and safety breaches over the "entirely preventable" death in the village of Moreton-on-Lugg, Herefordshire.

A judge also fined one of the firm's signalmen, Adrian Maund, for his part in the death of Jane Harding in January 2010.

Network Rail failed to ensure the safety of non-employees at the crossing by choosing not to install an automatic barrier locking system.

A trial at Birmingham Crown Court heard such a device would have detected the oncoming train and kept the crossing's barriers down.

Car passenger Mrs Harding, 52, died in the collision which happened just seconds after the barriers were raised by Maund who mistakenly thought the train had already passed.

Mrs Harding's husband Mark, who was at the wheel, suffered serious injuries.

 

[jnjkerbin]

I don't see how a hefty fine and unpaid work is relevant for someone who made a mistake. £450000 for NR sounds reasonable though.

 

[william]

A pretty hefty mistake.

 

[A-driver]

A pretty hefty mistake.

Indeed, but as the report showed, there was a lot more to this than just a mistake.

Sadly companies don't learn from these kind of things and signallers workloads won't be reduced as a result-that would cost far too much money.

 

[fsmr]

LCs have saddly been in the news all to frequently , this time the blame is firmly with NWR and of course the member of staff unfortunately caught in this tragic case which might go on to make the case for approach locking the norm.



http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-hereford-worcester-22090735

Network Rail and one of its signalmen have been fined for failing to ensure the safety of a woman killed when a train hit a car at a level crossing.

Jane Harding, 52, died when the car she was in was struck at Moreton-on-Lugg, Herefordshire, in January 2010.

Birmingham Crown Court heard Adrian Maund, 43, from Caswell Crescent, Leominster, had raised safety barriers shortly before the crash.

He was fined £1,750, while Network Rail was given a £450,000 fine.

Maund was also ordered to complete 275 hours of unpaid work.

Both were found guilty of health and safety regulations following a two-week trial in February.

During the trial, the jury was told Network Rail had failed to install an automatic barrier locking system at the site, when improvements were made in 2009, due to it costing an extra £40,000.

Prosecutors said Maund had raised the barriers after mistakenly thinking the Manchester Piccadilly to Milford Haven passenger service had already passed.

Phillip Mott QC told the court that he had been distracted after a farmer rang the signal box for a second time asking if it was safe to walk his sheep over another crossing further up the track.

'Safety top priority'

Mrs Harding's husband Mark, who was driving the car when it was hit by the train, said his life had "changed forever" following her death.

In a statement he said: "If Jane's passing is to have any meaning, it will be that, in future, rail and road users will be placed at the forefront of those in the rail industry whose responsibility it is to ensure the general public's safety at level crossings"

He said safety, rather than cost, should be the top priority when upgrading crossings.

"The cost of any life, as we can testify, is incalculable," he said.

Ms Harding died in hospital, while her husband suffered pelvic and shoulder injuries in the crash.

The Arriva Trains Wales service also hit another car being driven in the opposite direction, although the two passengers escaped with minor injuries.

Network Rail was also ordered to pay £33,000 towards prosecution costs, while Maund was told to pay £750.

 

[Tomnick]

We've recently had approach locking (in a fashion) fitted - so I think that particular message has been driven home!

 

[Ivo]

We've recently had approach locking (in a fashion) fitted - so I think that particular message has been driven home!

Sorry to have to ask this, but what exactly is approach locking?

 

[DarloRich]

does it not mean that you cant raise the barriers if the signal is cleared?

 

[David]

Sorry to have to ask this, but what exactly is approach locking?

In layman's terms, it's basically while the signal can be reset to red, the route will not cancel straight away if there is a train within a certain distance. This will also stop barriers at level crossings being raised too early.

Tomnick (or others) will be able to explain it in more detail.

 

[Tomnick]

No problem, it's a fair question! In relatively simple terms, it 'holds' the route beyond a signal for a predetermined period of time if the signal is replaced to Danger before a train passes it - the idea being that it gives any approaching train time to either stop short of the signal or, if unable to do that, pass the signal and hold the route directly by occupying subsequent track circuits. There are plenty of variations on that - ours starts timing (about seven minutes) when you clear the signal (or attempt to), and only locks the barrier control lever and not the points in the route.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

does it not mean that you cant raise the barriers if the signal is cleared?

That's the 'conventional' (for want of a better word!) between signals and points, LXs etc., whereas approach locking is an additional control to stop you doing silly things after you've put back in front of a train (either in an emergency or in error!)

 

[DarloRich]

That's the 'conventional' (for want of a better word!) between signals and points, LXs etc., whereas approach locking is an additional control to stop you doing silly things after you've put back in front of a train (either in an emergency or in error!)

Thanks - i am not a signalling expert so appreciate the information!

 

[Tomnick]

That's ok - personally, I greatly appreciate folk taking the time to ask meaningful questions (so, hopefully, everyone learns something...mutual improvement!), rather than spouting uninformed gibber as seems to increasingly be the case - so fair play to you both .

 

[fsmr]

That's ok - personally, I greatly appreciate folk taking the time to ask meaningful questions (so, hopefully, everyone learns something...mutual improvement!), rather than spouting uninformed gibber as seems to increasingly be the case - so fair play to you both .

Always good to hear from the coal face Tom

(Apologies for my earlier post, which has been merged into this, I looked to see if the news had already been posted but obviously not hard enough as it was some way down the list by planner)

BTW off topic but at my father in laws funeral in 2006, as we approached Oakham Brooke rd LC with the cortège leaving from his house next to the LC, the sequence started after the hearse had gone over, however the signaller at Oakham must have seen on the CCTV and realised as he then raised the barriers and held the signal until all the cortege of cars had gone over before then lowering the LC again
Never made anything of it at the time for obvious reasons but it was appreciated by all, Father in Law having the last laugh , and he got a 3 harrier flypast as the coffin came out of Oakham Church, again unplanned but being ex RAF appreciated

 

[Tomnick]

Indeed, I don't think many of us could bring ourselves to drop the barriers in the middle of a funeral procession. Generally, I try to wait until any approaching traffic has passed clear of the crossing, but that's not really practical at Oakham LC as it's so busy, nor at Brooke Road where you can't see the approaches on the CCTV - it's not always practical, especially given the short sections between Oakham and Whissendine which can make timings a bit tight, but it does help keep everyone happy and hopefully reduces the temptation to try it on.

 

[Darren R]

This really was a trully tragic case for all concerned, and one that should really not have happened given that the technology to prevent the signaller from making his fatal mistake has been around for so long. At least the judge seems to have apportioned blame accordingly in sentencing.

As a mere rail user and enthusiast I was genuinely shocked to discover that in the 21st Century such an incident could occur: if I had given the matter any consideration I would have assumed that interlocking between signals and barriers at locally controlled crossings such as this had been fitted as standard for decades. I seem to recall reading that it was estimated there are about 50 locations around the network where interlocking is not provided - which leads me to ask two questions:
1: is this being addressed with the urgency it should be, and;
2: are the signallers working these locations aware that the possibility of making a similar mistake exists?

 

[AndyPJG]

.... if I had given the matter any consideration I would have assumed that interlocking between signals and barriers at locally controlled crossings such as this had been fitted as standard for decades....

Interlocking between the protecting signal and the barriers was provided, it was the absence of approach locking to the signal that allowed him to be able to put the signal back in front of the approaching train and then raise the barriers.

 

[TDK]

As NR have been fined for this where does the money go to?

 

[455driver]

To the Courts, and so back to Government (who pay a subsidy to NR).

Justice has been seen to be done, that is the important bit.

 

[Bedpan]

Interlocking between the protecting signal and the barriers was provided, it was the absence of approach locking to the signal that allowed him to be able to put the signal back in front of the approaching train and then raise the barriers.

I thought (but I may be wrong) was that what had happened was that the signal prior to the crossing was some way before it - the train had passed the signal and so the signal had reverted to red and so the interlocking was released. The signalman had been distracted by a phone call and had assumed that the train had gone by and so raised the barriers, when in fact it had not, it was still between the signal and the crossing. The barrier was therefore raised just as the train got to the crossing, and the car pulled away into its path.

Whatever the emotive issues, we all make mistakes from time to time and some of those mistakes could have had disastrous consequences if circumstances were different, so I can't help thinking feeling sorry for the signalman. A fine and iunpaid work is nothing compared to the knowledge that you did something which cost somebody their life.

 

[Tomnick]

No. The signal wasn't very far in rear of the crossing, and was replaced to Danger whilst the train was still approaching it - too fast to stop before passing the signal at Danger and running over the (now open) crossing.

 

[185]

I don't see how a hefty fine and unpaid work is relevant for someone who made a mistake. £450000 for NR sounds reasonable though.

I don't see how 5 years is relevant for the Merseyrail guard who made a mistake.

Someone on here not so long ago says there's absolutely no comparison between one incident and the other. Well, sadly I know quite a few people who reckon there is.

 

[Bald Rick]

The signaller in the Moreton case, and Network Rail, were charged under the Health and Safety and Work Act. The guard at Liverpoool was charged with manslaughter.

I'm no barrister but these are quite different in law, have different tests to prove the case, and carry different penalties.

 

[Darren R]

No. The signal wasn't very far in rear of the crossing, and was replaced to Danger whilst the train was still approaching it - too fast to stop before passing the signal at Danger and running over the (now open) crossing.

Ah - I had misunderstood the sequence of events that led to the tragedy. This makes more sense to me now.

 

[fsmr]

The signaller in the Moreton case, and Network Rail, were charged under the Health and Safety and Work Act. The guard at Liverpoool was charged with manslaughter.

I'm no barrister but these are quite different in law, have different tests to prove the case, and carry different penalties.

I suspect if the incident with the guard had been a failure to check the train was clear of passengers rather than deliberately then that may have been brought by the HSE instead.

The guard made a conscious decision during his work to clear the train to leave despite the girl being obviously intoxicated and in a position of danger

The Signalman made a mistake during his work

Had the situation been for instance a remote monitored LC and he cleared the protecting signal with say someone on the LC that had run under the falling barrier and was now trapped, because he didn't want to delay the train and they were subsequently struck and killed, then IMHO it would have been the same situation as the guard and been brought as manslaughter. Note that i am not suggesting that any signalman or crossing keeper would ever do such a thing, just an example. It must be remembered that although signalmen are trained to cope with complex situations and pressure, at the end of the day they are human and just like air traffic controllers or anyone else in critical safety situations, should be provided with the latest technology and aids to prevent serious situations arising as is practical. This has always been the way on the railways since the signalling systems were developed, thus the main focus in this case was on the failings of NWR to prevent the situation from arising as it could be foreseen that clearing the signal and raising the barriers before a train had passed would lead to potential loss of life and could be largely negated by approach locking