Russia invades Ukraine

[najaB]

Trump wants Europe to increase its defence spending a) so that the US can decrease its spending (or redirect it elsewhere, to immigration control) and B) because he wants us to spend it on American arms products.

"Trump wants" is probably more accurately said "Trump's puppet masters want". At this point I'm not convinced he's capable of independent thought.

 

[DarloRich]

the response on social media to the RUssian attack on Chernobyl shows why we are in so much trouble. The lunacy of many posters ( if they are real) is illustrative.

 

[brad465]

the response on social media to the RUssian attack on Chernobyl shows why we are in so much trouble. The lunacy of many posters ( if they are real) is illustrative.

As well as the bold bit, I always remember a key quote from Jonathan Pie regarding social media and politics: "The real world is not on your Facebook feed!"

I can remember not that long ago all the vitriol being vented against the idea of a European army. How much more appealing that concept now looks.

Trump wants Europe to increase its defence spending a) so that the US can decrease its spending (or redirect it elsewhere, to immigration control) and B) because he wants us to spend it on American arms products. But I think we need to make it clear that if he wants Europe to become more self sufficient, that will include becoming more self sufficient in where we get our arms from.

I wonder what the balance of trade is in arms? How many European arms does the US buy? If he wants parity in trade, surely it applies to arms too.

Poland (the biggest NATO spender on defence as a % of GDP) has been using South Korean military tech more of late, so in a sense moving away from US kit is already underway.

 

[AM9]

As well as the bold bit, I always remember a key quote from Jonathan Pie regarding social media and politics: "The real world is not on your Facebook feed!"


Poland (the biggest NATO spender on defence as a % of GDP) has been using South Korean military tech more of late, so in a sense moving away from US kit is already underway.

The issue is the same, South Korean kit still contains US controlled components that can be manipulated within the ITAR regulations.

 

[edwin_m]

If America won't and Europe possibly can't provide a credible deterrent, I'm beginning to think the best way out of this for Ukraine would be for them to get nuclear weapons. They probably have the expertise to do it, and also to deliver a payload well into Russia. In fact I'd be surprised if there wasn't a team somewhere in Ukraine working on them right now.

 

[DarloRich]

As well as the bold bit, I always remember a key quote from Jonathan Pie regarding social media and politics: "The real world is not on your Facebook feed!"

Agreed - but it is too easy to say they are all Musk bots. They aren't. Look at this and other threads. There is a section of society so far into the rabbit hole they cant work out up from down.

If America won't and Europe possibly can't provide a credible deterrent,

Apart from our deterrent of the French Force de dissuasion ? We have enough rockets and warheads to turn several large cities in Russia to glass.

We don't want to be allowing more nations to hold nuclear weapons.

 

[Giugiaro]

Trump wants Europe to increase its defence spending (...) because he wants us to spend it on American arms products.
But I think we need to make it clear that if he wants Europe to become more self sufficient, that will include becoming more self sufficient in where we get our arms from.

That's exactly the concern I brought up at European Defence spending and strategy

If we are to increase our expenditure on defense, we might as well do so within the scope of the European Union and closer NATO and non-NATO members like the UK, Austria, and Switzerland.
If Putin by any chance decides to cause more turmoil beyond Ukraine, we should not expect the US to send any help like the hoards of Liberty ships they sent in WWII.

 

[najaB]

If America won't and Europe possibly can't provide a credible deterrent, I'm beginning to think the best way out of this for Ukraine would be for them to get nuclear weapons. They probably have the expertise to do it, and also to deliver a payload well into Russia. In fact I'd be surprised if there wasn't a team somewhere in Ukraine working on them right now.

It's worth pointing out that at one point Ukraine had the world's third largest stockpile of nuclear weapons, and also the domestically-developed means to deliver them (Russia - technically - still had the triggers, but that would have been trivial for Ukraine to bypass). They gave it all up in return for a guarantee of safety signed by both the USA and FSU.

 

[edwin_m]

Apart from our deterrent of the French Force de dissuasion ? We have enough rockets and warheads to turn several large cities in Russia to glass.

But would we do so, particularly in a hopefully unlikely but credible situation where the UK is run by Farage and France is run by Le Pen?

 

[DarloRich]

But would we do so, particularly in a hopefully unlikely but credible situation where the UK is run by Farage and France is run by Le Pen?

Sir Humphrey: With Trident we could obliterate the whole of Eastern Europe.
Jim Hacker: I don't want to obliterate the whole of Eastern Europe.
Sir Humphrey: It's a deterrent.
Jim Hacker: It's a bluff. I probably wouldn't use it.
Sir Humphrey: Yes, but they don't know that you probably wouldn't.
Jim Hacker: They probably do.
Sir Humphrey: Yes, they probably know that you probably wouldn't. But they can't certainly know.
Jim Hacker: They probably certainly know that I probably wouldn't.
Sir Humphrey: Yes, but even though they probably certainly know that you probably wouldn't, they don't certainly know that, although you probably wouldn't, there is no probability that you certainly would.

The point being you cant take the risk. Putin cant push too us or the French to far because he knows we have the ability to glass St Petersburg. He also cant push to far because he knows that while we probably wont use our deterrent to save, say, Tallin or Vilnius we just might. Of course, the odds change with his mate Trump in Washington giving him whatever he wants!

However, is that gamble worth Novosibirsk or Yekaterinburg?

 

[edwin_m]

The point being you cant take the risk. Putin cant push too us or the French to far because he knows we have the ability to glass St Petersburg. He also cant push to far because he knows that while we probably wont use our deterrent to save, say, Tallin or Vilnius we just might. Of course, the odds change with his mate Trump in Washington giving him whatever he wants!

However, is that gamble worth Novosibirsk or Yekaterinburg?

That also applied in 2014 or 2022 and didn't stop Putin invading.

 

[DarloRich]

That also applied in 2014 or 2022 and didn't stop Putin invading.

But we ( in the West) let it happen. Our response this time was much more robust this time, if still inadequate. That may prevent Putin snapping up the Baltic states - it even made Sweden join NATO.

Trump is the wildcard though.

 

[najaB]

That also applied in 2014 or 2022 and didn't stop Putin invading.

Which NATO state did Russia invade in 2014 or 2022?

 

[AlterEgo]

Russia and the USA are currently appointing teams to carve up Ukraine at the end of this grubby war.

U.S., Russia agree to "begin working on a path" to end Ukraine war, in meeting in Saudi Arabia with no Ukrainians

Senior officials from the U.S. and Russia meet in Saudi Arabia on improving ties and ending the war in Ukraine - but Ukraine isn't invited.

www.cbsnews.com

The Ukrainians are of course not present.

I regret that I was correct a couple of years ago and Great Power politics is back - and Europe is not one of them. A total passenger.

 

[brad465]

In WWIII there will only be one winner...

...Planet Earth.

 

[edwin_m]

Which NATO state did Russia invade in 2014 or 2022?

That's part of the point I'm trying to make. The possibility of nuclear (or any other) Western intervention didn't deter Putin from invading on either of these occasions. As of now the possibility has reduced because America is less likely to step up. I don't believe the NATO nuclear powers are obliged to respond with a nuclear strike even if a NATO member is invaded - the treaty just talks about appropriate response. So for all those reasons Western nuclear deterrence is irrelevant as far as Ukraine is concerned, and not is an overwhelming conventional deterrence realistic (Europe can't and America won't).

So in the current situation it's difficult to see how Ukraine preserves its existence other than by becoming a nuclear state.

 

[brad465]

I can remember not that long ago all the vitriol being vented against the idea of a European army. How much more appealing that concept now looks.

Trump wants Europe to increase its defence spending a) so that the US can decrease its spending (or redirect it elsewhere, to immigration control) and B) because he wants us to spend it on American arms products. But I think we need to make it clear that if he wants Europe to become more self sufficient, that will include becoming more self sufficient in where we get our arms from.

I wonder what the balance of trade is in arms? How many European arms does the US buy? If he wants parity in trade, surely it applies to arms too.

In an update, defence industry markets are very much reacting in favour of European defence manufacturing going up and US defence manufacturing going down. In the last month, and last week especially, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman stocks have crashed while European ones shot up:

x.com

x.com

(Image of the % change in the stocks of different defence companies over the last month, with US companies dropping 9-13% and others increasing 8-34%)

 

[Annetts key]

So for all those reasons Western nuclear deterrence is irrelevant as far as Ukraine is concerned, and not is an overwhelming conventional deterrence realistic (Europe can't and America won't).

The problem was not that nuclear deterrence did not work, more that Putin believed that Russia threatening to use nuclear weapons and him believing western governments to be weak meant that they (western countries) would not help Ukraine with direct military support, let alone use nuclear weapons. Keep in mind that Russian intelligence agencies almost certainly have details of western nuclear protocols.

Now, with regards to N.A.T.O. (well up to when Trump won the election), that's a different matter as far as Putin was concerned.

The situation has changed now though. Russia is not doing very well in Ukraine, their rate of advance has slowed to a craw. Their economy is not doing as well as they say (21% interest rates and a very high level of inflation). And of course Trump is being a chump.

We just don't know what Trump will do. That and what the current U.S. government has said scares the willies out of the European governments.

With regards to can Europe provide an overwhelming conventional deterrence, I would argue that If the European countries got their act together (including the U.K.) and joined up with Ukraine, the answer would be yes. Although it would be a struggle if a war did start in multiple places.

Russia is only making (very slow) progress in Ukraine because they are throwing men and equipment at the front line. This is unsustainable.

Remember, if there was a conflict between Russia and N.A.T.O. air power would have a more significant role. Even without the U.S. air force, Russia would not want to fight a European N.A.T.O. countries joint air force. And it's not about the number of aircraft, rather the number of trained pilots.

It is however clear for all to see (including Putin) that under Trump, the U.S.A. is unreliable. Hence European, N.A.T.O. and other countries that previously relied on American help and support, will now quickly have to work out what to do. And that almost certainly means increasing or further increasing their own military spending and increasing the size of their army, air force and maybe navy.

Plus carefully considering where to buy new military weapons and equipment.

 

[edwin_m]

The problem was not that nuclear deterrence did not work, more that Putin believed that Russia threatening to use nuclear weapons and him believing western governments to be weak meant that they (western countries) would not help Ukraine with direct military support, let alone use nuclear weapons.

That's the more talked about problem, but it works the other way too. Hypothetically Biden could have said before the 2022 invasion that if he happened, he would counter the escalation by all means including deployment of Western forces to Ukraine (realistically probably air power only) or even a nuclear retaliation. If he'd done so then Putin would quite possibly have been deterred.

The situation has changed now though. Russia is not doing very well in Ukraine, their rate of advance has slowed to a craw. Their economy is not doing as well as they say (21% interest rates and a very high level of inflation). And of course Trump is being a chump.

It's probable that both sides were stretching things out until the outcome of the US election because both hoped they might get a better outcome. Which now looks to be the case for Russia.

It wasn't worth trying to get a deal during Bidens's final months - even in the unlikely event that was successful, Trump would quite possibly have torn it up as he did with the Iran deal and various other international agreements.

 

[Cloud Strife]

I regret that I was correct a couple of years ago and Great Power politics is back - and Europe is not one of them. A total passenger.

This could backfire very, very badly on America. There's now plenty of motivation to support European industry with things such as the Saab Gripen, which is more than capable of doing serious damage in any war. American defence industries may also find themselves frozen out of European procurement, especially if Germany under the CDU decides to invest heavily on German defence production to take up the slack from the automotive companies.

If Europe does rearm with European defence contractors, there's every possibility that quite a few members of Congress will be facing difficult questions from their campaign contributors.

With regards to can Europe provide an overwhelming conventional deterrence, I would argue that If the European countries got their act together (including the U.K.) and joined up with Ukraine, the answer would be yes. Although it would be a struggle if a war did start in multiple places.

I would say that Russia has no real means of fighting on multiple fronts. There are some very weak points in Russia's armour that could be taken by a single country alone, e.g. the Grodno Region or Karelia. The danger to me is if Ukraine is forced to accept a peace settlement on the current territorial changes, which would allow Russia to focus on an individual weak point. Narva in Estonia is an obvious one, as well as the Suwałki Gap on the Lithuanian side.

 

[Giugiaro]

Russia and the USA are currently appointing teams to carve up Ukraine at the end of this grubby war.

The Ukrainians are of course not present.

I regret that I was correct a couple of years ago and Great Power politics is back - and Europe is not one of them. A total passenger.

Why is this starting to feel less like the Munich Agreement and more like the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact?

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

Why is this starting to feel less like the Munich Agreement and more like the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact?

Neither ended well!

 

[najaB]

I would say that Russia has no real means of fighting on multiple fronts. There are some very weak points in Russia's armour that could be taken by a single country alone, e.g. the Grodno Region or Karelia.

I'd say that for the next decade or so Russia has no real means of fighting an offensive war on even one front. They've wasted so much in terms of men, machines and money on their three-day takeover of Ukraine that they'll be incapable of conducting an attack on any moderately-armed army of size.

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

I'd say that for the next decade or so Russia has no real means of fighting an offensive war on even one front. They've wasted so much in terms of men, machines and money on their three-day takeover of Ukraine that they'll be incapable of conducting an attack on any moderately-armed army of size.

The Europeans don't seem to share you positive assessment.

 

[najaB]

The Europeans don't seem to share you positive assessment.

We need to prepare for the latter part of that decade.

 

[edwin_m]

I'd say that for the next decade or so Russia has no real means of fighting an offensive war on even one front. They've wasted so much in terms of men, machines and money on their three-day takeover of Ukraine that they'll be incapable of conducting an attack on any moderately-armed army of size.

At present they are still sustaining a campaign in Ukraine, and if that was stopped they would be able to move those forces and conduct a similar-sized campaign elsewhere. They would risk a Ukrainian counter-attack, but that would put Ukraine even more in the wrong in Trump's eyes.

That situation could change if the war continues long enough to deplete Russia's remaining military or economic strength to the extent that they can't continue. But we don't really know how long that period is, and we may not get the chance to find out.

 

[najaB]

At present they are still sustaining a campaign in Ukraine, and if that was stopped they would be able to move those forces and conduct a similar-sized campaign elsewhere. They would risk a Ukrainian counter-attack, but that would put Ukraine even more in the wrong in Trump's eyes.

Sustaining an ongoing war requires significantly fewer men and machines than starting a new conflict.

 

[edwin_m]

Sustaining an ongoing war requires significantly fewer men and machines than starting a new conflict.

Russia has a lot more resources committed now than when they grabbed about 15% of Ukraine in the space of a few days in 2022.

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

Russia has a lot more resources committed now than when they grabbed about 15% of Ukraine in the space of a few days in 2022.

the Wests techie weapons haven't been able to dislodge them though needs boots on the ground and Europeans wont commit to that

 

[Cloud Strife]

I'd say that for the next decade or so Russia has no real means of fighting an offensive war on even one front. They've wasted so much in terms of men, machines and money on their three-day takeover of Ukraine that they'll be incapable of conducting an attack on any moderately-armed army of size.

Indeed, I don't think they have any realistic possibilities, except perhaps some very opportunistic attacks on some areas with a large Russophone population. Places like Narva in Estonia could possibly fall, and they'd probably get away with attacking Georgia again, but they definitely don't have the means to do any real damage now.

That situation could change if the war continues long enough to deplete Russia's remaining military or economic strength to the extent that they can't continue. But we don't really know how long that period is, and we may not get the chance to find out.

This is what is so infuriating about Trump. Russia has serious problems, they haven't been able to liberate the part of Kursk under Ukrainian occupation, and despite everything that they've thrown at Ukraine, they've only managed to progress about 35km from the old front lines in Donetsk. They are bleeding heavily, and they have no prospect of making any serious and substantial gains at the moment. With Ukraine producing more and more drones, every forward advance is costing them dearly, and it's obvious that they don't have the training to deal with the threat of drones.

Having said this, my gut feeling right now is that Russia is hoping to seize the whole of Donetsk Oblast before transforming into a defensive force. They know they don't have the ability to overthrow Kyiv, but controlling Donetsk Oblast is definitely possible.