Two trackworkers killed near Port Talbot in South Wales (03/07/19)

[alxndr]

As a signaller I’m totally with you, it’s extremely frustrating to keep having to knock you guys back mainly due to poor planning. Stupidly long sections blocked when you only need a fraction.

I think my "record" was a grand total of an hour over the course of three nights (excluding the days where we just got laughed at because it was never going to happen). Incredibly frustrating for both parties, and we felt awful for having to ring up again and again asking for the impossible. Doesn't do much to help working relations.
Part of the plans to improve things, along with the changes that @GuyGibsonVC has outlined includes improving the planning system to try to make things more feasible, which can only be a good thing. I don't know exactly what form it will take, but surely it's not beyond the wit of man to come up with something similar to a supermarket delivery booking system.

Our workstations are all axle counters, we use EPR as standard on all LBs which will not allow us to signal trains into your block so it’s to protect you guys - well okay it’s to prevent delays in hand back if you drop counters!

Coming from a location that didn’t mandate EPR to one that does really makes you think how risky the former was.

The push to full LB for work is obviously good for safety, but with increased workload on us something has to give we already have limits on how many we can manage.

I really do feel for you guys, we / I really do try and help where I can.

Although EPR is by far the most practical form of additional protection in terms of applying and removing, especially with short margins and limited resources, it doesn't remove the risk of there being a misunderstanding about the area that is being blocked. The other methods of additional protection require some collaboration between the person on the ground and the person in the box (admittedly less so with dets but at least the person on the ground has the reassurance of physically seeing it there). I wonder whether a hierarchy of additional protection should be considered. EPR can also pose some problems when it comes to needing signals cleared within line blockages. It's certainly a step in the right direction, but there are still some issues to iron out.

 

[GuyGibsonVC]

There is work going on on a register that links up with the SSOWP Planning System. This is open to third parties, too, so it should eliminate that times where there are clashes and take some of the heat off the GZAC and the signallers. It is done via Excel spreadsheets at the moment, but hopefully this is a step in the right direction. It also links to Google Maps, Senitel etc.

Lots of things are being looked at due to the ORR instruction, as it did have to change, but there is a lot of frustration. You could plan everything, have everything accepted and then a fault throws out two or three days worth of work. That's before the 'Please explain your backlog' email from higher up. This, implied and perceived pressure, contributes to the 'lets jump on when this one passes' sort of thinking. I would hazard a bet that a fair chunk of track workers still use the level crossing barriers going down as a Safe System of Work as it easier than going through the planning system.

What people have to remember is that we employ railway men and women on the front line, not safety professionals who think of risk. Some have been here 40 years, some, by their own admittance, were/are poorly educated, and to try and change their way of thinking is a very hard task. The tide is turning but it will be a slow process.

 

[Strat-tastic]

There's a lot of jargon going on here which I don't understand.

I'd like to learn here, but it's not easy

 

[DerekC]

There's a lot of jargon going on here which I don't understand.

I'd like to learn here, but it's not easy

I recommend the Network Rail jargon buster:

https://safety.networkrail.co.uk/tools-resources/jargon-buster/

The jargon buster aims to give simple, plain English explanations of typical words and phrases used in the rail industry – to help us all understand what we read or hear day-to-day.
If you’ve heard a word or phrase you don’t know, check to see if it’s on the list below. If it isn’t, please send it in, giving as much context as possible. We will do our best to find out what it means and publish an explanation here.

You can also add terms yourself. If you do, please include the word or phrase itself, plus a short explanation of what it means and when it might be used. Please email suggestions here

There are also terms used on this site as defined in Network Rail’s Infrastructure Projects organisation that maybe of more general use and help you in your understanding.

 

[alxndr]

There's a lot of jargon going on here which I don't understand.

I'd like to learn here, but it's not easy

Apologies if this is aimed at the sidetrack onto line blockage availability and planning. I'll try and decode it for you:

Dets - Detonators. Small explosive discs that get strapped to the top of the rail go BANG when a train crushes them, loud enough for a driver to hear in their cab.

EPR - Engineering Possession Reminder. A signaller's reminder provided for axle counters which allows a reset to be carried out after engineering work, regardless of what has been done to the axle counter while it is applied. Also has the effect of preventing a train being routed into that section.

GZAC - Green Zone Access Coordinator/Controller (seen both ways used). The people who accept or refuse the pre-planned booking of a line blockage, taking into consideration the level of trains and signaller workload.

LB - Line blockage. The blocking of a line, not part of a larger possession and usually in between trains.

LOWS - Lookout Operated Warning System. A system which allows a lookout to warn of approaching trains without relying on horns or flags. Allows the lookout to be positioned further than the available sighting would allow.

TCOD - Track Circuit Operating Device. A strap that can be applied across the rails to operate a track circuit.

SSOWP - Safe System of Work Planning - The system used to produce the paperwork which details the arrangements for accessing the track and carrying out the work. Would include times, location, method of working (e.g. line blocks or lookout) amongst other details.


Additionally, when reading accident reports they include something of a glossary at the back to help explain some of the terms used, which I believe appear in italics the first time they appear.

Nothing to do with that. People fall into the habit of talking like that when talking to others in the same industry (what ever that industry may be).

Exactly this, especially when they're rarely written out or spoken in full. I know it's a rule here, but it's easy to forget when it ends up being more of just another word to you rather than an acronym (akin to PIN in real life).

 

[Strat-tastic]

I recommend the Network Rail jargon buster:

https://safety.networkrail.co.uk/tools-resources/jargon-buster/

Apologies if this is aimed at the sidetrack onto line blockage availability and planning. I'll try and decode it for you:

Dets - Detonators. Small explosive discs that get strapped to the top of the rail go BANG when a train crushes them, loud enough for a driver to hear in their cab.

EPR - Engineering Possession Reminder. A signaller's reminder provided for axle counters which allows a reset to be carried out after engineering work, regardless of what has been done to the axle counter while it is applied. Also has the effect of preventing a train being routed into that section.

GZAC - Green Zone Access Coordinator/Controller (seen both ways used). The people who accept or refuse the pre-planned booking of a line blockage, taking into consideration the level of trains and signaller workload.

LB - Line blockage. The blocking of a line, not part of a larger possession and usually in between trains.

LOWS - Lookout Operated Warning System. A system which allows a lookout to warn of approaching trains without relying on horns or flags. Allows the lookout to be positioned further than the available sighting would allow.

TCOD - Track Circuit Operating Device. A strap that can be applied across the rails to operate a track circuit.

SSOWP - Safe System of Work Planning - The system used to produce the paperwork which details the arrangements for accessing the track and carrying out the work. Would include times, location, method of working (e.g. line blocks or lookout) amongst other details.


Additionally, when reading accident reports they include something of a glossary at the back to help explain some of the terms used, which I believe appear in italics the first time they appear.


Exactly this, especially when they're rarely written out or spoken in full. I know it's a rule here, but it's easy to forget when it ends up being more of just another word to you rather than an acronym (akin to PIN in real life).

Thank you both

 

[trebor79]

Exactly this, especially when they're rarely written out or spoken in full. I know it's a rule here, but it's easy to forget when it ends up being more of just another word to you rather than an acronym (akin to PIN in real life).

Yes this is very normal in industry. I used to work in the sugar industry, and we'd talk about Schenks, DLPs, Eimco, Filtomats, GPs, and loads of other jargon than meant absolutely nothing to anyone outside of the (UK) industry. It was very difficult to remember to communicate in plain language with contractors that came to work on the site.
There was the memorable occasion some contractors were working unsupervised over a weekend. They were instructed to remove "all of the low green pipework" in a particular area. There were horrified faces on Monday morning when they'd done just that - removed all of the green painted pipework that could be reached from floor level, instead of the pipe that carried "low green" which was what the manager instructing them meant and assumed they understood. Problem was the factory was meant to start up in 2 days and they'd completely hacked into lots of very complicated water systems that were critical to its operation.

It's interesting to learn about some of the systems on the railway. Again from my sugar experience, when safety systems become impracticable or unwieldy they tend to get sidestepped in the interst of getting the job done. I guess it's a difficult square to circle with trackwork, as human lookouts are fallible as has been shown time and again, but perhaps better than very good paper systems that sometimes don't work in practice.

 

[Mag_seven]

Just a gentle reminder to keep to the topic under discussion, namely the awful incident at Port Talbot.

If anyone has any concerns that a post has broken the forum rules in any way then please alert the forum staff by using the report function.

Thank you.

 

[YorkshireBear]

There needs to be a serious discussion about access to the railway for engineering.

Saying that's it all needs line block or Possessions is fine. But fatigue of moving most work to nights also has huge safety risks that need to be considered. The closest I've come to serious injury on the railway is definitely driving while fatigued after shifts. Do we need to provide engineers better access if we say no more red zone? Some inspections I do you just wouldn't be able to do at night, you can't pick out earthwork and drainage features properly in the dark.

It's a really hard one this. The report makes for sombre reading and hopefully it will lead to positive change.

 

[Cricketer8for9]

I’ve got a memory of reading about a similar incident in the early 1980s in which track workers were hit by a train in the South or possibly West Yorkshire areas. I’ve looked at the Railway Archive site and not seen anything that looks like this incident so my memory may be failing me. Workers were using power tools and the lookout was supposed to cut power when a train approached. Something went wrong, obviously. Can anyone with a better memory or access to information confirm whether I’m right?

 

[Tom Quinne]

There needs to be a serious discussion about access to the railway for engineering.

Saying that's it all needs line block or Possessions is fine. But fatigue of moving most work to nights also has huge safety risks that need to be considered. The closest I've come to serious injury on the railway is definitely driving while fatigued after shifts. Do we need to provide engineers better access if we say no more red zone? Some inspections I do you just wouldn't be able to do at night, you can't pick out earthwork and drainage features properly in the dark.

It's a really hard one this. The report makes for sombre reading and hopefully it will lead to positive change.

The problem with line blocks there a nightmare to accommodate with increased train services, planning needs to be looked at as well.

Often you’ll get blocks taken over half a dozen signal sections, when the work is taking place in only one. By the time one train has cleared the next is due or you can only give the crew a matter of minutes.

Either there planned to long or just piss poor, blocking limits at one or both ends blocking key points so you have to take the block back to get trains moving, when if a little thought was used limits could be approach or beyond XYZ points.

Another favourite is having blocks booked at 0600 when the service is starting up, when there’s no been any trains for the previous 5 hours!

 

[Stuart-h]

I don't wish to speculate, but would the workers have felt vibrations in the tracks? Whenever I am near a railway line I can hear the distinctive sound of ringing, but obviously I don't know whether the vibrations of this can be felt when on the tracks.

Condolences to the families of those involved.

Im a look out. Its difficult to feel the vibrations from a train till its right by you where your standing.

 

[edwin_m]

Im a look out. Its difficult to feel the vibrations from a train till its right by you where your standing.

And if someone is using a power tool to tighten the bolts in the track, as in this case, there's no way anyone would detect the vibrations from a train.

 

[GuyGibsonVC]

It seems that this was a case of no Safe System of Work in place, rather than a failure of said system. Culture, management, training and assurance processes have all contributed and it has seemed that the holes in the Swiss Cheese have all lined up for this tragic event.

In terms of access, you usually have loads of staff trying to get on between 0700 - 1500 and then trying to get on from 2200 onwards with a big gap in the middle. Possession times are being squeezed as TOC try to run more trains. Additionally, rosters and the unions would be a major barrier to any change.

The Trackworker Safety Task force was set up last year with great fanfare and I've been involved in a few work streams. Hopefully, there can be a step change in the coming years.

 

[Mag_seven]

The problem with line blocks there a nightmare to accommodate with increased train services, planning needs to be looked at as well.

Often you’ll get blocks taken over half a dozen signal sections, when the work is taking place in only one. By the time one train has cleared the next is due or you can only give the crew a matter of minutes.

Either there planned to long or just piss poor, blocking limits at one or both ends blocking key points so you have to take the block back to get trains moving, when if a little thought was used limits could be approach or beyond XYZ points.

Another favourite is having blocks booked at 0600 when the service is starting up, when there’s no been any trains for the previous 5 hours!

From the other side I can testify that when using line blocks for project surveys it was often a nightmare trying to get blocks that you have booked in good faith using the services of the Green Zone Access Coordinator (GZAC) actually granted. Despite having all the paperwork in place the signaller would still often refuse to grant the agreed block due to things such as late running trains etc. This would cost NR significant amounts of money in terms of "frustrated access" as suppliers would have to be sent out again to do the required work and the original supplier shift that NR had paid for would be lost. All in all the line block system seems very inefficient to me especially for project work.

 

[4069]

I’ve got a memory of reading about a similar incident in the early 1980s in which track workers were hit by a train in the South or possibly West Yorkshire areas. I’ve looked at the Railway Archive site and not seen anything that looks like this incident so my memory may be failing me. Workers were using power tools and the lookout was supposed to cut power when a train approached. Something went wrong, obviously. Can anyone with a better memory or access to information confirm whether I’m right?

RAILWAY ACCIDENT report on the fatal accident involving a permanent gang on 8th December 1987 near Methley Junction,: Amazon.co.uk: DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT: Books

Buy RAILWAY ACCIDENT report on the fatal accident involving a permanent gang on 8th December 1987 near Methley Junction, by DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT (ISBN: ) from Amazon's Book Store. Everyday low prices and free delivery on eligible orders.

www.amazon.co.uk

 

[krus_aragon]

RAILWAY ACCIDENT report on the fatal accident involving a permanent gang on 8th December 1987 near Methley Junction,: Amazon.co.uk: DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT: Books

Buy RAILWAY ACCIDENT report on the fatal accident involving a permanent gang on 8th December 1987 near Methley Junction, by DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT (ISBN: ) from Amazon's Book Store. Everyday low prices and free delivery on eligible orders.

www.amazon.co.uk

Seems that accident has a page on the Railways Archive, but the report's not yet been uploaded (https://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docsummary.php?docID=6144)

 

[Tom Quinne]

From the other side I can testify that when using line blocks for project surveys it was often a nightmare trying to get blocks that you have booked in good faith using the services of the Green Zone Access Coordinator (GZAC) actually granted. Despite having all the paperwork in place the signaller would still often refuse to grant the agreed block due to things such as late running trains etc. This would cost NR significant amounts of money in terms of "frustrated access" as suppliers would have to be sent out again to do the required work and the original supplier shift that NR had paid for would be lost. All in all the line block system seems very inefficient to me especially for project work.

The wasted money isn’t something that is lost on me, at my previous location rhe GZAC planners were on actually on the ops floor with us. They could ask us in real time the best blocking points, the refusal and mistake rate was very very low.

 

[Tomnick]

From the other side I can testify that when using line blocks for project surveys it was often a nightmare trying to get blocks that you have booked in good faith using the services of the Green Zone Access Coordinator (GZAC) actually granted. Despite having all the paperwork in place the signaller would still often refuse to grant the agreed block due to things such as late running trains etc. This would cost NR significant amounts of money in terms of "frustrated access" as suppliers would have to be sent out again to do the required work and the original supplier shift that NR had paid for would be lost. All in all the line block system seems very inefficient to me especially for project work.

In my experience, the GZAC never considered the traffic levels when approving blocks. I once had a gang turn up to work in a mile-long tunnel, in the middle of an 11 mile signal section on the one week in six when overnight freight trains (lots of them) were diverted that way. Not a hope! I worked out that I should be able to get them on for forty minutes in the quietest part of the night, if everything ran to time, but that'd barely give them time to get to/from where they needed to work, let alone get any work done. They'd driven for about two hours to get there too. Hopefully things have improved in that respect now.

 

[ainsworth74]

Seems that accident has a page on the Railways Archive, but the report's not yet been uploaded (https://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docsummary.php?docID=6144)

Could be wrong but I don't think they're the same accident. You've linked to one from 13 December 1878 and the Amazon link is for one on 8 December 1987

 

[Cricketer8for9]

@4069 and Krus_aragon. Thanks. Maybe a six of of ten for my memory, right region, right type of incident, wrong year. Or maybe not depending on the link.

 

[theageofthetra]

There needs to be a serious discussion about access to the railway for engineering.

Saying that's it all needs line block or Possessions is fine. But fatigue of moving most work to nights also has huge safety risks that need to be considered. The closest I've come to serious injury on the railway is definitely driving while fatigued after shifts. Do we need to provide engineers better access if we say no more red zone? Some inspections I do you just wouldn't be able to do at night, you can't pick out earthwork and drainage features properly in the dark.

It's a really hard one this. The report makes for sombre reading and hopefully it will lead to positive change.

Fatigue, as most who work in our industry know, is one of the biggest concerns and one that no one seems to have any interest in resolving or dealing with--though possibly reduced services post Covid could help.
Unfortunately I don't have the link but a woman was jailed the other week for causing serious injuries to a child pedestrian after she fell asleep at the wheel. She had a history of sleep issues and this case had 4 hours of sleep when the accident occurred. Bet there are plenty of railway workers driving after that sort of length sleep.

Unfortunately I fear we are (literally) sleepwalking into another Clapham Junction over fatigue.

 

[Mag_seven]

Bet there are plenty of railway workers driving after that sort of length sleep.

Three rail workers were killed in a road accident on the M4 a few years back. They weren't wearing seatbelts but there must have been a reason why the van collided with a lorry in the first place - that might have been because the driver was fatigued.

Network Rail hauls in Carillion over tragic M4 crash

Safety crackdown after four fatalities in 2014 from failure to wear safety belts

www.constructionenquirer.com

Five Carillion track workers from South Wales were on their way home in the early hours from a shift at Reading.

Their white Transit van collided with the back of a lorry on the hard shoulder near Chippenham, leading to the deaths of three of them.

The men who died are understood not to have been wearing seat belts in the back of the van.

 

[BrianW]

There needs to be a serious discussion about access to the railway for engineering.

Saying that's it all needs line block or Possessions is fine. But fatigue of moving most work to nights also has huge safety risks that need to be considered. The closest I've come to serious injury on the railway is definitely driving while fatigued after shifts. Do we need to provide engineers better access if we say no more red zone? Some inspections I do you just wouldn't be able to do at night, you can't pick out earthwork and drainage features properly in the dark.

It's a really hard one this. The report makes for sombre reading and hopefully it will lead to positive change.

I'm not a track worker, but please read on-

I found the report a gripping read. It said a lot about issues raised in this thread, eg culture, paperwork, adherence or changes to agreed procedures. Also lack of training, lack of 'challenge', doing work not only not needed but out of date years ago. The risk of technology increasing people's 'tolerance' levels. People at the depot (managers?) not checking up, submitting useless or inaccurate reports. The person preparing the safety plan is supposed to also be on site. Pilot projects have been run and evaluated to see if improvement resulted.

The report clearly states it's about 'learning lessons' and improving practice, and not placing blame. I dare say a number of people will be feeling some part in what happened, and what might have elsewhere.

Another thread features someone wanting to become a COSS- and I ask why. Is it the money, the 'power'?

I also detect here a certain disdain for those in management trying to 'get it right'. It's no good being sorry after the event. I'm feeling awful for the surviving trackworker TW3, traumatised, and the other half of the team of six, watching powerless, and their colleagues, friends and families.

I reinforce what Yorkshire Bear says: The report makes sombre reading and hopefully it will lead to positive change.

 

[TSG]

Another thread features someone wanting to become a COSS- and I ask why. Is it the money, the 'power'?

Well, that ones pretty easy to answer. To progress beyond the lowest operative grades and pay rates COSS is, not unreasonably, a prerequisite. What is the point of leading the work of others if you need somebody else there to take charge of worker safety. In practice you can't work alone without holding COSS either (most people are qualified as Individual Working Alone by virtue of holding COSS). I would think a large proportion of PTS holders will have COSS.

 

[Class 170101]

There needs to be a serious discussion about access to the railway for engineering.

Saying that's it all needs line block or Possessions is fine. But fatigue of moving most work to nights also has huge safety risks that need to be considered. The closest I've come to serious injury on the railway is definitely driving while fatigued after shifts. Do we need to provide engineers better access if we say no more red zone? Some inspections I do you just wouldn't be able to do at night, you can't pick out earthwork and drainage features properly in the dark.

It's a really hard one this. The report makes for sombre reading and hopefully it will lead to positive change.

But a serious discussion also needs to be had about how access is used. Access should be used wisely and from where I am sitting planning around the blocks NR would have a hard time convincing me it is anywhere full utilisation, particularly in scenarios where an all day maintenance block has been given up early and not just on the odd occasion. More access during evenings and weekends is probably not the time we need to be granting blocks especially if he railway has to switch from focussing on the commuter to gaining the trust of leisure users to maintain revenue streams. If the railway wants to continue blocking the line for one major task at a time we won't have a railway to maintain.

 

[YorkshireBear]

But a serious discussion also needs to be had about how access is used. Access should be used wisely and from where I am sitting planning around the blocks NR would have a hard time convincing me it is anywhere full utilisation, particularly in scenarios where an all day maintenance block has been given up early and not just on the odd occasion. More access during evenings and weekends is probably not the time we need to be granting blocks especially if he railway has to switch from focussing on the commuter to gaining the trust of leisure users to maintain revenue streams. If the railway wants to continue blocking the line for one major task at a time we won't have a railway to maintain.

As an Rail engineer I fully agree with this. Every block should have maximum utilisation from every perspective.

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

This report exposes that despite best part of 10 years of track worker safety initiatives there are underlying issues with compliance and culture that have not been addressed despite numerous previous RAIB reports into fatalities and serious injuries. Also ORR seem to be questioning how much further safety can be improved given the current direction of travel. For me the report also illuminates the difficult task workers have at the front line in getting the job done when wrapped up in the cotton wool of 019 which is why managers turn a blind eye to the failures to comply with it. Im not so sure its fits for purpose after this period of time but these recommendations are about improving what already exists rather than a wholesale re-evaluation of how the safety of track workers is achieved. Yet the reality is 019 generates massive amounts paperwork for what are basically repetitive tasks in the maintenance environment versus the unique tasks that project and renewals work requires where its more appropriate. Surely an in house trained and competent workforce ought to be able to operate more simply in its own geographical area with an 019 lite approach.

Paperwork has become the problem not the solution. i.e paperwork does not keep people safe. People do.

Ultimately though the fact that RAIB note that they've never had to investigate any similar incidents on DLR or TfL infrastructure because they keep people and trains apart should be a challenge to NR as to why they can't do the same. Granted both run intensive services so limited opportunities for line blockages and of course the tunnel/tube are inaccessible with trains running. However, they operate services much later and earlier than much of the mainline network so have even more limited access opportunities but manage to maintain the network.

Remember subsequent this there has been another tragic fatality at Roade earlier this year so its about time NR gets DofT buy in that if it really cares about track worker safety in the 21st Century the time has come to separate people from trains for all routine tasks and its reserved for incident and emergency response only.

 

[theageofthetra]

As an Rail engineer I fully agree with this. Every block should have maximum utilisation from every perspective.

I never understand why when there's an engineering block, foliage work, tree trimming etc isn't undertaken at the same time.

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

I never understand why when there's an engineering block, foliage work, tree trimming etc isn't undertaken at the same time.

One of the issues i encountered especially on weekend blocks is that they are invariably for project work and lead by contractors who are risk adverse and don't want the responsibility for anyone else especially as the finger will get pointed at them when it overruns or there incidents or some residual issue that reveals itself in traffic. NR need to realise access is the most precious commodity and take responsibility for planning the works within the possession to ensure maximum utilsation. The Schedule 4 mechanism was designed to incentivise this and maybe in a privatised world it might have worked but in the current world its just built into NRs budget for a control period to pay the TOCs off.