Note that Boeing wasn't planning a further 737 generation aircraft, but airlines practically demanded it as a response to Airbus announcing the A320neo. Airlines heavily invested in the 737 family didn't want the delay (yet alone the retraining/tooling required) to wait for a 737 replacement to compete with others getting the A320neo.It's all pounds, shillings and pence though (well, dollars and cents!). The Max was a lot cheaper, faster and less risky (no laughing at the back) for Boeing to develop than a brand new airframe. It sold exceptionally well before the crashes showing that it was the correct decision in commercial terms.
Yeah, for me it's vastly more interesting from the point-of-view of the corporate culture that led to the design flaws (and the governance culture that led the FAA to approve it) rather than the specific flaws in the 737 MAX itself. With all of its developmental pressures, does the 787 have internally known hidden flaws? Because if it's a corporate culture problem, then that's a real risk even without the old airframe design.My own feeling is that what lead to the MAX situation is, one way or another, the result of a series of decisions that reflect a particular corporate culture at Boeing.
Unfortunately, that means that I am now inherently less comfortable (although admittedly it's all about degrees, and I'd favour a competent Boeing operator over an incompetent Airbus one) flying a newer Boeing product than I am an Airbus one.
And much has been written about how Boeing's culture changed since the McDonnell Douglas acquisition, and all of it for the worse.