Thameslink ‘Core’ major disruption (04/04)

[Supercoss]

Signage at Blackfriars supports this

 

[infobleep]

They put in Redhill to Horsham shuttles which worked well for the first two hours but then fell apart and didn't recover through to end of service. Hopefully the Bognor trains stopped additionally although that's hit and miss in my experience. I'd never risk waiting at Littlehaven during disruption.

I was fortunate to get one of the Redhill to Horsham shuttles.

This did lead me to wonder something.

I was on the delayed 18:07 Redhill to Horsham. When I started it wasn't showing on the online departure board.

When I checked later in the evening it was but the first two stations had no report against them.

So when a train is entered into the system after it has already departed, are the previous station stopped at always reported as no report? I'm assuming so.

I then ended up on a train to Ore who's stopping pattern was:
London Victoria, East Croydon, Horley, Three Bridges, Balcome, Haywards Heath and then stations to Ore.

I wonder when was the last time a train stopped at every station between Horley and Haywards Heath except Gatwick Airport. This is normally a non-stop service between Horley and Haywards Heath.

Despite the extra 2 stood, it made up a minute of lost time. This shows how slow it normally is. It follows a stopping train in none disruption times.

 

[choochoochoo]

As 700s can't run in multiple and drivers are not trained to couple or uncouple them ( as not required in ' normal' operation ) a driver manager or fitter is required to attend.
A "push out" has been done a few times with unit mechanically coupled but not electrically ( electrical connection latched back) and ' rescue ' air pipe connected.View attachment 112548View attachment 112549

Why can 700s not run in multiple but 717s can ? Aren't they pretty much the same train ? Also could a 717 rescue a 700 ? or Vice Versa ?

 

[Surreytraveller]

Why can 700s not run in multiple but 717s can ? Aren't they pretty much the same train ? Also could a 717 rescue a 700 ? or Vice Versa ?

700s are 8 or 12 coach trains. So a minimum of 16 coaches if two are coupled together.

 

[aleggatta]

Is there any real reason (apart from the questionable no extension to third rail) that third rail couldn't simply be extended northwards to the next multi platform station? it could be argued that if power changeover were to happen in a multi platform station there might be some mitigation to pan strikes, and if the wires were removed to allow a big enough gap on the north side at least you might be able to have a controlled run off and time for the over height to take effect.

 

[SynthD]

There isn’t a multi platform station before the route splits.

If you mean multiple platforms meant for the same direction, that is. I think the whole core is bidirectional.

 

[Western Sunset]

As the core is, well, core to Thameslink, and as the above post intimates that it's bidirectional, could the OHLE be made independent over each line so that if it fails over one track, the other is still useable. Just a thought.

 

[choochoochoo]

700s are 8 or 12 coach trains. So a minimum of 16 coaches if two are coupled together.

Very true, that's a valid operational reason they do not run in multiple. But in theory could they technically run as multiples (probably with a couple of pans down to reduce OLE burden) should the need ever arise ?

Or is 700-700 coupling for rescue purposes only ?

 

[aleggatta]

so you take the DC through the route split and have two separate changeover locations? If they could do power changeover on the move (something which must be feasible as LO do it) then you could quite easily do it away from an area that has the potential for so many other things going on to distract you from such a disruptive mistake. Even if you had say auto changeover in the Canal Tunnels and on approach to Kentish Town on the move, at least then if one route is blocked for whatever reason its not complete endgame for the train service through the core with the other route being available. Also with it being an automatic changeover via baliase it wouldn't really be a distraction for a driver, and there would not need to be the thought process if anything needs to visit Smithfield sidings.

Alternatively, do away with the two Smithfield sidings or only allow units to turn around at Blackfriars when coming out of them (limiting this to an end of service operation)

 

[zwk500]

As the core is, well, core to Thameslink, and as the above post intimates that it's bidirectional

The whole core is indeed Bi-Directional (from Blackfriars to Canal Tunnel Junction and just south of Kentish Town), and there are a number of crossovers within the core to permit rerouting, which were made use of last night to release the trapped trains. See https://www.opentraintimes.com/maps/signalling/tlk_core

could the OHLE be made independent over each line so that if it fails over one track, the other is still useable. Just a thought.

The OHLE in this instance is technically not an Overhead Line but an Overhead Rigid Conductor Bar for each track. Each is mounted independently to the tunnel roof so the chance of one bringing down the other is very small. The OLE didn't fail, it was damaged by a pan that was never meant to be up.

 

[Western Sunset]

The whole core is indeed Bi-Directional (from Blackfriars to Canal Tunnel Junction and just south of Kentish Town), and there are a number of crossovers within the core to permit rerouting, which were made use of last night to release the trapped trains. See https://www.opentraintimes.com/maps/signalling/tlk_core

The OHLE in this instance is technically not an Overhead Line but an Overhead Rigid Conductor Bar for each track. Each is mounted independently to the tunnel roof so the chance of one bringing down the other is very small. The OLE didn't fail, it was damaged by a pan that was never meant to be up.

So if the OH Rigid Bar wasn't damaged in one direction, why was the core section totally closed? Or have I missed something?

 

[AM9]

Very true, that's a valid operational reason they do not run in multiple. But in theory could they technically run as multiples (probably with a couple of pans down to reduce OLE burden) should the need ever arise ?

Or is 700-700 coupling for rescue purposes only ?

They certainly can run as pairs of units and 24 car 700s have been tested through the core. Although that was to confirm that their intended recovery function would work, where one unit was pushing/pulling the other, especially up the 1:29 grades in the core, I presume that the consist could work fully powered if the fault was in the leading cab of one. How the signalling could cope with a 480m long train would be interesting as sections are very short in much of the core. The OLE would be OK with a theoretical 10MW load, but I doubt the 3rd rail would be happy with a 6MW one.

 

[westcoaster]

Because the offending train was straddling the junction.

There seems to be some confusion around the rigid conductor bar.
There is two section of it in the core, with only one being live. The first section is from Canal tunnel junction (St Pancras low level) through to the old kings cross Thameslink which is live. The second section is dead and acts as a run off out of the core ( if the pans are left up this stops them hitting the tunnel roof and damaging them.) It's only 80M or so long.
The short dead section does work as intended, when driven off with the pans up they raise to their over height position and drop (no snapping/folding over them selves like 319's used to).

 

[zwk500]

So if the OH Rigid Bar wasn't damaged in one direction, why was the core section totally closed? Or have I missed something?

Initially the train failed across both lines. Later both platforms at Blackfriars were blocked to allow the pantograph to be removed safely.

 

[Western Sunset]

Getting rid of Smithfield Sidings might be the answer, as its value appears marginal at best. There seems to be a bit of "wrong line running" (yes, I know it's bidirectional but access/egress looks convoluted) which must reduce core capacity when trains turnback/stable there.

 

[zwk500]

Getting rid of Smithfield Sidings might be the answer, as its value appears marginal at best. There seems to be a bit of "wrong line running" (yes, I know it's bidirectional but access/egress looks convoluted) which must reduce core capacity when trains turnback/stable there.

It's been talked about as I believe you can't get a 12-car in there and as you say it requires an awkward move to get out of them. However abolishing sidings that presumably had a reason to remain because the driver put the pan up when they shouldn't seems a tad extreme. The other stabling options would presumably be Hornsey or Cricklewood, maybe with 1 train left at Herne Hill turnback.

 

[Western Sunset]

I'm trying to get my head around as to why the pan would be raised anyway. Was the unit reversing at City Thameslink to go north? But then it wouldn't have blocked both lines. A tad confused.

 

[zwk500]

I'm trying to get my head around as to why the pan would be raised anyway. Was the unit reversing at City Thameslink to go north? But then it wouldn't have blocked both lines. A tad confused.

As I understand it, the pan was raised in error. 5V55 was planned to go to Blackfriars. The schedules is labelled as VSTP in RTT, indicating it was a late-notice alteration to the plan. This may have increased the chance of the driver making the mistake.

 

[Class2ldn]

It is odd thats for sure, could have been turning back at city and then told otherwise and had to go SB and forgot to change it back, as a driver on that route I must admit I'm not sure how it's happened if its definitely come out the sidings as if you were going straight through you'd just chuck it in dc mode until you got to blackfriars to make sure , well I would anyway, not entirely necessary but belts and braces and all that.
Either way the driver will be feeling like dirt so let's not forget them in all this, mistakes happen and lessons will hopefully be learnt .

 

[387star]

It is odd thats for sure, could have been turning back at city and then told otherwise and had to go SB and forgot to change it back, as a driver on that route I must admit I'm not sure how it's happened if its definitely come out the sidings as if you were going straight through you'd just chuck it in dc mode until you got to blackfriars to make sure , well I would anyway, not entirely necessary but belts and braces and all that.
Either way the driver will be feeling like dirt so let's not forget them in all this, mistakes happen and lessons will hopefully be learnt .

Definitely a challenging route to drive on though and as mentioned it's nuts that smithfield is dc only but there must not be clearance for AC wires there...

 

[Western Sunset]

I'm not all that clear about current-day operations, but back in the day, I thought the changeover from DC to AC (and vice versa) always took place whilst the unit was stationary at Farringdon. Are there now different locations where this can happen; not just at Farringdon? Are Smithfield Sdgs equipped with both 3rd rail and OHLE?

PS Can a 700 run on 3rd rail with the pan up? Surely there'd be electrical/mechanical interlocking to prevent that?

 

[zwk500]

I'm not all that clear about current-day operations, but back in the day, I thought the changeover from DC to AC (and vice versa) always took place whilst the unit was stationary at Farringdon. Are there now different locations where this can happen; not just at Farringdon? Are Smithfield Sdgs equipped with both 3rd rail and OHLE?

Northbound changeover regularly takes place at City TL, Southbound at Farringdon. If the changeover should fail, this allows the driver to contact the signaller and arrange for trains to be held, then advance to the next station to change direction and return to the system that works.

 

[Western Sunset]

Northbound changeover regularly takes place at City TL, Southbound at Farringdon. If the changeover should fail, this allows the driver to contact the signaller and arrange for trains to be held, then advance to the next station to change direction and return to the system that works.

Cheers; thanks. Didn't know that.

 

[zwk500]

Are Smithfield Sdgs equipped with both 3rd rail and OHLE?

No, they are 3rd rail only. So a driver heading north would have to leave on 3rd rail then change to OLE in the Platform at City TL. A driver heading south would be on 3rd rail all the way out.

PS Can a 700 run on 3rd rail with the pan up? Surely there'd be electrical/mechanical interlocking to prevent that?

This was discussed upthread, although I'm not sure what the conclusion was! I think it only takes power from one source but can run with both pickups extended.

 

[Western Sunset]

Thanks again. But if heading north, the unit wouldn't have had to cross to the southbound line. So presumably (in this case) the unit was heading south so wouldn't have needed to raise the pan at all. Sorry for asking the obvious questions...

 

[Class2ldn]

No, they are 3rd rail only. So a driver heading north would have to leave on 3rd rail then change to OLE in the Platform at City TL. A driver heading south would be on 3rd rail all the way out.

This was discussed upthread, although I'm not sure what the conclusion was! I think it only takes power from one source but can run with both pickups extended.

The shoes are not retractable on 700s which might be why there's confusion, unlike a 319 they are not active as such unless in dc mode

Thanks again. But if heading north, the unit wouldn't have had to cross to the southbound line. So presumably (in this case) the unit was heading south so wouldn't have needed to raise the pan at all. Sorry for asking the obvious questions...

It shouldn't have put it up so its a bit strange if its come out the sidings and gone south

 

[ExRes]

I may well be in the minority but I see no reason for changes to the infrastructure when the fault, unless something exceptional took place with the unit itself, is solely down to driver error, if you sign the route then you must be fully aware of the requirements in that area, back along I used to take 325s on the Willesden - Tonbridge route, my route knowledge along with lineside notices made me fully aware of the impending AC to DC changeover, nothing else, especially infrastructure expense, was required

 

[dosxuk]

I may well be in the minority but I see no reason for changes to the infrastructure when the fault, unless something exceptional took place with the unit itself, is solely down to driver error, if you sign the route then you must be fully aware of the requirements in that area, back along I used to take 325s on the Willesden - Tonbridge route, my route knowledge along with lineside notices made me fully aware of the impending AC to DC changeover, nothing else, especially infrastructure expense, was required

Surely if there are sensible, affordable, changes that can be made to the infrastructure, which would reduce the impact of a driver error, they should be implemented.

Nobody answered my question above about if there was an expected occaision when a unit starting from standstill should have the pan extended but be taking power from DC - but if not, then why not some interlock to prevent this, or even a software update to sound an alarm in the cab in those circumstances. As this appears to be happening when drivers are asked to do something out of the ordinary - there should be something that helps them not make a mistake. These are modern units, with modern capabilities - adding software alerts or restrictions should be trivial - that should be able to help the drivers - especially when the consequences of getting it wrong are a multi-hour core shutdown.

In many industries, including much of the rail industry, technology is used to prevent people from making mistakes. It seems in this case some people just want to blame the person rather than asking "why didn't the technology prevent the driver from having the opportunity to make a mistake" or "why didn't the technology reduce the consequences of the driver making a mistake".

 

[Western Sunset]

I may well be in the minority but I see no reason for changes to the infrastructure when the fault, unless something exceptional took place with the unit itself, is solely down to driver error, if you sign the route then you must be fully aware of the requirements in that area, back along I used to take 325s on the Willesden - Tonbridge route, my route knowledge along with lineside notices made me fully aware of the impending AC to DC changeover, nothing else, especially infrastructure expense, was required

To a point. But as "The Core" is such a vital part of Thameslink, I'd have thought they'd need a belt and braces approach to ensure things didn't go wrong, even if there were a driver's error. Think of all the palaver at Cardiff Central to prevent an IET heading west with its pan up, with balises to ensure drivers have to use diesel power (with pan down) to access the electrically-wired Brickyard Sdgs.

 

[ComUtoR]

Surely if there are sensible, affordable, changes that can be made to the infrastructure, which would reduce the impact of a driver error, they should be implemented.

The cost ratio will be insanely high. If you counted the number of trains doing a changeover, taking units out the Sidings, and generally making these moves on a daily basis. The number of incidents is a teeny tiny fraction. How much are you prepared to pay for it ?

In many industries, including much of the rail industry, technology is used to prevent people from making mistakes. It seems in this case some people just want to blame the person rather than asking "why didn't the technology prevent the driver from having the opportunity to make a mistake" or "why didn't the technology reduce the consequences of the driver making a mistake".

Because it was, or at least appears to be, Driver error. No amount of technology is going to design that out. Improvements could be made for sure but again, at what cost ?

Also, the technology still won't prevent an incident. So far most of the proposals will simply move the incident elsewhere.

As far as blaming the Driver. Nobody really know what happened unless they were the Driver themself or they are involved in the investigation. What will happen is that any learnings from the investigation will be passed down and acted upon.

You would be surprised how effective a simple rebrief can be.

It's very difficult for an outsider looking in to really understand why these incidents happen or what is actually involved during the investigations. Rather than ask why technology didn't prevent the incident or how can the incident be 'solved' We need to ask the most important question first...